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Author Topic: Tactical Vignettes (merged from several topics)  (Read 27858 times)
Rattler
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« on: 25 September 2009, 00:31:39 »
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Same as the TDG´s (Tactical Decision Games) for Marines, the Doctrine Division of the U.S. Army Armor Center has developed a lot of tactical vignettes for the armor platoon and coy leader.

A lot of these scenarios make good bases for wargame scenarios for PBM or CPXes (I used a lot of them in TacOps scenario development) and I stumbled over a small collection of them today.

Here an example for people who have never seen one (Tactical Map Symbols explained here: http://www.warandtactics.com/smf/the-military-facts-procedures-drills-tactics-traditions-qa/nato-military-map-symbols-explained/):



Tactical Vignette 97-1

“The Battle of Durango Valley”

Quote
Situation:

You are the commander of A Team (tank heavy), TF 2-8.

You are the advance guard company (AGC) of the TF as it conducts a movement to contact.

The brigade commander wants the task force to find, fix, and destroy the advance guard of an MRR that is moving east. This will allow the rest of the brigade to maneuver and destroy the regimental main body, with enough combat power left to block the second-echelon MRR. The task force commander directs the AGC to find, fix, and destroy the FSE allowing the task force main body to maneuver into the flank of the AGMB.

Your team consists of two M1A1 tank platoons and one mechanized infantry, (BFV) platoon. An engineer platoon and the mortar platoon follow in support; you have priority of mortars. Your team is moving on an axis south of the task force based on an erroneous report that the FSE was at CP 8.

The terrain is mostly open desert flanked by mountains, with some high terrain in the center of the zone. As you approach the intersection at CP 6, your 1st Platoon reports seeing approximately 20 vehicles moving east and starting to deploy vicinity CP 2.

A moment later, task force scouts report they have identified the AGMB north of Hill 560 moving east
toward CP 4. You suddenly realize that the element identified by 1st Platoon must be the FSE and that it is probably deploying to
engage the task force from Hill 110.

You attempt to contact the task force commander but receive no response. The last transmission with the task force had
them approximately 15 minutes out from CP 2. Based on the scout’s last report, the AGMB is 20 minutes from CP 4. It will take you 9-10 minutes to move northeast to engage the FSE or 11-12 minutes to move northwest to intercept the AGMB. You must act now! What do you do?

Requirement:

In 2 minutes or less, make your decision and issue your FRAGO and any other reports you would submit.

Readers wanting to submit their solutions to the scenario should provide the following: Fragmentary order to
the company team, the rationale behind your decision, and a sketch of your plan of action.

WHAT’S YOUR NEXT MOVE??



A nice collection of Tactical Vignettes (with solutions), all in .pdf format, can be found here, all from Armor Magazine:

http://www.knox.army.mil/armormag/vignettes.htm

Rattler
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« Reply #1 on: 25 September 2009, 00:09:43 »
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The famous TDG´s by the Marine Corps Gazette always have made a great base for all kind of wargame scenarios in modern warfare wargames, I myself have converted many of them for TacOps PBM or net scenarios.

Also, to go through them is a good mental training for evrybody who wants to understand moderrn infantry and cav tactics.

Here an example of a rather simply constructed one for people who don´t know them (and you get a chance to make use of our tacticle map symbols thread Smiley http://www.warandtactics.com/smf/the-military-facts-procedures-drills-tactics-traditions-qa/nato-military-map-symbols-explained/):


Tactical Decision Game #06–1



Quote
Village Ambush

by Paul Turnan

Situation

You command a Marine rifle company conducting a movement to contact as the lead element in the battalion’s march westward. Your battalion is the supporting effort and does not have priority of fires. The battalion’s route of march is through a rural, wooded landscape dotted with small villages.

Roads, logging trails, firebreaks, and footpaths crisscross the region. There are few all-weather, hard top roads. The local population counts just as many who favor the enemy as who welcome the Marine forces. Most of the locals remain impartial, trying to stay out of the line of fire. Enemy activity has been limited to small, meek reconnaissance foot patrols. Weather has been stormy and foggy with low ceilings and limited visibility that has grounded aircraft.

Your company is making slow progress through a village. You move forward to join the leading platoon commander. You tell him to get going, get his point element moving, and push his flank security beyond the few houses that line the road. The point squad is just past the village and hustling along the road. The platoon commander has his second wind and is directing his flank security farther away from the village buildings. From the nearest house an excited schoolgirl runs to you shouting. All you can decipher from her gestures and fractured English is that the enemy is “over there.” How many? How far? You can’t understand the girl. You offer pen and paper for her to draw a picture for you when shots are fired from the wooded hillside 300 meters west of town. The point squad dives for cover unscathed as scattered shots strike the road amidst them. The platoon commander already has Marines returning fire on the wood line from behind village buildings. From the woods comes a very long burst of heavy machinegun fire stitching high across the village, splintering wood and shattering masonry. All of this happens in less than 30 seconds. The machinegun stops firing. You can hear Marines in the houses calling out to each other, loud and calm. You look over your shoulder at 2d Platoon on the road, just coming into town. You spot the 2d Platoon commander. He has an “I’m ready. What next?” look on his face. You sprint to the cover of the nearest building as firing resumes—rifles shots are being fired, and there are more long bursts from a machinegun in the woods. This fire is answered with suppressive fires from two squads of your lead platoon. You have a plan already in mind.

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, issue orders to your company. Make any reports and requests for support that are necessary. Provide your fragmentary order, overlay of your scheme of maneuver, and the rationale for your actions.



Here is a good collection of them, most in .pdf, but also some web only:

http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/tdgpdf.asp

If someone found the time it might be a good idea to have them all posted here one by one, as in the exampl above.

Rattler

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stoffel
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« Reply #2 on: 25 September 2009, 08:27:12 »
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Rattler,

What do you think about setting this up the old tacops cpx style?

Who dares to write orders here?
Preferably two or more players forming a team with different tasks or commands.

Henk
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« Reply #3 on: 25 September 2009, 08:49:27 »
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I am all for some CPXes the old TO style, and I would have plenty ideas for some where even not gamers would have fun, but the problem is that I could not umpire it as TacOps does not run on my new machines anymore (and my old ones do not connect to the net anymore).

