Tactical Vignettes (merged from several topics)

Same as the TDG´s (Tactical Decision Games) for Marines, the Doctrine Division of the U.S. Army Armor Center has developed a lot of tactical vignettes for the armor platoon and coy leader.

A lot of these scenarios make good bases for wargame scenarios for PBM or CPXes (I used a lot of them in TacOps scenario development) and I stumbled over a small collection of them today.

Here an example for people who have never seen one (Tactical Map Symbols explained here: http://www.warandtactics.com/smf/the-military-facts-procedures-drills-tactics-traditions-qa/nato-military-map-symbols-explained/):



Tactical Vignette 97-1

“The Battle of Durango Valley”




A nice collection of Tactical Vignettes (with solutions), all in .pdf format, can be found here, all from Armor Magazine:

http://www.knox.army.mil/armormag/vignettes.htm

Rattler

Rattler,

What do you think about setting this up the old tacops cpx style?

Who dares to write orders here?
Preferably two or more players forming a team with different tasks or commands.

Henk

Great find Rattler!

US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC)
W300: Brigade Combat Team Operations Block
W399: Brigade Combat Team Battle Command Exercise

Exercise Advance Sheet
Appendix 4
BREAKOUT FROM ENCIRCLEMENT/CONDUCTING AN ENCIRCLEMENT
Instructor Notes and Student Handouts

1.   INTRODUCTION

The objective of this vignette is to have the students draw conclusions from a problem set that addresses the battle command traits of—
•   Deciding when and how to make adjustments.
•   Assessing and taking risks.
•   Prioritizing and allocating resources for a battalion level operation.

The intent is to “box out” the problem so that students spend their time working the problem, not on analyzing higher headquarters products, generating RFIs, or seeking additional guidance from the notional Commander.  In order to do this, provide students the minimum information required to work their problem while still reflecting doctrinal expectations.

2.   LEADER BEHAVIORS

COMPETENCY:           CONCEPTUAL            2.0
SKILL:            Understanding Systems                   2.2.1
Critical Reasoning                                               2.3.2
Adaptation                                             2.6.1/2.6.2

COMPETENCY:         INFLUENCING            5.0
SKILL:            Decision Making            5.2.1

COMPETENCY:         OPERATING               6.0
SKILL:            Executing               6.2.1
               Assessing               6.3.1

From working this problem, the students should determine that, as future S-3s/XOs, there are situations that require creative and adaptive decision-making. Considerations should include requirements versus the qualifications of the battalion, restrictive terrain, multiple COE threats, and the compression of available reaction time.

3. PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE

The purpose of this exercise is to:

•   Cause students to deal with conflicting reports and to visualize what type and size of enemy they are facing and what he is trying to do, against the capability, requirements, responsibility to their unit.
•   Challenge students to consider time/space/resources inside the unit rather than requesting support external to the higher headquarters.
•   Require students to prioritize activities and scarce resources, sequence activities over time, or describe the risk associated with not doing so.
•   Cause students to consider implications of civilians on a fluid battlefield and subsequent challenges to battle command.

4.  DOCTRINAL REFERENCES:

a.   FM 3-90, Tactics, Jul 01; para D-1 - D-25 (Encirclement).
b.   FM 3-90, Tactics, Jul 01; para D-41 - D-71 (Breakout from Encirclement).
c.   FM 3-90.3, The Mounted Brigade Combat Team; Nov 01.
d.   Modular Brigade Combat Teams: Task Force Modularity White Paper Part III (7/15/04 DRAFT).
e.   Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, V1.0, 8 Oct 04.

