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Author Topic: Germany WW II, Inspector general pamphlet for Tiger tanks 1943  (Read 5795 times)
stoffel
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« on: 1 August 2010, 23:06:08 »
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A general document describing the usage of tigertanks was not existent.
The troops needed a guideline to fall back upon.
Therefore in 1943 the inspectior general for the armored forces wrote a pamphlet with 25 points critical for the Tigertank.
In this topic a few of the most important ones is written.
The pamphlet emphasized the importance of the unit in the breakthrough role and is provided guidance to keep the heavy tank batallion informes of its mission.
It also discussed the concept of breakthrough by the heavytank batallionb and exploitation by lighter, faster forces in second echelon waves.
In keeping with Guderians concept for the employment of tanks the pamphlet discusses the need to concentrate the bn to achieve maximum succes.
As with other doctrinal guidance the Pamphlet focussed on offensive operations, but it also provided some guidance for defensive actions.
The focus of the Pamphlet was on the concentration of all tanks in the desicive action.
This could be adapted in breakthroughs or or to mobile counterattacks conducted while in defensive posture.
The sections on movement and maintanance are important when considering the heavy tank bn as a mobile reserve in the defense.

1: Close liasion of Tigercommander with operationally responsible command HQ( is necessary)
Reason: Long range disposition is indispensable for the Tiger units.
All pre-operation preparations( recon and supply) require more time than with other weapons.

2: Issue orders for movement or action to Tiger commanders as quickley as possible.
Reason: As in 1

3: As a general principle issue orders to the Tigercommander first.
Reason : the tiger is the primary carrier of the breakthrough,they are incorporated in the first strike at the point of main effort (schwerpunkt)

4: Never place a Tiger unit under the command of an infantrydivision during an attack.
Reason: In difficult situations contacts will breakdown between division and batallion.
The infantry division lacks troops which, on the basis of their equipment and experience can fight with and keep up pace with the Tigers.
In most cases the tigers succes can not be exploited by the infantry and the conquered territory cannot be held.

5: As much as possible allow the Tiger to move alone.
Reason: The stress on the automotive parts of the tiger are least when its given the opprortunity to drive quickley without changing gears, breaking and restarting.
The tiger also disturbs the movement of other units.
Main roads, bridges and passages can be blocked for entire units by a single broken down Tigertank.

7: Do Not request forced marches.
Reason: The result will be high wear on the engine, transmission and running gear.
The tigers combat ability will than be used up on the road and not in combat.
(Average speed for a tiger is 10km/h by day and 7km/h at night)

8: Have tanks travel as little as possible.
Reason: During (long) movements the great weight of the tiger results in great wear on automotive parts, engine brakes.

9: On the defense a tiger unit must be held in the rear as a reserve.
Reason: They can react to enemy penetrations and destroy them from defensive positions.
Having them  in front of the defensive line gives the enemy a chance to outflank them and/or force them to retreat ( danger of breakdowns)

10: The Tiger unit must be the main asset for a commander to achieve a decisive action.
Reason: Concentrated use of the tiger at the point of main effort forces the succes.
Any dispersal of forces places it in question.

11: As a general principle employ the Tiger unit in coorporation with other weapons.
Reason: Following the penetration, it is the tigers task to push through the enemy artillery and smash it.
All other weapons mustsupport them toward reaching the objective.
Simultaniously light tanks and assault guns are to smash the enemy's heavy infantry weapons and antitank guns.
Friendly artillery provides suppresive fire against enemy artillery and covers the flanks of the attack.
Panzergrenadiers follow mounted on the tanks and occupy the conquered territory.
They also must protect the Tiger against close-in infantry and flank attacks.
Light tanks can exploit the succes and expand the tactical penetration into a succesfull breakthrough.

24: Following prolonged action , allow the Tiger batallion two to three weeks restore its fighting power.
Reason: After usage the systems need to be maintained and repaired.
Failing to do so will result in numerous mechanical breakdowns which will have negative effects on the units operational status and therefor to the outcome of a battle.

Source:
Sledgehammers (WIllbeck)
Panzerkampfwagen tiger (Spielberger)
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Alan65
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« Reply #1 on: 2 August 2010, 01:16:37 »
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Interesting list!

Isn't it funny that the command was still seeing it as an offensive weapon in '43?
The other issues seem to negate this thinking, however -- they break down a lot; travel alone and not for very long distances/time; concentrate forces but not the Tiger, etc. 
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the_13th_redneck
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« Reply #2 on: 2 August 2010, 01:39:17 »
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So basically a semi-mobile static gun.
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stoffel
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« Reply #3 on: 2 August 2010, 09:59:45 »
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Actually, if all precautions were taken a very succesfull weapon.
But often used wrong.
Only in 2 cases did a complete Tiger batallion attacked, causing heavy losses with the enemy and taking their objectives.
In Hungary the Germans lost 2 tanks by enemy fire, the other 30+ by mechanical breakdowns.
A lot of breakdowns also were caused by the drivers, stressing to much on the gear, only a good driver could avoid troubles but as in many other cases almost all good men were dead by that time.
Another huge problem was fuel, many Tigers were destroyed after running out of fuel.

Its often said that they should have relied on the MKIV and the Panther, which might have been a better solution.
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« Reply #4 on: 14 August 2010, 22:05:46 »
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So basically a semi-mobile static gun.


yes, but used wrongly

theu should've been used as mobile defenses and ambushes, instead they used them for attacking.....
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« Reply #5 on: 24 August 2010, 07:14:27 »
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Actually, if all precautions were taken a very succesfull weapon.
But often used wrong.
Only in 2 cases did a complete Tiger batallion attacked, causing heavy losses with the enemy and taking their objectives.
In Hungary the Germans lost 2 tanks by enemy fire, the other 30+ by mechanical breakdowns.
A lot of breakdowns also were caused by the drivers, stressing to much on the gear, only a good driver could avoid troubles but as in many other cases almost all good men were dead by that time.
Another huge problem was fuel, many Tigers were destroyed after running out of fuel.

Its often said that they should have relied on the MKIV and the Panther, which might have been a better solution.


I have never been a supporter of the idea to concentrate on the Mk IV my personal belief is that they should have concentrated on the Panther and developed the Mk IV solely in the tank destroyer and special purpose vehicle role because by 1945 the Mk IV was at best the equal of Russian vehicles but losing ground rapidly to newer generation vehicles from both East and West.
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We are more often treacherous through weakness than through calculation. ~Francois De La Rochefoucauld
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