Rattler
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« Reply #4 on: 8 October 2009, 11:47:37 »
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Great find Rattler!
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stoffel
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« Reply #5 on: 26 April 2010, 20:19:43 »
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US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC)
W300: Brigade Combat Team Operations Block
W399: Brigade Combat Team Battle Command Exercise

Exercise Advance Sheet
Appendix 6
CORDON & SEARCH Instructor Notes and Student Handout

1.   INTRODUCTION

The objective of this vignette is to have the students draw conclusions from a problem set that addresses the battle command traits of—
•   Deciding when and how to make adjustments.
•   Assessing and taking risks.
•   Prioritizing and allocating resources for a battalion level operation.

The intent is to “box out” the problem so that students spend their time working the problem, not on analyzing higher headquarters products, generating RFIs, or seeking additional guidance from the notional Commander.  In order to do this, provide students the minimum information required to work their problem while still reflecting doctrinal expectations.

2.   LEADER BEHAVIORS

COMPETENCY:           CONCEPTUAL            2.0
SKILL:                  Understanding Systems         2.2.1
Critical Reasoning            2.3.2
Adaptation                  2.6.1/2.6.2

COMPETENCY:         INFLUENCING            5.0
SKILL:                  Decision Making            5.2.1

COMPETENCY:         OPERATING               6.0
SKILL:                  Executing                  6.2.1
                           Assessing                  6.3.1

From working this problem, the students should determine that, as future Commanders, XOs and S-3s, there are situations that require creative and adaptive decision-making. Considerations should include requirements versus the qualifications of the battalion, restrictive terrain, multiple COE threats, and the compression of available reaction time.

3.   PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE


The purpose of this exercise is to—

•   Cause students to deal with conflicting reports and to visualize what type and size of enemy they are facing and what he is trying to do, against the capability, requirements, responsibility to their unit.
•   Challenge students to consider time/space/resources inside the unit rather than requesting support external to the higher headquarters.
•   Require students to prioritize activities and scarce resources, sequence activities over time, or describe the risk associated with not doing so.
•   Cause students to consider implications of civilians on a fluid battlefield and subsequent challenges to battle command.

4.   VIGNETTE DESCRIPTION

This vignette is focused on an SBCT battalion (1-23 IN) conducting a high-threat cordon and search.  The background is that the fight to clear and control PUSHKINO is still ongoing.  The unit, an SBCT joining 4th ID late in the fight, has been tasked with support to the consolidation and security of “rear areas,” MSRs, and LOCs.  The most significant recent threat has emerged in the towns of KIROVKA and KONSTANTINOVKA (K-Town) astride the MSR leading to PUSHKINO.  Currently, the player battalion (1-23 IN) has three companies available for conducting operations, as well as engineers, scouts, etc.  Additionally, the unit has battery of 155mm’s and two OH-58D KWs in direct support.  The scene starts with the establishment of the Inner Cordon and the initial moves into the objective area.  There is increasing resistance as the forces make close contact, and there are a lot of neutrals moving about in and around the town.  There are three guarded caches and other groups of SAPA moving about.  Additionally, there is an 82mm mortar positioned so that if a blue unit comes within range, the mortar will open fires, continuing until the unit moves out of range or becomes neutralized.  There is also an HPT (SAPA leader) that is quickly attempting to flee the area.  The HPT will succeed unless the units establishing the cordon actually construct obstacles to block vehicular traffic.

Cordon & Search is a decision simulation.  It includes blue, red, gray, orange and gold elements to complicate and replicate a COE tactical problem.  Moves and actions are already programmed for all of the non-blue elements and for some portion of blue forces.  That being said, the simulation can also be played competitively with another player (or players) executing orders for the red, orange, gold and gray elements.

Generally, The US forces (blue) are set to Self-Defense mode.  This is in keeping with the ROE in an S&RO Mission.  The threat forces are a mixed set of Free Fire on the US Forces or a Defense only.  This means that not every SAPA (Orange/Gold) icon will attack US Forces.  Also, once one SAPA unit opens fire, it does not mean that all SAPA are engaged by US Forces.  The SAPA in Self-Defense mode will remain in self-defense mode.  The gray side (the neutral locals) moves about in cars or trucks and in small and large groups.  Their movements cannot be controlled unless there is a second computer networked to the simulation for the grays.  The same is true for the SAPA.  The red forces are essentially wild cards to complicate the environment and force the student commander to react to an ambiguous situation and make decisions without discounting his assigned mission.

This vignette remains visible on the screen without any scrolling; nonetheless, it is very busy with a degree of activity that is deliberately designed to defy the ability of the student commander to attend to everything that is occurring.  Even if the blue forces do nothing, within three turns activities will commence that will force the commander to make a decision.

5.   INSTRUCTOR NOTES

a.   The M-T-P of the vignette is as follows:
      M – Movement to contact
      T – Search and attack (cordon & search TTP)
      P - To eliminate threats to MSR and increase local government viability.
b.   No change of preset locations, task organization, or preset routes until after the simulation starts.
c.   Do not allow the commander to use any form of FASCAM or other 155 fires without clearance.
d.   If a student gets distracted by the wandering armored threat, then the dilemma question for the instructor to ask is this:  what about your original mission?  The situation could draw students into the piecemeal use of forces trying to accomplish both missions.  How does the commander mitigate such a challenge?

6.   CONDUCT OF THE VIGNETTE


Instructors should allow students about 30 minutes to get a handle on where their forces are and what they are currently doing.  The objective is situational awareness, and no movement orders are allowed to be input.  Early decisions the student commander should address are:  what elements of the cordon to complete, how to use the UAV (a route is already programmed), and when conditions are appropriate for search elements (A & C Co) to close on their assigned areas in the town.

There are a number of decisions the commander should make, or actions (absent from the SIM) that he/she should direct.  One of the most important is constructing obstacles at checkpoints.  If the commander fails to recognize this during his initial assessment, he will pay the price with the loss of the HPT.  If he directs obstacles be established, the instructor needs to use umpire tools to emplace.  If just an infantry unit is at the checkpoint, use the wire only option and make the obstacle mobility factor at 75%, which will slow down someone trying to pass.  If engineers are there or later arrive to improve the obstacle, then use the ditch + wire, or the barricade + wire, and change the factor to 20%.

Since the SIM does not replicate searching vehicles, or questioning or detaining personnel, some instructor interaction is required here as well.  The easiest way is to give “constructive” credit for doing the right thing and then “magic move” the detainee to a collection area.  To retain the detainee, change the icon “side” from orange/gold to blue, load on truck or other vehicle, drive to the collection area, unload, etc.