5.   VIGNETTE DESCRIPTION

This vignette is designed to have a true thinking and competitive force-on-force exercise with students playing both the Blue Force and the Red Force.  This vignette uses the overarching JTF GAAT setting.  Force ratios are approximately equal allowing instructor focus on the respective students’ decisions rather than the application of one-sided force ratios to analyze the outcome.  Initial Blue Force (2-7 IN) and Red Force (2-643 IN) player battalions’ schemes of maneuver are not set.  The Red Force Brigade Tactical Group (BTG)’s other infantry battalion and two armor battalions, as well as civilians on the battle field and IEDs, are set for movement because that movement may affect the battle’s outcome.  The Blue Force BCT’s other units’ movements will not affect the battle; therefore, they are (theoretically) out of the close fight direct fire zone of operation and cannot be seen.
Since it is possible at this point in the academic year your students will have turned in texts, they will only have electronic references available.  The night before execution, refer your students to the AOWC Reference CD?Publications? FM 3-90? Appendix D for encirclement doctrine applicable to this vignette.
The Blue Force’s 2-7 IN is a Combined Arms Battalion which is part of the 1/3 HBCT.  As a result of intense fighting and decisions made by commanders at various levels, TF 2-7 IN is by itself, well out in front of the entire 4ID and other Coalition Forces who have withdrawn to the northwest.  Blue intelligence and information is sketchy.  They know Red Force attacked Blue Force with specific efforts against US units the previous night; OPREPS show intense hand-to-hand fighting with tenuous situations that compelled some Blue commanders to commit reserves to facilitate unit withdrawal and new FLOT establishment further to the northwest.  The new defensive line will be the last organized defensive line in the Imishli - Sabirabad area to re-establish zone security and help protect the Division Rear.  TF 2-7 IN is ordered to break out from an impending encirclement and move to BP SAFEGUARD to protect the southern exposed flank of 4ID’s counterattack that its parent BCT will initially lead.  The counterattack will commence on order within 24 hours along AXIS IRONHORSE to envelop attacking Red units.  Blue Force students should develop a plan to conduct the breakout attack, move to the battle position (leaving nothing behind in the original location), and prepare to support the 4ID’s counterattack.  The Blue Force Commander’s tactical dilemmas are: (a) how much time to spend locating the encircling Red Force, (b) how to organize the break out force, and (c) whether to breakout and move to the defensive position to protect 4ID’s flank, or attack the Red Force from their tactical rear.  

Red Force is 2-643 IN.  The battalion is part of a balanced heavy BTG consisting of two armor battalions and two mechanized infantry battalions.  The Red BTG’s mission is to defeat Blue mounted forces between the Araks and Kura Rivers in order to facilitate the seizure of Attack Position SLINGSHOT along the Kura from which to either attack the Blue Division or defend against the Blue Division’s counterattack.  The original mission for 2-643 IN was to help clear the zone up to the attack position for the armor battalions, then to follow and support the exploitation attack, or prepare to defend a possible Blue Force counterattack.  The original mission is temporarily abated when 2-643 IN is ordered to find and destroy Blue Force remnants still in the movement zone in order to protect/facilitate the movement and passage of the Red Force tank battalions located to the south.  The Red Force students should develop a plan to move to contact, develop the situation, and conduct either a hasty attack or an encirclement of Blue Force to prevent their ability to affect the Red BTG’s operation.  There are a variety of forces available to the Red commander. He has the flexibility to change the task organization and the task and purpose of subordinate units.  The Red Force Commander’s tactical dilemmas are: (a) conduct a hasty attack of the Blue Force with an ill-defined “enemy situation,” or (b) develop the situation so as to encircle the Blue Force and either prevent his movement, or attack the Blue Force so as to prevent it affecting the Red BTG’s movement to ATK SLINGSHOT and subsequent operations.
The vignette’s underpinnings are: (a) if you know the capabilities and limitations of the enemy's weapon systems, they can be defeated on the battlefield, plus (b) there is a fine balance commanders face in displaying personal initiative within their next higher commander’s intent or following specified orders.  Additionally, this vignette introduces or refreshes students’ understanding of the tactics of “encirclement” and “breakout from encirclement.”  These two operations were not studied in depth during the academic year, but today's Contemporary Operating Environment battlefield clearly indicates the need for this understanding.

