Amazing: Plane-to-Plane Skydive

there'll certainly be champagne popped afterwards 

there'll certainly be champagne popped afterwards  (grounded or not)

ok, but I do see a difference...

the one guy has a small civil plane
the other has a B-52

yes, I know...when they crash they kill people...both of them

when I saw the vid I got scared when the vid went on and on....I'm not a flyer but I'm a still an ex-airforce dude so I've seen planes live and on vid doing stunts....with F-16's...not with B-52's...the feeling I got watching the vid is watching someone who every time he took off took it 1 step further...

why wasn't he stopped? was he so high-ranked?

the speed, or lack of, he's taking the corners with...well....you see it coming....and that on an airshow?

I will, I'll print it out tomorrow at work and have a read

Rattler,
  I read, with great interest, the posted analysis by Major Tony Kern, in his paper Darker Shades of Blue: A Case Study of Failed Leadership.  It is very well done, and I found myself seeing so many parallels to management dealing with leadership failures in civilian workplace jobs as well.  Clearly, in military circles, and to some extent, in Para-military type jobs, such as law enforcement, there is a great reluctance for management to discipline a fellow manager, "one of their own," so to speak.  I have found that several reasons come into play for such reluctance.  These all seem to apply to the accident at Fairchild as well as my civilian experiences.

1)   Management is hesitant to discipline a fellow manager because "management" chose to promote that individual to a leadership position.  By disciplining them, they are, in effect, disciplining themselves in a general way, for having made a promotional decision that probably wasn't such a good idea in the first place.  In other words, it makes them (management) collectively look bad.  This also fosters an accompanying climate of us versus them, management versus rank-and-file, because the non-managers are quick to point out that management has no qualms in disciplining them, but always seem reluctant to discipline a boss.

2)    With a high turnover rate of command which was the case at Fairchild, and in some large bureaucratic organizations, there is a tendency to view a managerial problem as something a manager only has to deal with until the manager is transferred away to another duty station.  Then the problem is no longer theirs, and becomes that of the new guy.  At Fairchild, it seems the commanders rotated out fairly quickly, checking off another command box and moving on to bigger or better jobs.  In a large bureaucracy, the managers may not move around so often, so then the solution is to move the problem to another duty station.  But, the ideal situation for the manager is to plunge their head into the sand, hope that nothing bad happens during their tour of duty, and then move on quickly and safely, with the problem continuing for the next guy.

3)   The out-going commander or head manager may be reluctant to brief the new guy about problems in his command, because this will reflect poorly on the out-going manager’s ability to command.  In the case of Fairchild, each out-going commander knew the problems with their “rogue” B-52 pilot/expert, but chose not to bring the new commander up to speed on him, because the system allowed for them to quickly and quietly move away from the problem, and without any sort of written record, they couldn’t be scrutinized for any failure to command properly.  If a manager is reluctant to lead or manage, then his safest recourse is to quietly slip away from his former post, with no formal record or even verbal conversation with the new commander, and thus he leaves the new appointee cold, starting out with no knowledge of any ongoing problems he should be aware of.  The out-going manager will probably believe, or tell himself to justify it in his own mind, that the incoming commander or manager should be the one to discover problems inherent with his new command.  The old adage that “I had to discover all the problems when I arrived, so he should have to do the same thing when he comes in” simply perpetuates the problems inherent with the system.  Over time this behavior and lack of leadership actually becomes the expected norm for managers or commanders.  They don’t expect, or even want, to be told about ongoing problems in their new command, preferring to discover them on their own.  This then becomes a test of their own leadership prowess.

All of this is amazing to people who have not experienced this sort of action, because they inevitably ask the valid question, “If this was known all along, why didn’t someone do something?”  Those who live it everyday become inured to the situation, knowing that it is endemic to the job, and that until the “leaders” do something about it, there is nothing they can do to fix the situation.  They themselves hope for transfers, but in the case of Fairchild, many chose the drastic and probably career-damaging course of action of refusing to fly with Lt. Col. Holland.  Many more simply knew something really bad had to happen soon, and as one put it,

Red flags of warning were abundant-- and yet those who could act did not do so, in spite of recommendations to ground Bud Holland. As one B-52 crewmember said about the accident, "You could see it, hear it, feel it, and smell it coming. We were all just trying to be somewhere else when it happened." 6
 
Incredibly enough, all those who refused to fly with him were probably ending a long-term career with the Air Force, as long as commanders continued to protect Lt. Col Holland.  The terrible accident resulting in the death of Holland and his crew forced the Air Force to reconsider their position.  The men who refused to fly with Holland were vindicated in their fears and concerns, and the Air Force had to act.  However, all those who were brave enough to stand up and refuse to fly with Holland had inexorably damaged their careers, and would likely not be promoted or get decent postings, simply because they had tried to make the commanders do something that should have been done long ago.

I have seen dangerous incompetence promoted, and then kept around even though they were clearly mistakes and should never have been promoted in the first place.  They usually end up quietly promoted or transferred to some HQ position, where they either finish out in imposed obscurity, or re-invent themselves and come out of HQ even more dangerous than before.  But rarely, if ever, are they downgraded, having their promotions rescinded and being relegated back to being rank-and-file.  Management will protect their lower-level managers, unless the mistakes made by them are so grievous in nature that no upper level manager will risk their own careers to protect the guy.  And even then, if possible, they will pigeon-hole the problem manager into some safe place, where he allegedly can’t hurt anyone – meaning he can’t hurt anyone’s career, rather than hurt someone in the non-manager category. 

The commander in the Fairchild accident, Col. Pellerin, got off lightly in his punishment, and likely his contemporaries all shook their heads and clucked about how unlucky Pellerin was, because “but for the grace of God” it could have been one of them.

Rattler, do we know what happened to Major Tony Kern?  After he published this paper, I would imagine that his career in the Air Force was essentially ended.  The Big Birds would have closed ranks and seen to it that he was punished for his temerity.  Perhaps, banished to laundry and morale officer in Greenland?  I have seen it happen, often.

Thanks for posting this.  It is a sad commentary on the failures of our leaders, both in uniform and in high manager positions.  Kern’s article was excellent, and right on target.

                                 Heinrich505