The vignette map is scaled to make it visible, which is useful for the SIM, but weapon ranges and movement times become skewed.  Therefore, the visibility and engagement ranges are deliberately reduced to 500 meters (as game scaled).  The point is this:  don’t let the students make an issue of it.  It is a condition of the environment.  (Limited visibility – night or shamal)

Unlike many of the other decision-centric vignettes that should be terminated after the commander makes the one “major” decision, this vignette is designed to require many decisions because of the constantly changing perceptions influenced by the dynamics of the environment.  However, the SIM can be terminated once the commander has—
•   Closed the cordon – isolation and effective barriers/checkpoints.
•   Identified the two centers of resistance and means to reduce them.
•   Recognized multiple cache sites and plans to search/seize/secure.
•   Dealt with the enemy armored element.
•   Reduced impact/effectiveness of IED/VBIED.

Once 40 minutes of game time elapses and there are no other scripted events, you can terminate.  Unless the commander is still learning, there is little point in continuation.


7.   QUESTIONS TO ASK THE COMMANDER


a.   What do I know?
b.   What do I think I know?
c.   What are my decisions?
d.   What do I need to know to make my decisions?
e.   When must I make the decisions?
f.   What decisions can I not change, which can I change?
g.   What are the second and third order effects of my decisions?
h.   What are the concerns/physics of the battlefield?
i.   Why? How are they influencing my decisions?
j.   What will confirm or deny my vision of the enemy?

8.   POSSIBLE DILEMMAS AND POINTS OF DISCUSSION

a.   Belief that HPT and IED factory is in KIROVKA, yet there are indicators of other activity in KONSTANTINOVKA – how do you isolate and search both with forces available?
b.   Insurgent resistance escalates very rapidly.  At what point do you decide to transition to attack rather than maintain contact and allow the SBCT Commander to decide how to develop the situation?
c.   What is your casualty threshold that would influence a tactical transition decision?
d.   Limited visibility affects security of cordon as positioned.  How do you adjust?
e.   What assumptions about the operational environment are you making and failing to account for?
f.   React to the armor threat – how do you find it, what do you do about it, and what do you give up by allocating forces to deal with that threat?
g.   The civilians (gray) don’t really do anything except constrain your options – how do you account for them, especially as the level of conflict increases with insurgent resistance?

        SEQUENCE OF AI SCRIPTED EVENTS
        CORDON & SEARCH VIGNETTE
        W399 EXERCISE
        
7:00:00       B Co partially in position & patrolling cordon, control access to Kirovka and Konstantivoka (K-town) from N, E, W. A Co assembled SE of town. C Co is W of the town.  HHC/CP is SW of town.
“Is your BN set?”
7:01:00       UAV is up, patrols are active, Civilian activity is routine. Enemy tank & APC force visible in SE corner of AO.  Contact with SAPA elements moving NE to SW toward K-town.
“What are you going to do about _____?”
7:02:00       Host nation governmental officials and US MP security elements move into Kirovka from South. SAPA engage HN & US MP elements moving into Kirovka from South; HPT boards ambulance and starts egress; AH armor elms engage HN vehicles on MSR in SE of AO.
“Are you going to counter-attack?”
7:03:00       HPT (in ambulance) now on west side of K-town, moving west. Contact continues with HN and MPs in Kirovka. UAV is observing Kirovka. Civilian ambulance approaching the CP/Aid station with civilian casualties, requesting medical aid. Fire truck from PUSHKINO AO (with bomb on board) approaching outer cordon from SE. Contact continues with "technical" w/ SAPA elements approaching K-town from NE.
“What is your assessment of the situation?”
7:04:00       Orange ambulance arriving at aid station.  Ambulance with HPT heading NW toward outer cordon - if obstacle not established will escape.
7:05:00       Contact continues with technicals in NE outer cordon. Fire truck approaching check point in east. Lack of vehicular traffic on main route should raise suspicion (SAPA have blocked the road in the NW). Local area patrolling should identify IEDs on the main route in NW and SE.
Instructor may want to coach the IED scenario.
7:06:00       Ambulance transfers patient to aid station (and unloads bomb inside perimeter). Ambulance departs. Fire truck is at check point in east. HPT fleeing in ambulance to NW is almost beyond outer cordon. Truck bomb is traveling cross country from Novo-town, headed South to attack CP from west side.
7:07:00       RPG ambush in K-town takes out a vehicle.
7:08:00       Tanks (T55) engage outer cordon in the south.
7:09:00       Media arriving near CP location.  Virtually only traffic that has appeared on the MSR - should be questioned. HPT almost out of the cordon.  Note: Media near the CP is orange.
7:10:00       Media dismounts within LOS of CP area.  HPT ambulance is past last element of cordon. Truck bomb begins moving east toward CP.
7:11:00       Engagement with SAPA elements on SE side of K-town.
7:12:00       Engagement with SAPA elements on SE side of K-town continues. US unit runs into mined area. Truck bomb accelerating toward CP area. Media filming the event.
7:13:00       Truck bomb inside CP area, headed to the most antennas.
7:14:00       Host nation MEDCAP arrives in K-town from the northwest. Truck bomb detonates in CP area - casualties. UAV engaged with small arms fire.
7:15:00       
7:16:00       
7:17:00       
7:18:00       
7:19:00       
7:20:00       IED detonated on MSR in NW portion of AO.  Civilian casualties.
7:21:00       IED detonated on MSR in SE portion of AO.  No casualties.
7:22:00       
7:23:00       
7:24:00       
7:25:00       BMP unit engages outer cordon element in the south.
7:26:00       
7:27:00       
7:28:00       
7:29:00       
7:30:00       Bomb deposited by ambulance at aid station detonates. BMPs and T-55 engage cordon elements in the south.
7:31:00       SA armor force eliminates cordon elements in the SE.
7:32:00       SA armor force, continuing NE movement, engage another outer cordon element
7:33:00       Bomb in fire truck stopped at checkpoint detonates.
7:34:00       SA armor force continues movement and engagement of forces in outer cordon on east side.
7:35:00       Armor vs. cordon elements engagement continues
7:36:00       
7:37:00       
7:38:00       All of eastern cordon element eliminated.
7:39:00       
7:40:00       
7:41:00       
7:42:00       Armor elements disengage and return SE toward PUSHKINO.
7:43:00       
7:44:00       
7:45:00              

Student Handout
"Cordon and Search”
TF STRYKER

1.   CURRENT SITUATION
You command 1-23 IN (Stryker) and were recently attached to the 4th ID.  Within the 4th ID’s AO, there have been repeated attacks along the MSR, a 10-kilometer stretch of highway centered on the town of KIROVKA (Grid 8576).  This is an area where the enemy activity is extremely heavy and often severe.  This area receives a great deal of attention from the US and international press.  The Brigade commander and you have set the conditions to isolate the center of activity in the area around KIROVKA.  1-23 IN is ready to conduct operations in AO KIROVKA.  Attached is a copy of your BN’s FRAGO for the upcoming operation.