6.   INSTRUCTOR NOTES

a.   Blue:
?   No Army attack aviation is available; the units are repositioning to support the counterattack and cannot be employed deep to help TF 2-7 IN.
?   Students should not count on any CAS.
?   Only the Paladin battery and the mortar platoon within their perimeter are available for traditional fire support.  Because of a major communications outage, the parent battalion of the Paladin battery cannot be contacted directly or indirectly—the battalion headquarters or the communications node may have been overrun.
?   2-7 IN has access to limited MLRS rocket fire from a platoon of two launchers pushed forward with limited security; the MLRS battery has no re-load capability once the rockets are expended.

b.   Red:
?   No rotary or fix winged CAS support is available.  Blue ADA is and has been effective.
?   Red artillery is limited to the battalion’s 120mm mortars and one battalion of 152mm SP artillery “played off the board” with limited ammunition.  This situation reflects that Red artillery is being reduced by effective US counterfire.


7.   CONDUCT OF THE VIGNETTE
   
Blue students’ scenarios are built to clearly indicate their battalion is the farthest forward (southern) US unit.  Though probed and reconnoitered, TF 2-7 IN is intact.  After midnight, a friendly Paladin battery roared into TF 2-7 IN battalion’s position, escaping intensive ground combat in their former position.  The commander reported truck-mounted infantry and BMPs to the east plus inability to get his parent unit to respond to his reports.  The evening LOGPAC, scheduled to arrive at 2000 hours, does not arrive in the infantry battalion’s position until 0330 hours.  The commander reports the rear’s situation (to the northwest) is chaotic—random engagements of high volume rifle/mortar fire and IED, plus a great number of displaced civilians in vehicles and on foot.  NGO’s are evacuating compounds and moving uncoordinated convoys from multiple locations.  The LOGPAC had to fight to get to 2-7 IN’s position.

TF 2-7 IN is ordered to conduct a breakout attack from its current location, and then secure BP SAFEGUARD to the southwest in order to protect the Division’s flank during its turning movement as it conducts a rapid counterattack along AXIS IRONHORSE.  The Division’s attack is initially led by the battalion’s parent BCT to clear the routes, allowing the forward passage of lines of another BCT as the Division’s main effort for the attack on enemy forces to the north of Salyany.  TF 2-7 IN is ordered to start the breakout NLT 60 minutes from order receipt so as not to become enveloped and/or decisively engaged by rapidly moving Red Force.

Red students’ scenarios are built to clearly indicate their battalion is the farthest eastern battalion of the Red BTG trying to move to the northwest to occupy ATK SLINGSHOT from which to either continue the attack into an ill-prepared Blue Force, or defend against the Blue Force counterattack.  Supported by both conventional and unconventional Red Forces, a Blue Force unit has been found with the potential to spoil the Red Force movement to ATK SLINGSHOT.

The Red Force’s 2-643 IN is ordered to temporarily divert from its original plan of occupying ATK SLINGSHOT, take charge of the Red units in contact with Blue Force, and find/fix/destroy the Blue Force unit so it does not interfere with the Red Force’s occupation of the attack position; however, 2-643 IN must also be prepared to participate in the Red BTG’s attack.  Shortly after midnight, a Blue Force self-propelled field artillery unit was found south of Pushkino by elements of 3-842 IN and immediately attacked.  After heavy fighting, in which the artillery pieces leveled their tubes and fought like tanks, the Red platoon lost contact with the Blue artillery unit because fire and smoke in the Blue position obscured their withdrawal from the Red Force.  The Red BTG Headquarters is beginning to receive reports through the Red Division from Red Special Operations Forces that numerous Blue Force and NGO convoys are moving in the Red BTG’s area of operations.  The Red Special Forces and Red partisan elements are interdicting convoys that are identified as military in nature.  Numerous SAPA elements are reporting Blue Force units seen or found south of Narivmanovka and Novotroitskoya (their two local safe havens and re-supply points); teams are out to locate, and report or attack Blue Force as appropriate.  

