Analysis by AU Gen. Mick Ryan on Mine Warfare in UKR and Lessons Learned

The operations to penetrate the Russian defences in southern Ukraine have been subject to much scrutiny. Observations such as the lack of Ukrainian air power, poor training or insufficient Western equipment have been offered. These have played a role.

But there is a more fundamental reason why operations are proceeding slowly. While military technology has advanced in the past few decades, the tactics and technologies for detecting, clearing and penetrating minefields has not advanced in the past 50 years.

Two recent technological developments have widened the gap between the challenge of breaching minefields and existing solutions.

The first is that battlefield observation is now pervasive. This war has seen the development of a meshed civil-military network of sensors, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. This is unprecedented & not a factor when extant obstacle-breaching doctrine was developed.

The second development is digitised control of fire support. Long range rockets, artillery, attack helicopters, loitering munitions, & electronic warfare are now synchronised with new-era digitised battle command systems, which are in turn linked to the meshed sensor network. Consequently, where decades ago it may have taken some time for an enemy to detect someone conducting a breach of their obstacles and even longer to bring them under fire, this is now a process that takes a minute or two.

This represents an intellectual failure by western nations. We have not anticipated the application of this new meshed sensor-fires complex to modern ground operations over the past couple of decades. There were months where we observed Russian defences being constructed. At the same time, the past year has made clear trends in the reduction of time between detection and destruction on the modern battlefield. Yet still we failed to update the tactics and techniques of breaching minefields.

While Ukraine has adapted its clearance techniches, Western military institutions should establish a crash program to develop technologies for minefield detection and clearance that offer significant improvement in the speed and quality of such activities.

However, the physical means to assist is just the beginning. Doctrinal innovation is required to explore tactics of undertaking opposed minefield detection and neutralisation more quickly, without a guarantee of air control.