1-23 IN (+) (Stryker) current capability includes:   
HHC (HAWKEYE)
      Scout Platoon
      Mortar Platoon
      Medical Platoon
      Sniper Squad
      Fire Support Element
Platoon of M-1083's 5tn from SBCT BSB
Mobility Engineer Platoon & EOD/UXO Team with M-998
Mobility Support Platoon (3 DEUCEs / 3 IHMEEs) from SBCT ENG CO
Counter Intelligence Team from SBCT MI CO
MP Sec
Host Nation elected official with Police team / Military section

A CO (APACHE)
   1st Platoon
   2nd Platoon
   3rd Platoon
   MGS Platoon
   Mortar Section
   Sniper Section
   Forward Observation Section
   Medic section
B CO (BLACKHAWK)
1st Platoon
   2nd Platoon
   3rd Platoon
   MGS Platoon
   Mortar Section
   Sniper Section
   Forward Observation Section
   Medic section
C CO (COMANCHE)
1st Platoon
   2nd Platoon
   3rd Platoon
   MGS Platoon
   Mortar Section
   Sniper Section
   Forward Observation Section
   Medic section
OPCON:

-   A (-) 1-4 AV (BIRDS)
(2-OH-58DS)
-    A 1st BN 41ST FA (GUNS)   (155mm w/smoke and HE and per 4th ID TACSOP-Fires must be cleared by the CDR of AO)
-  1- UAV (ANGEL)

HQ, 1-23 IN
KHALADZH, AZERBAIJAN
APO AE 09128
080500 APR 2013
HQ, 1-23 IN OPORD 1303-07

FRAGMENTARY ORDER 1

REFERENCES:
a.   Map: TPC F-4C, F-4D, G-4B, G-5A; 1:500,000.
b.   C/JFLCC FRAGMENTARY ORDER 1, 200600 March 2013.
c.   4ID OPORD 69991-13 (WARHORSE CHALLENGE), 270600 March 2013.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: DELTA (LOCAL)

Task Organization: Unchanged

1. SITUATION

a.   General. – No Change.
b.   Enemy.  Enemy activities included mines, IEDs, snipers, RPG attacks, and in the past five days,
two US convoys were ambushed.  There have been rocket and heavy MG AA fire at escorting helicopters and armed vehicles.  There are reports of overt SAPA recruitment and training in one town, enemy-established safe houses in another town, and at least one of the key enemy leaders in the area.  CJFLCC HUMINT sources indicate the possibility of two SAPA leaders (HPTs) in the town of KIROVKA and the presence of a SAPA training school, where school-aged girls are learning to make IEDs.
c. Friendly.  No Change.
d. Environment.  No Change.

2. MISSION:
O/O, 1-23 IN conducts a movement to contact to secure KIROVKA IOT ensure freedom of movement along the MSR and increase the viability of the local government.

3. EXECUTION

a.   Intent:  Securing the MSR vicinity of KIROVKA will enhance the local government(s) and limit the freedom movement/maneuver of the SAPA insurgency.   To do this we must cordon off the urban areas surrounding KIROVKA/K-Town and conduct effective searches for SAPA training sites and capture known SAPA leader(s) (HPT).  This will impede the SAPA’s ability to maintain or gain footholds within the AO.  The end state will bring freedom of movement for the host nation and US forces along the MSR while further diminishing SAPA’s activities in the AO.
b.   Concept of Operations.  o/o 1-23 IN will search and attack (TTP-Cordon and Search) centered on KIROVKA IOT re-establish the security of the MSR.  (DO) APACHE will search the southern half of the AO and COMANCHE will search the north half of the AO.
(SO) BLACKHAWK (-) will establish the outer cordon of the AO.  HAWKEYE will provide support to APACHE and COMANCHE.  FIRES, EFST:  Priority of fires (FA and AV) goes to the units in contact.  (All fires must be cleared IAW 4th ID TACSOP)  
c.   Tasks to Maneuver Units.  

(1)  APACHE

(a)  Search the Southern part of KIROVKA.
(b)  Provide Southern interior cordon

(2)  BLACKHAWK (-)

(a)   Provide the Outer Cordon.
(b)   Provide one Stryker Platoon to HAWKEYE for a reserve   

(3)  COMANCHE

(a) Search the Northern part of KIROVKA.
(b) Provide Northern interior cordon
(c) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) This FRAGO effective for planning immediately upon receipt.
(2) Cdr’s back-brief TF plan at 080530APR (30 minutes from now)
(3) Once SAPA individuals and facilities are found, secure for CI units.  
(4)  If confronted by armed resistance, you are to defeat or capture the resistors.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS


Concept of Support. No Change.
b]5. COMMAND AND CONTROL. [/b]

•1-23 CDR will move with HAWKEYE.
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US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC)
W300: Brigade Combat Team Operations Block
W399: Brigade Combat Team Battle Command Exercise

Exercise Advance Sheet
Appendix 4
BREAKOUT FROM ENCIRCLEMENT/CONDUCTING AN ENCIRCLEMENT
Instructor Notes and Student Handouts

1.   INTRODUCTION

The objective of this vignette is to have the students draw conclusions from a problem set that addresses the battle command traits of—
•   Deciding when and how to make adjustments.
•   Assessing and taking risks.
•   Prioritizing and allocating resources for a battalion level operation.

The intent is to “box out” the problem so that students spend their time working the problem, not on analyzing higher headquarters products, generating RFIs, or seeking additional guidance from the notional Commander.  In order to do this, provide students the minimum information required to work their problem while still reflecting doctrinal expectations.

2.   LEADER BEHAVIORS

COMPETENCY:           CONCEPTUAL            2.0
SKILL:            Understanding Systems                   2.2.1
Critical Reasoning                                               2.3.2
Adaptation                                             2.6.1/2.6.2

COMPETENCY:         INFLUENCING            5.0
SKILL:            Decision Making            5.2.1

COMPETENCY:         OPERATING               6.0
SKILL:            Executing               6.2.1
               Assessing               6.3.1

From working this problem, the students should determine that, as future S-3s/XOs, there are situations that require creative and adaptive decision-making. Considerations should include requirements versus the qualifications of the battalion, restrictive terrain, multiple COE threats, and the compression of available reaction time.

3. PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE

The purpose of this exercise is to:

•   Cause students to deal with conflicting reports and to visualize what type and size of enemy they are facing and what he is trying to do, against the capability, requirements, responsibility to their unit.
•   Challenge students to consider time/space/resources inside the unit rather than requesting support external to the higher headquarters.
•   Require students to prioritize activities and scarce resources, sequence activities over time, or describe the risk associated with not doing so.
•   Cause students to consider implications of civilians on a fluid battlefield and subsequent challenges to battle command.

4.  DOCTRINAL REFERENCES:

a.   FM 3-90, Tactics, Jul 01; para D-1 - D-25 (Encirclement).
b.   FM 3-90, Tactics, Jul 01; para D-41 - D-71 (Breakout from Encirclement).
c.   FM 3-90.3, The Mounted Brigade Combat Team; Nov 01.
d.   Modular Brigade Combat Teams: Task Force Modularity White Paper Part III (7/15/04 DRAFT).
e.   Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, V1.0, 8 Oct 04.

5.   VIGNETTE DESCRIPTION

This vignette is designed to have a true thinking and competitive force-on-force exercise with students playing both the Blue Force and the Red Force.  This vignette uses the overarching JTF GAAT setting.  Force ratios are approximately equal allowing instructor focus on the respective students’ decisions rather than the application of one-sided force ratios to analyze the outcome.  Initial Blue Force (2-7 IN) and Red Force (2-643 IN) player battalions’ schemes of maneuver are not set.  The Red Force Brigade Tactical Group (BTG)’s other infantry battalion and two armor battalions, as well as civilians on the battle field and IEDs, are set for movement because that movement may affect the battle’s outcome.  The Blue Force BCT’s other units’ movements will not affect the battle; therefore, they are (theoretically) out of the close fight direct fire zone of operation and cannot be seen.
Since it is possible at this point in the academic year your students will have turned in texts, they will only have electronic references available.  The night before execution, refer your students to the AOWC Reference CD?Publications? FM 3-90? Appendix D for encirclement doctrine applicable to this vignette.
The Blue Force’s 2-7 IN is a Combined Arms Battalion which is part of the 1/3 HBCT.  As a result of intense fighting and decisions made by commanders at various levels, TF 2-7 IN is by itself, well out in front of the entire 4ID and other Coalition Forces who have withdrawn to the northwest.  Blue intelligence and information is sketchy.  They know Red Force attacked Blue Force with specific efforts against US units the previous night; OPREPS show intense hand-to-hand fighting with tenuous situations that compelled some Blue commanders to commit reserves to facilitate unit withdrawal and new FLOT establishment further to the northwest.  The new defensive line will be the last organized defensive line in the Imishli - Sabirabad area to re-establish zone security and help protect the Division Rear.  TF 2-7 IN is ordered to break out from an impending encirclement and move to BP SAFEGUARD to protect the southern exposed flank of 4ID’s counterattack that its parent BCT will initially lead.  The counterattack will commence on order within 24 hours along AXIS IRONHORSE to envelop attacking Red units.  Blue Force students should develop a plan to conduct the breakout attack, move to the battle position (leaving nothing behind in the original location), and prepare to support the 4ID’s counterattack.  The Blue Force Commander’s tactical dilemmas are: (a) how much time to spend locating the encircling Red Force, (b) how to organize the break out force, and (c) whether to breakout and move to the defensive position to protect 4ID’s flank, or attack the Red Force from their tactical rear.  

Red Force is 2-643 IN.  The battalion is part of a balanced heavy BTG consisting of two armor battalions and two mechanized infantry battalions.  The Red BTG’s mission is to defeat Blue mounted forces between the Araks and Kura Rivers in order to facilitate the seizure of Attack Position SLINGSHOT along the Kura from which to either attack the Blue Division or defend against the Blue Division’s counterattack.  The original mission for 2-643 IN was to help clear the zone up to the attack position for the armor battalions, then to follow and support the exploitation attack, or prepare to defend a possible Blue Force counterattack.  The original mission is temporarily abated when 2-643 IN is ordered to find and destroy Blue Force remnants still in the movement zone in order to protect/facilitate the movement and passage of the Red Force tank battalions located to the south.  The Red Force students should develop a plan to move to contact, develop the situation, and conduct either a hasty attack or an encirclement of Blue Force to prevent their ability to affect the Red BTG’s operation.  There are a variety of forces available to the Red commander. He has the flexibility to change the task organization and the task and purpose of subordinate units.  The Red Force Commander’s tactical dilemmas are: (a) conduct a hasty attack of the Blue Force with an ill-defined “enemy situation,” or (b) develop the situation so as to encircle the Blue Force and either prevent his movement, or attack the Blue Force so as to prevent it affecting the Red BTG’s movement to ATK SLINGSHOT and subsequent operations.
The vignette’s underpinnings are: (a) if you know the capabilities and limitations of the enemy's weapon systems, they can be defeated on the battlefield, plus (b) there is a fine balance commanders face in displaying personal initiative within their next higher commander’s intent or following specified orders.  Additionally, this vignette introduces or refreshes students’ understanding of the tactics of “encirclement” and “breakout from encirclement.”  These two operations were not studied in depth during the academic year, but today's Contemporary Operating Environment battlefield clearly indicates the need for this understanding.

6.   INSTRUCTOR NOTES

a.   Blue:
?   No Army attack aviation is available; the units are repositioning to support the counterattack and cannot be employed deep to help TF 2-7 IN.
?   Students should not count on any CAS.
?   Only the Paladin battery and the mortar platoon within their perimeter are available for traditional fire support.  Because of a major communications outage, the parent battalion of the Paladin battery cannot be contacted directly or indirectly—the battalion headquarters or the communications node may have been overrun.
?   2-7 IN has access to limited MLRS rocket fire from a platoon of two launchers pushed forward with limited security; the MLRS battery has no re-load capability once the rockets are expended.

b.   Red:
?   No rotary or fix winged CAS support is available.  Blue ADA is and has been effective.
?   Red artillery is limited to the battalion’s 120mm mortars and one battalion of 152mm SP artillery “played off the board” with limited ammunition.  This situation reflects that Red artillery is being reduced by effective US counterfire.