Force ratios are approximately equal allowing instructor focus on the respective students’ decisions rather than the application of one-sided force ratios to analyze the outcome.  Initial Blue and Red battalions’ schemes of maneuver are not set – students will need every bit of 60 minutes to conduct their hasty analyses, make decisions, and issue orders.  The focus is not developing the optimal COA, but rapid decision making from a “base plan” based on imperfect information.  Applying the “1/3 – 2/3 Rule,” student commanders could use up to 30 minutes analyzing information, determining anticipated decisions and what information requirements are needed to make those decisions.  Instructors should suggest that students refer often to the electronic “MCOO” (i.e. terrain map) to help visualize the simulation’s terrain effects on tactical operations.  Instructors should strongly encourage students to start “issuing orders” (i.e. ‘pucking moves’) to units within their control NLT 20 minutes into the PE, and force the simulation to start NLT 60 minutes into the PE.  If either student commander completes “issuing orders” before the 60 minute preparation period is completed, the instructor should intercede and start the simulation.  Turns should run in 5 minute movement increments, stopped, students allowed to modify existing orders for a limited time (suggested as not more than 2 minutes).  Stop the vignette and conduct the AAR when either the Red or Blue battalion becomes combat ineffective (practice runs indicate approximately 60 minutes of simulations time).  Vignette rehearsals indicate the Red Force computer should be designated as the “host”.

8.   TACTICAL DILEMAS ANTICIPATED

a.   Does Blue focus on the task (breakout), or purpose (get to a battle position protecting the Division’s flank during its counterattack)?
b.   Can Blue fix Red with a minimum force and attack through to their battle position, or must Blue attack Red in order to accomplish its purpose?
c.   How does Blue’s METT-TC hasty analysis account for civilians and mitigate risk to COBs plus deal with IEDs?
d.   Does Red follow the plan and attempt to occupy the attack position while leaving a mechanized infantry company to deal with the Blue Force, or does it focus on the Blue Force?
e.   Does Red’s METT-TC hasty analysis account for civil considerations and mitigate risk to COBs with IEDs emplaced by supporting insurgent forces that have not been coordinated with attacking Red Force?

9.   QUESTIONS TO ASK THE BLUE AND RED FORCES’ COMMANDERS

a.   What do you know?
b.   What do you think you know?
c.   What are your decisions?
d.   What do you need to know to make your decisions and how do you get the information?
e.   When must you make the decisions?
f.   What decisions can you  not change, which can you change?
g.   What are the 2nd and 3rd order effects of your decisions?
h.   What are the concerns/physics of the battlefield and why?
i.   How are concerns/physics influencing your decisions?
j.   What will confirm or deny your vision of the opposing force?

Student Handout
"BREAKOUT"
TASK FORCE BLUE

1.   CURRENT SITUATION
You command TF 2-7 IN, a CAB of 1/3 HBCT, currently attached to 4ID.  You are operating in the southwestern portion of AO 4 within the JTF GAAT area of operations.  During the night, as a result of intense fighting and decisions made by commanders at various levels within the Blue Coalition of Forces, TF 2-7 IN is isolated, well out in front of the entire 4ID and other Coalition Forces who have withdrawn to the northwest.  You’ve consolidated into a 360 degree hasty defense.  Though probed and reconnoitered, TF 2-7 IN is intact:

Tm A (2 Bradleys)                     
1/A/2-7 IN (4 Bradleys)
2/A/2-7 IN (4 Bradleys)      
3/C/2-7 IN (4 tanks)

Tm B (1 Bradley)
1/B/2-7 IN (4 Bradleys)
2/B/2-7 IN (3 Bradleys)
3/D/2-7 IN (3 tanks)

Tm C (2 tanks)
1/C/2-7 IN (4 tanks)
2/C/2-7 IN (3 tanks)
3/A/2-7 IN (3 Bradleys)

Tm D
1/D/2-7 IN (4 tanks)
2/D/2-7 IN (3 tanks)
3/B/2-7 IN (3 Bradleys)

SCT PLT
   4 x M998
   2 x TUAV

MTR PLT (120MM)
   4 x M121

BN SNIPERS
MED PLT (4 x M113)

C/153 EN Co.
6 x ACE
2 x AVLM
1 x M548

1/D/1-44 ADA PLT
   3 x Linebacker

3/14th CM Co (Smoke)
   5 x M113

CBT Trains (LOGPAC included)
   CP: 2 x M998
   UMCP: 2 x M88
   BAS: 2 x M113
      9 - injured SM's
   Decontamination Vehicle: 1
   FSB Support: - MST: 3 x M998
   Ammo Section: 4 x M981 HEMTT (CGO)
   POL Tanker Section: 2 x M984 HEMTT (POL)

you have taken OPCON of:
B/1-17 FA (155mm SP)
   5 x M109A6 Howitzers
   4 x FAASV
 

