Operation MONTANA RAIDER, conducted from 12 April to 14 May 1969 in the area east and north of Tay Ninh City, was aimed at a rear service support and transportation zone for enemy troops and equipment entering South Vietnam from Cambodia. Although the exact location and identity of enemy units in this region were not known, two North Vietnamese divisions were thought to be present. The terrain was not rugged, but dense jungle hampered movement. The MONTANA RAIDER force consisted of one infantry-heavy and two armor-heavy task forces under command of the 11th Armored Cavalry. The regiment's air cavalry troop and the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, the air cavalry squadron of the 1st Cavalry Division, flew in support of the operation. An artillery battalion headquarters under direct control of.the regiment coordinated all artillery fire. A cover and deception plan was devised to persuade the enemy that U.S. forces were moving north and west of Tay Ninh City. Air cavalrymen, flying over enemy base camps, deliberately lost map overlays clearly marking the area northwest of Tay Ninh City as an objective for the operation, and intentional security breaches in radio transmissions were employed to the same end.
At 0800 on 12 April operational control of the 11th Armored Cavalry passed from the 1st Infantry Division to the 1st Cavalry Division, marking the beginning Of MONTANA RAIDER. In accordance with the deception plan, the armor-heavy task forces left Bien Hoa and moved past the actual area of operations. As the 11th Armored Cavalry's 2d Squadron task force neared Dau Tieng, it swung northwest to join Company A of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry (Airmobile), while the l1th Cavalry's 1st Squadron task force moved into another base and linked up with Company C of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry. The movement through and beyond the actual area of operations was designed to suggest further to the enemy that the operation would be conducted northwest of Tay Ninh City. By 1700 on 12 April all forces had completed the 98 kilometer move and were ready for action.
On 13 April Colonel James H. Leach, commander of the 11th Armored Cavalry took operational control of an airmobile infantry unit, the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, and began reconnaissance in force operations east to Tay Ninh City. The 11th Cavalry's 1st Squadron task force entered the area from the southwest, its 2d Squadron task force from the northwest, and the 8th Cavalry task force from the northeast. In order to give the 8th Cavalry task force additional firepower and some armored protection, Troop G and one platoon of Company H, the tank company of the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, were attached. The first unit to clash with the enemy was the regimental air cavalry troop, which was assessing bomb damage from a B-52 strike. After the aerorifles and infantry reinforcements were sent in, Troop A of the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, arrived, and in an all-day battle in the heavy jungle finally drove the enemy out. The following days saw scattered fighting as the task forces converged. Artillery and air strikes were used liberally to destroy enemy base camps. The longest battle of Phase I occurred on 18 April when Troops A and B of the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, met a large enemy force. Heavy artillery and air strikes were used against the enemy, but the assault was delayed when machine gun tracer ammunition created a fire storm in the bamboo thickets. The enemy lost seventy-six men in this battle.
At the end of Phase I, and after two days devoted to maintenance, Phase II opened with a 149-kilometer road march for the entire regiment to Quan Loi in Binh Long Province, 100 kilometers north of Saigon. Phases II and III saw the combined arms task forces of the 11th Armored Cavalry ranging throughout eastern War Zone C, engaging the enemy in short, bitter fights, almost always in heavy jungle. The stress again was on mobility, firepower, and the combined arms team.
MONTANA RAIDER demonstrated the versatility of a large, mounted unit, aggressively led and employing conventional armored award doctrine in isolated jungle. All three phases of MONTANA RAIDER again showed the value of combined arms -armored cavalry, infantry, artillery, and air cavalry. Surprising mobility was achieved by tracked vehicles, which covered more than 1,600 kilometers during the operation; of that distance, 1,300 kilometers were in dense jungle. More important was the fact that this operation, REMAGEN in the north, and others throughout Vietnam put free world forces in possession of the enemy base areas during 1969. With nowhere else to go, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese pulled back to their bases in Cambodia and Laos.
Primary Sources:
http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/mounted/chapter6.htmGood Hunting.
MR