7.   CONDUCT OF THE VIGNETTE
   
Blue students’ scenarios are built to clearly indicate their battalion is the farthest forward (southern) US unit.  Though probed and reconnoitered, TF 2-7 IN is intact.  After midnight, a friendly Paladin battery roared into TF 2-7 IN battalion’s position, escaping intensive ground combat in their former position.  The commander reported truck-mounted infantry and BMPs to the east plus inability to get his parent unit to respond to his reports.  The evening LOGPAC, scheduled to arrive at 2000 hours, does not arrive in the infantry battalion’s position until 0330 hours.  The commander reports the rear’s situation (to the northwest) is chaotic—random engagements of high volume rifle/mortar fire and IED, plus a great number of displaced civilians in vehicles and on foot.  NGO’s are evacuating compounds and moving uncoordinated convoys from multiple locations.  The LOGPAC had to fight to get to 2-7 IN’s position.

TF 2-7 IN is ordered to conduct a breakout attack from its current location, and then secure BP SAFEGUARD to the southwest in order to protect the Division’s flank during its turning movement as it conducts a rapid counterattack along AXIS IRONHORSE.  The Division’s attack is initially led by the battalion’s parent BCT to clear the routes, allowing the forward passage of lines of another BCT as the Division’s main effort for the attack on enemy forces to the north of Salyany.  TF 2-7 IN is ordered to start the breakout NLT 60 minutes from order receipt so as not to become enveloped and/or decisively engaged by rapidly moving Red Force.

Red students’ scenarios are built to clearly indicate their battalion is the farthest eastern battalion of the Red BTG trying to move to the northwest to occupy ATK SLINGSHOT from which to either continue the attack into an ill-prepared Blue Force, or defend against the Blue Force counterattack.  Supported by both conventional and unconventional Red Forces, a Blue Force unit has been found with the potential to spoil the Red Force movement to ATK SLINGSHOT.

The Red Force’s 2-643 IN is ordered to temporarily divert from its original plan of occupying ATK SLINGSHOT, take charge of the Red units in contact with Blue Force, and find/fix/destroy the Blue Force unit so it does not interfere with the Red Force’s occupation of the attack position; however, 2-643 IN must also be prepared to participate in the Red BTG’s attack.  Shortly after midnight, a Blue Force self-propelled field artillery unit was found south of Pushkino by elements of 3-842 IN and immediately attacked.  After heavy fighting, in which the artillery pieces leveled their tubes and fought like tanks, the Red platoon lost contact with the Blue artillery unit because fire and smoke in the Blue position obscured their withdrawal from the Red Force.  The Red BTG Headquarters is beginning to receive reports through the Red Division from Red Special Operations Forces that numerous Blue Force and NGO convoys are moving in the Red BTG’s area of operations.  The Red Special Forces and Red partisan elements are interdicting convoys that are identified as military in nature.  Numerous SAPA elements are reporting Blue Force units seen or found south of Narivmanovka and Novotroitskoya (their two local safe havens and re-supply points); teams are out to locate, and report or attack Blue Force as appropriate.  

Force ratios are approximately equal allowing instructor focus on the respective students’ decisions rather than the application of one-sided force ratios to analyze the outcome.  Initial Blue and Red battalions’ schemes of maneuver are not set – students will need every bit of 60 minutes to conduct their hasty analyses, make decisions, and issue orders.  The focus is not developing the optimal COA, but rapid decision making from a “base plan” based on imperfect information.  Applying the “1/3 – 2/3 Rule,” student commanders could use up to 30 minutes analyzing information, determining anticipated decisions and what information requirements are needed to make those decisions.  Instructors should suggest that students refer often to the electronic “MCOO” (i.e. terrain map) to help visualize the simulation’s terrain effects on tactical operations.  Instructors should strongly encourage students to start “issuing orders” (i.e. ‘pucking moves’) to units within their control NLT 20 minutes into the PE, and force the simulation to start NLT 60 minutes into the PE.  If either student commander completes “issuing orders” before the 60 minute preparation period is completed, the instructor should intercede and start the simulation.  Turns should run in 5 minute movement increments, stopped, students allowed to modify existing orders for a limited time (suggested as not more than 2 minutes).  Stop the vignette and conduct the AAR when either the Red or Blue battalion becomes combat ineffective (practice runs indicate approximately 60 minutes of simulations time).  Vignette rehearsals indicate the Red Force computer should be designated as the “host”.

8.   TACTICAL DILEMAS ANTICIPATED

a.   Does Blue focus on the task (breakout), or purpose (get to a battle position protecting the Division’s flank during its counterattack)?
b.   Can Blue fix Red with a minimum force and attack through to their battle position, or must Blue attack Red in order to accomplish its purpose?
c.   How does Blue’s METT-TC hasty analysis account for civilians and mitigate risk to COBs plus deal with IEDs?
d.   Does Red follow the plan and attempt to occupy the attack position while leaving a mechanized infantry company to deal with the Blue Force, or does it focus on the Blue Force?
e.   Does Red’s METT-TC hasty analysis account for civil considerations and mitigate risk to COBs with IEDs emplaced by supporting insurgent forces that have not been coordinated with attacking Red Force?

9.   QUESTIONS TO ASK THE BLUE AND RED FORCES’ COMMANDERS

a.   What do you know?
b.   What do you think you know?
c.   What are your decisions?
d.   What do you need to know to make your decisions and how do you get the information?
e.   When must you make the decisions?
f.   What decisions can you  not change, which can you change?
g.   What are the 2nd and 3rd order effects of your decisions?
h.   What are the concerns/physics of the battlefield and why?
i.   How are concerns/physics influencing your decisions?
j.   What will confirm or deny your vision of the opposing force?

Student Handout
"BREAKOUT"
TASK FORCE BLUE

1.   CURRENT SITUATION
You command TF 2-7 IN, a CAB of 1/3 HBCT, currently attached to 4ID.  You are operating in the southwestern portion of AO 4 within the JTF GAAT area of operations.  During the night, as a result of intense fighting and decisions made by commanders at various levels within the Blue Coalition of Forces, TF 2-7 IN is isolated, well out in front of the entire 4ID and other Coalition Forces who have withdrawn to the northwest.  You’ve consolidated into a 360 degree hasty defense.  Though probed and reconnoitered, TF 2-7 IN is intact:

Tm A (2 Bradleys)                     
1/A/2-7 IN (4 Bradleys)
2/A/2-7 IN (4 Bradleys)      
3/C/2-7 IN (4 tanks)

Tm B (1 Bradley)
1/B/2-7 IN (4 Bradleys)
2/B/2-7 IN (3 Bradleys)
3/D/2-7 IN (3 tanks)

Tm C (2 tanks)
1/C/2-7 IN (4 tanks)
2/C/2-7 IN (3 tanks)
3/A/2-7 IN (3 Bradleys)