You, 0400 hours:  “RAIDER X-RAY, this is COTTONBALER 6, SITREP follows: current contact is moderate with battalion-sized mechanized and truck-mounted infantry.  TF defense center of mass is QJ 820695.  Will send unit COMs via FBCB2.  Current slant: M2: 25, M1: 23, Mortar: 4, UAV: 2, Linebacker: 3, ACE: 6, AVLM: 2, and ad hoc OPCON of 5 each M109A6 with FAASVs.  Paladin battery arrived 0230.  Last night’s LOGPAC fought to link up us 30 minutes ago.  Class III and V status Green.  Continuing to defend.  Over.”

1/3 HBCT TOC: “Roger.  Stand by for FRAGO via FBCB2.”
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

HQ, 1/3 HBCT
KHALADZH, AZERBAIJAN
APO AE 09128
080500 APR 2013
HQ, 1/3 HBCT OPORD 1303-04
RAIDER CHALLENGE

FRAGMENTARY ORDER 1

REFERENCES:
a.   Map: TPC F-4C, F-4D, G-4B, G-5A; 1:500,000.
b.   C/JFLCC FRAGMENTARY ORDER 1, 200600 March 2013.
c.   4ID OPORD 69991-13 (WARHORSE CHALLENGE), 270600 March 2013.
d.   1/3 HBCT OPORD 1303-04 (RAIDER CHALLENGE), 010600 April 2013.
 
Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: DELTA (LOCAL)

Task Organization: Unchanged

1. SITUATION

a. General.
(1) See current 4ID INTSUM.
(2) US forces commenced defense operations in AO 4 to defeat Ahurastan (AH) forces attacking into Azerbaijan (AZ).
(3) AH forces have been contained south of the KURA and ARAKS rivers, and have committed the OSC-E exploitation force in an attempt to reach BAKU.

b. Enemy.  Intelligence and information is vague.  During the night of 07 April, AH forces attacked 1/3 HBCT.  Intense fighting in tenuous situations compelled flank brigades to commit reserves facilitating unit withdrawal and new FLOT establishment further to the northwest of PL VIOLET.  The new FLOT will be the last organized set of defenses in the IMISHLI - SABIRABAD area to reestablish zone security to protect the Division Rear Area.  AH forces have isolated TF 2-7 IN in front of the entire 4ID and other Coalition Forces who have withdrawn to the northwest.  TF 2-7 IN is surrounded by a battalion-sized mechanized and truck-mounted infantry unit.  An enemy armor battalion is currently south TF 2-7 and is expected to move through BP SAFEGUARD in approximately 3 hours.
 
c. Friendly.  O/O, 4ID attacks along AXIS IRONHORSE to isolate OSC-E exploitation forces north of SALYANY.  1/4 HBCT defends along the ARAKS River between SAATLY and BIRMAN to fix enemy forces IOT allow attack to develop.  3/4 HBCT defends along ARAKS River between SABIRABAD and ULADZHALY to fix enemy forces IOT allow attack to develop.  4/4 HBCT (ME) follows 1/3 HBCT and attacks to isolate OSC-E exploitation force north of SALYANY.  TF MERLIN AASLT north of PUSHKINO and defends to protect the northern flank of the ME.

d. Environment.  No Change.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

2. MISSION:
O/O, 1/3 HBCT attacks along AXIS IRONHORSE to clear the road network through the canals to facilitate 4/4 HBCT (4ID main effort) attack to SALYANY.

