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Author Topic: Interesting Portrait of an UKR Offensive (3 OShBr)  (Read 4862 times)
Rattler
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« on: 15 August 2023, 09:06:52 »
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3rd Separate Assault Brigade (3 OShBr) is one the most successful brigades in the Ukrainian Army. Since the beginning of May it has advanced about 6-7 kilometres south-west of the outskirts of Bakhmut. This article describes 3 OShBr’s summer campaign to date – how it has achieved its advances and why success over twelve weeks on the eastern battlefields of Ukraine is measured in metres gained and not tens of kilometres.

Key Takeways:

The explanations for 3OShBr’s slow advance do not lie in mine belts and defensive obstacles which are slowing down the Ukrainian counter-offensive on the Zaphorizhzhia front. Russian forces never built these in this sector, as they were advancing with the intent to capture Bakhmut and the surrounding area. The three principal reasons for the slow tempo are:

    • Casualty aversion:  3 OShBr has been pursuing a deliberate policy of re-capturing ground, incurring no or few casualties. This goal has been achieved but has reduced the tempo of Ukrainian operations.

    • Soldier weights: In an infantry war, an assault can only advance as far as a soldier of average fitness can fight before exhaustion sets in.

    • Artillery: Artillery (and rocket) fire is still accounting for four in five casualties. This may explain why of 100 Ukrainian soldiers wounded within 3 miles of the front line, 36% are very seriously wounded (shrapnel wounds). After capturing a Russian strongpoint or trench line, Ukrainian troops perforce must remain in place as the standard Russian response is to bombard the lost positions. In one recent case, Ukrainian soldiers had to share the trenches with the Russian dead which could not be moved (not least because the departing Russians, who not uncommonly abandon their dead, had booby-trapped the corpses). The only option was to cover the corpses with plastic sheets which due to the cramped conditions were used as ‘soft’ seats, while smoking heavily to disguise the smells. A Ukrainian soldier asked whether he was not afraid one of bodies might suddenly detonate, replied; ‘Everything is detonating here.’


Full article: https://wavellroom.com/2023/08/15/portrait-of-a-ukrainian-offensive-oshbr/
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