Tm D
1/D/2-7 IN (4 tanks)
2/D/2-7 IN (3 tanks)
3/B/2-7 IN (3 Bradleys)

SCT PLT
   4 x M998
   2 x TUAV

MTR PLT (120MM)
   4 x M121

BN SNIPERS
MED PLT (4 x M113)

C/153 EN Co.
6 x ACE
2 x AVLM
1 x M548

1/D/1-44 ADA PLT
   3 x Linebacker

3/14th CM Co (Smoke)
   5 x M113

CBT Trains (LOGPAC included)
   CP: 2 x M998
   UMCP: 2 x M88
   BAS: 2 x M113
      9 - injured SM's
   Decontamination Vehicle: 1
   FSB Support: - MST: 3 x M998
   Ammo Section: 4 x M981 HEMTT (CGO)
   POL Tanker Section: 2 x M984 HEMTT (POL)

you have taken OPCON of:
B/1-17 FA (155mm SP)
   5 x M109A6 Howitzers
   4 x FAASV
 

You, 0400 hours:  “RAIDER X-RAY, this is COTTONBALER 6, SITREP follows: current contact is moderate with battalion-sized mechanized and truck-mounted infantry.  TF defense center of mass is QJ 820695.  Will send unit COMs via FBCB2.  Current slant: M2: 25, M1: 23, Mortar: 4, UAV: 2, Linebacker: 3, ACE: 6, AVLM: 2, and ad hoc OPCON of 5 each M109A6 with FAASVs.  Paladin battery arrived 0230.  Last night’s LOGPAC fought to link up us 30 minutes ago.  Class III and V status Green.  Continuing to defend.  Over.”

1/3 HBCT TOC: “Roger.  Stand by for FRAGO via FBCB2.”
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

HQ, 1/3 HBCT
KHALADZH, AZERBAIJAN
APO AE 09128
080500 APR 2013
HQ, 1/3 HBCT OPORD 1303-04
RAIDER CHALLENGE

FRAGMENTARY ORDER 1

REFERENCES:
a.   Map: TPC F-4C, F-4D, G-4B, G-5A; 1:500,000.
b.   C/JFLCC FRAGMENTARY ORDER 1, 200600 March 2013.
c.   4ID OPORD 69991-13 (WARHORSE CHALLENGE), 270600 March 2013.
d.   1/3 HBCT OPORD 1303-04 (RAIDER CHALLENGE), 010600 April 2013.
 
Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: DELTA (LOCAL)

Task Organization: Unchanged

1. SITUATION

a. General.
(1) See current 4ID INTSUM.
(2) US forces commenced defense operations in AO 4 to defeat Ahurastan (AH) forces attacking into Azerbaijan (AZ).
(3) AH forces have been contained south of the KURA and ARAKS rivers, and have committed the OSC-E exploitation force in an attempt to reach BAKU.

b. Enemy.  Intelligence and information is vague.  During the night of 07 April, AH forces attacked 1/3 HBCT.  Intense fighting in tenuous situations compelled flank brigades to commit reserves facilitating unit withdrawal and new FLOT establishment further to the northwest of PL VIOLET.  The new FLOT will be the last organized set of defenses in the IMISHLI - SABIRABAD area to reestablish zone security to protect the Division Rear Area.  AH forces have isolated TF 2-7 IN in front of the entire 4ID and other Coalition Forces who have withdrawn to the northwest.  TF 2-7 IN is surrounded by a battalion-sized mechanized and truck-mounted infantry unit.  An enemy armor battalion is currently south TF 2-7 and is expected to move through BP SAFEGUARD in approximately 3 hours.
 
c. Friendly.  O/O, 4ID attacks along AXIS IRONHORSE to isolate OSC-E exploitation forces north of SALYANY.  1/4 HBCT defends along the ARAKS River between SAATLY and BIRMAN to fix enemy forces IOT allow attack to develop.  3/4 HBCT defends along ARAKS River between SABIRABAD and ULADZHALY to fix enemy forces IOT allow attack to develop.  4/4 HBCT (ME) follows 1/3 HBCT and attacks to isolate OSC-E exploitation force north of SALYANY.  TF MERLIN AASLT north of PUSHKINO and defends to protect the northern flank of the ME.

d. Environment.  No Change.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

2. MISSION:
O/O, 1/3 HBCT attacks along AXIS IRONHORSE to clear the road network through the canals to facilitate 4/4 HBCT (4ID main effort) attack to SALYANY.

3. EXECUTION
a. Concept of Operations.  NLT 080900 APR 2013, 1/3 HBCT attacks in column along AXIS IRONHORSE to clear road networks through the canals to facilitate 4/4 HBCT’s attack to SALYANY.  5-7 CAV screens to the south to provide early warning, and conducts zone reconnaissance from PL VIOLET through PUSHKINO to provide intelligence on enemy forces and the road network through the canals.  TF 2-7 defends from BP SAFEGUARD to protect the HBCT’s southern flank.  TF 3-69 AR (ME) attacks to clear enemy forces along AXIS IRONHORSE to facilitate forward passage of 4/4 HBCT.  POF: 5-7 CAV, TF 3-69 AR, TF 2-7 IN.  At end state, all enemy is cleared from AXIS IRONHORSE, 4/4 HBCT has successfully passed through to attack towards SALYANY, and 1/3 HBCT is postured to protect follow-on forces during their forward passage.

b. Tasks to subordinate units.  

   5-7 CAV:
   (1) screen HBCT southern flank during movement to provide early warning of threats from south.
   (2) conduct zone reconnaissance from BP SAFEGUARD through PUSHKINO
(3) establish contact with TF 2-7 IN in the south and TF MERLIN in the north.

TF 2-7 IN:
(1) Break out of current encirclement.
(2) Occupy BP SAFEGUARD oriented south.
(3) Defend to defeat AH forces IOT protect the main effort southern flank.

TF 3-69 AR (ME):
(1) attack to clear AH forces from PL VIOLET through PUSHKINO.
  
   c. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) This FRAGO effective for planning immediately upon receipt.
(2) MOPP 2 in effect.
(3) Cdr’s back-brief TF plan at 080530APR (20 minutes from now).


4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Concept of Support. No Change.