3. EXECUTION
a. Concept of Operations.  NLT 080900 APR 2013, 1/3 HBCT attacks in column along AXIS IRONHORSE to clear road networks through the canals to facilitate 4/4 HBCT’s attack to SALYANY.  5-7 CAV screens to the south to provide early warning, and conducts zone reconnaissance from PL VIOLET through PUSHKINO to provide intelligence on enemy forces and the road network through the canals.  TF 2-7 defends from BP SAFEGUARD to protect the HBCT’s southern flank.  TF 3-69 AR (ME) attacks to clear enemy forces along AXIS IRONHORSE to facilitate forward passage of 4/4 HBCT.  POF: 5-7 CAV, TF 3-69 AR, TF 2-7 IN.  At end state, all enemy is cleared from AXIS IRONHORSE, 4/4 HBCT has successfully passed through to attack towards SALYANY, and 1/3 HBCT is postured to protect follow-on forces during their forward passage.

b. Tasks to subordinate units.  

   5-7 CAV:
   (1) screen HBCT southern flank during movement to provide early warning of threats from south.
   (2) conduct zone reconnaissance from BP SAFEGUARD through PUSHKINO
(3) establish contact with TF 2-7 IN in the south and TF MERLIN in the north.

TF 2-7 IN:
(1) Break out of current encirclement.
(2) Occupy BP SAFEGUARD oriented south.
(3) Defend to defeat AH forces IOT protect the main effort southern flank.

TF 3-69 AR (ME):
(1) attack to clear AH forces from PL VIOLET through PUSHKINO.
  
   c. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) This FRAGO effective for planning immediately upon receipt.
(2) MOPP 2 in effect.
(3) Cdr’s back-brief TF plan at 080530APR (20 minutes from now).


4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Concept of Support. No Change.


5. COMMAND AND CONTROL. No Change.

STUDENT WORKSHEET

Tactical Problem:
Projected - Task Organization:  (STUDENT DEVELOPED BEFORE STARTEX)
Rupture Force:
Follow-and-Assume Force:
Main Body:
Reserve:
Diversionary/Shaping Force:
Rear Guard:
Hasty COA:

Student Handout
"BREAKOUT"
TASK FORCE RED


1.   GENERAL SITUATION
You command 2-643 Mechanized Infantry Battalion (MIB), located north of PUSHKINO.  You are part of a balanced heavy BTG conducting offensive operations near the border with Azerbaijan.  Last night, your BTG’s attacks forced U.S. forces to withdraw to the north and your Division Commander intends to exploit the apparent rout by attacking through Attack Position (ATK) SLINGSHOT, continuing north of the ARAKS River and into the Coalition rear area.  However, a U.S. mechanized force located northeast of BILASUVAR threatens the BTG’s axis of advance to Attack Position (ATK) SLINGSHOT.  Your battalion has been tasked to destroy this force quickly so the attack can proceed.  Your battalion, 2-643 MIB, is currently task organized as follows:    
A Co.  
9 x BMP-1
3 x Type 85-III Tank

B Co.
7 x BMP-1
2 x Type 85-III Tank

C/2-881 MIB (OPCON)
6 x BMP-2
2 x Type 85-III Tank

B/3-881 MIB (OPCON)
7 x BMP-2
3 x Type 85-III Tank
3/B/3-842 Infantry Bde (OPCON)
4 x BTR-80A w/dismounted platoon

Mortar PLT
   4 x 120mm mortars

3 x SAPA teams (supporting the Division)
1st Team – 2 x Tech (1 x 12.7mm MG; 1 x RPG)
2nd Team – 2 x Tech (2 x 12.7mm MG)
3rd Team – 3 x Tech (3 x 12.7mm MG)

You, 0400 hours: “HUSKY X-RAY, this is MAD DOG 6, SITREP follows: current contact is moderate with a roughly battalion-sized U.S. mechanized force vic QJ 810690.  My battalion center of mass location is north of PUSHKINO vic QJ 890770.  SAPA and motorized units OPCON to me have the U.S. force surrounded.  My current slant is: Tanks: 10, BMPs: 29, BTRs: 4, Mortars: 4, Technicals: 7.  Class III and V status Green.  Developing the situation.  Over.”

BTG HQ: “Roger.  Stand by for FRAGO.”  