5. COMMAND AND CONTROL. No Change.


STUDENT WORKSHEET

Tactical Problem:
Projected - Task Organization:  (STUDENT DEVELOPED BEFORE STARTEX)
Rupture Force:
Follow-and-Assume Force:
Main Body:
Reserve:
Diversionary/Shaping Force:
Rear Guard:
Hasty COA:

Student Handout
"BREAKOUT"
TASK FORCE RED


1.   GENERAL SITUATION
You command 2-643 Mechanized Infantry Battalion (MIB), located north of PUSHKINO.  You are part of a balanced heavy BTG conducting offensive operations near the border with Azerbaijan.  Last night, your BTG’s attacks forced U.S. forces to withdraw to the north and your Division Commander intends to exploit the apparent rout by attacking through Attack Position (ATK) SLINGSHOT, continuing north of the ARAKS River and into the Coalition rear area.  However, a U.S. mechanized force located northeast of BILASUVAR threatens the BTG’s axis of advance to Attack Position (ATK) SLINGSHOT.  Your battalion has been tasked to destroy this force quickly so the attack can proceed.  Your battalion, 2-643 MIB, is currently task organized as follows:    
A Co.  
9 x BMP-1
3 x Type 85-III Tank

B Co.
7 x BMP-1
2 x Type 85-III Tank

C/2-881 MIB (OPCON)
6 x BMP-2
2 x Type 85-III Tank

B/3-881 MIB (OPCON)
7 x BMP-2
3 x Type 85-III Tank
3/B/3-842 Infantry Bde (OPCON)
4 x BTR-80A w/dismounted platoon

Mortar PLT
   4 x 120mm mortars

3 x SAPA teams (supporting the Division)
1st Team – 2 x Tech (1 x 12.7mm MG; 1 x RPG)
2nd Team – 2 x Tech (2 x 12.7mm MG)
3rd Team – 3 x Tech (3 x 12.7mm MG)

You, 0400 hours: “HUSKY X-RAY, this is MAD DOG 6, SITREP follows: current contact is moderate with a roughly battalion-sized U.S. mechanized force vic QJ 810690.  My battalion center of mass location is north of PUSHKINO vic QJ 890770.  SAPA and motorized units OPCON to me have the U.S. force surrounded.  My current slant is: Tanks: 10, BMPs: 29, BTRs: 4, Mortars: 4, Technicals: 7.  Class III and V status Green.  Developing the situation.  Over.”

BTG HQ: “Roger.  Stand by for FRAGO.”  

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

HQ, 643 BTG
CALILABAD, AZERBAIJAN
080400 APR 2013
HQ, 643 BTG OPORD 1303-04
HUSKY ASSAULT

FRAGMENTARY ORDER 1

REFERENCES:
a.   Map: TPC F-4C, F-4D, G-4B, G-5A; 1:500,000.
b.   OSC-E OPORD 13-2-01 (AHURISTAN VICTORY), 270600 December 2012.
c.   84 DTG OPORD 13-2-01 (BAKU ASSAULT), 010600 January 2013.
d.   643 BTG OPORD 13-2-01 (HUSKY ASSAULT), 031200 January 2013.
 
Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: DELTA (LOCAL)

Task Organization:  Unchanged

1. SITUATION

a. General.
(1) See current DTG INTSUM.
(2) AH forces continue offensive operations to seize BAKU and oil facilities in Azerbaijan (AZ).
(3) US and Coalition forces have been repelled from defensive positions south of the ARAKS River.

b. Enemy.  As a result of our attacks during the night of 7 April, U.S. forces have retreated northward in an attempt to consolidate their defense, with the exception of one U.S. mechanized force northeast of BILASUVAR. It is unknown if this force was left behind in their confusion or if it is a deliberate stay-behind force to disrupt our continued offensive operations along the nearby mobility corridor.  Even in their apparent state of disarray, U.S. forces have the capability to counterattack with up to two mechanized brigades.
 
c. Friendly.  The Division Commander intends to exploit the current situation by driving northwest across the ARAKS River and into the U.S. rear area.  This will force them to commit their operational reserves and leave BAKU vulnerable to the OSC-E exploitation force.  I BTG attacks across the ARAKS River between SAATLY and BIRMAN to facilitate the Division attack towards ZARDOB.  II BTG secures defensive positions north of the ARAKS River between SABIRABAD and ULADZHALY to fix enemy forces in the east.  III BTG attacks to seize AGOZHABEDI to protect the west flank of the division main effort.  643 BTG exploits north of the ARAKS River to provide maneuver space for the Division main effort.  V BTG (ME) attacks to seize defensible terrain north of the crossing sites vic ZARDOB to facilitate future offensive operations to the northeast.

d. Environment.  No Change.

2. MISSION: NLT 081000APR2013, 643 BTG attacks to clear enemy forces north of the ARAKS River IOT facilitate attack of Division exploitation forces north toward ZARDOB.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations.  To set the conditions for this attack, 2-643 MIB attacks to destroy the U.S. force northeast of BILASUVAR IOT protect the eastern flank of the ME as it moves north; O/O, follow and support 1-643 MIB to clear U.S. forces from ATK SLINGSHOT.  The BTG attacks with 1-643 MIB leading to clear U.S. forces from ATK SLINGSHOT to facilitate the main effort’s exploitation north of the ARAKS River.  2-644 TBN (ME) follows and attacks to destroy the U.S. Mechanized brigade north of BIRMAN IOT facilitate the Division exploitation towards ZARDOB.  1-644 TBN follows and supports the ME.  At end-state, U.S. forces are cleared south of the ARAKS River, the U.S. Mech brigade north of the ARAKS River is destroyed, and the BTG is established in a hasty defense north of IMISHLI prepared to pass the Division ME forward to ZARDOB.

b. Tasks to subordinate units.  

   2-643 MIB:
   (1) attack to destroy U.S. forces remaining northeast of BILASUVAR.
   (2) O/O, follow and support 1-643 MIB to clear U.S. forces from ATK SLINGSHOT.

1-643 MIB:
(1) attack to clear U.S. forces from ATK SLINGSHOT to facilitate attack north by both TBNs.
(2) B/P to follow and support ME TBN.

2-644 TBN (ME):
(1) attack to destroy U.S. mechanized brigade north of BIRMAN.
(2) establish hasty defense northwest of IMISHLI to protect eastern flank of Division ME attack.

1-644 TBN:
(1) follow and support ME.
(2) establish hasty defense northwest of KHALADZH to protect western flank of Division ME attack.
  
   c. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) This FRAGO effective for planning immediately upon receipt.
(2) MOPP 2 in effect.
(2) Bn Cdrs back-brief plans to HUSKY 6 at 080530APR (30 minutes from now).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No Change.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL. No Change.
Logged

My topics are about my personal opinion, my thoughts and what I think. They do not reflect the official opinion of the ministry of defense of the Netherlands.
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