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

HQ, 643 BTG
CALILABAD, AZERBAIJAN
080400 APR 2013
HQ, 643 BTG OPORD 1303-04
HUSKY ASSAULT

FRAGMENTARY ORDER 1

REFERENCES:
a.   Map: TPC F-4C, F-4D, G-4B, G-5A; 1:500,000.
b.   OSC-E OPORD 13-2-01 (AHURISTAN VICTORY), 270600 December 2012.
c.   84 DTG OPORD 13-2-01 (BAKU ASSAULT), 010600 January 2013.
d.   643 BTG OPORD 13-2-01 (HUSKY ASSAULT), 031200 January 2013.
 
Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: DELTA (LOCAL)

Task Organization:  Unchanged

1. SITUATION

a. General.
(1) See current DTG INTSUM.
(2) AH forces continue offensive operations to seize BAKU and oil facilities in Azerbaijan (AZ).
(3) US and Coalition forces have been repelled from defensive positions south of the ARAKS River.

b. Enemy.  As a result of our attacks during the night of 7 April, U.S. forces have retreated northward in an attempt to consolidate their defense, with the exception of one U.S. mechanized force northeast of BILASUVAR. It is unknown if this force was left behind in their confusion or if it is a deliberate stay-behind force to disrupt our continued offensive operations along the nearby mobility corridor.  Even in their apparent state of disarray, U.S. forces have the capability to counterattack with up to two mechanized brigades.
 
c. Friendly.  The Division Commander intends to exploit the current situation by driving northwest across the ARAKS River and into the U.S. rear area.  This will force them to commit their operational reserves and leave BAKU vulnerable to the OSC-E exploitation force.  I BTG attacks across the ARAKS River between SAATLY and BIRMAN to facilitate the Division attack towards ZARDOB.  II BTG secures defensive positions north of the ARAKS River between SABIRABAD and ULADZHALY to fix enemy forces in the east.  III BTG attacks to seize AGOZHABEDI to protect the west flank of the division main effort.  643 BTG exploits north of the ARAKS River to provide maneuver space for the Division main effort.  V BTG (ME) attacks to seize defensible terrain north of the crossing sites vic ZARDOB to facilitate future offensive operations to the northeast.

d. Environment.  No Change.

2. MISSION: NLT 081000APR2013, 643 BTG attacks to clear enemy forces north of the ARAKS River IOT facilitate attack of Division exploitation forces north toward ZARDOB.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations.  To set the conditions for this attack, 2-643 MIB attacks to destroy the U.S. force northeast of BILASUVAR IOT protect the eastern flank of the ME as it moves north; O/O, follow and support 1-643 MIB to clear U.S. forces from ATK SLINGSHOT.  The BTG attacks with 1-643 MIB leading to clear U.S. forces from ATK SLINGSHOT to facilitate the main effort’s exploitation north of the ARAKS River.  2-644 TBN (ME) follows and attacks to destroy the U.S. Mechanized brigade north of BIRMAN IOT facilitate the Division exploitation towards ZARDOB.  1-644 TBN follows and supports the ME.  At end-state, U.S. forces are cleared south of the ARAKS River, the U.S. Mech brigade north of the ARAKS River is destroyed, and the BTG is established in a hasty defense north of IMISHLI prepared to pass the Division ME forward to ZARDOB.

b. Tasks to subordinate units.  

   2-643 MIB:
   (1) attack to destroy U.S. forces remaining northeast of BILASUVAR.
   (2) O/O, follow and support 1-643 MIB to clear U.S. forces from ATK SLINGSHOT.

1-643 MIB:
(1) attack to clear U.S. forces from ATK SLINGSHOT to facilitate attack north by both TBNs.
(2) B/P to follow and support ME TBN.

2-644 TBN (ME):
(1) attack to destroy U.S. mechanized brigade north of BIRMAN.
(2) establish hasty defense northwest of IMISHLI to protect eastern flank of Division ME attack.

1-644 TBN:
(1) follow and support ME.
(2) establish hasty defense northwest of KHALADZH to protect western flank of Division ME attack.
  
   c. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) This FRAGO effective for planning immediately upon receipt.
(2) MOPP 2 in effect.
(2) Bn Cdrs back-brief plans to HUSKY 6 at 080530APR (30 minutes from now).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No Change.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL. No Change.