Generalkommando III. FlakkorpsFormed February 22nd, 1944 in Paris from Stab/11. Flak Division, subordinated to Luftflotte 3:
* 16th Flak Division at Lille
* 18th Flak Brigade (mot.) at Cambrai
* 19th Flak Brigade (mot.) at Hertogenbosch
Most of the korps was destroyed in the Falaise Pocket. The remains of the korps withdrew to Germany. It was in the Cochem area September 1944, supporting Heeresgruppe B, which was under the command of Luftwaffenkommando West.
The third Flakkorps was a rather unique unit. There existed other Flak Korps on the eastern front, but they were only partly composed of motorized units. The III. Flak Korps was made up of motorized units only, even though there were shortages of vehicles.
It is common to emphasize the anti-tank role of the 88 mm Flak gun. However, this seems not to be consistent with the employement of the III. Flakkorps.
The fact that the 88 mm Flak was not suitable for anti-tank misisons was also clearly recognized by the commanders and men serving in the III. Flakkorps. Both in the post-war manuscript produced by the korps commander, Wolfgang Pickert, and in a report, dated 20 September 1944, discussing the experiences from the actions of the korps during the battles in Normandy, this is clear.
First and foremost, the korps was employed in the air defence role. This was the main mission and initially it extended from the front to a line from Falaise to Le Beny Bocage8. The second important mission of the korps was to provide indirect fire to support the ground combat units. The chief reason for this was the shortage of GHQ artillery. Due to the range of the 88 mm guns, this could often be provided from the positions they were to protect from air attack.
If enemy tanks had broken through, the flak units were expected to engage them if they reached the positions of the flak. Also, the corps was supplied with Flakkampfgruppen. These were created for ground combat.
However, they did not arrive at the korps until it was already in Normandy. When these Flakkampfgruppen arrived, they were deemed to be insufficiently trained. Consequently they were placed in the Trun area to train and were not sent into combat until the British Goodwood offensive opertation in July.
Each Flakkampfgruppe consisted of four Flakkamftruppen, which each had two 88 mm Flak guns. Three such Flakkamfgruppen were created.
The Flakkampfgruppen were not very successful in combat. The results were not in proportion to the casualties. They lost about 35 88 mm guns and 70 light Flak guns, while the number of tanks they knocked out were assessed to be twenty.
The main components of the korps were the four Flak Sturm Regiments. These were numbered 1 - 4. These had been formed by utilizing the regiment staffs 32, 36, 37 and 79 respectively. It seems that these numbers were occasionally used in Normandy too , which probably have caused some confusion as to which Flak units actually participated in the battle. The regiments had recently recieved their Flak Sturm designation when the allied forces landed.
Nominally each regiment was supposed to have three battalions with five batteries each. Three of the batteries were supposed to have 88 mm guns and two were to be equipped with light AA guns. Altogether this meant that the corps was supposed to have 36 batteries with heavy guns and 24 with light guns.
In reality, the organization of the corps did not correspond exactly to this pattern. On 23 June, it had 27 heavy batteries and 26 light batteries. This had increased to 29 heavy and 40 light batteries by 8 August. Since a heavy battery had four 88 mm guns, the authorized strength of the korps included 108 such guns on 23 June and 116 on 8 August. Three of the heavy batteries had the more powerful 88 mm Flak 41. With its higher muzzle velocity it also had much better armour penetration capabilities than the 88 mm Flak 18/36/37 which made up the vast majority of the heavy batteries.
On D-Day Flak Sturm Rgeiments 2, 3 and 4 were located around the Somme-estuary, while Flak Sturm Regiment 1 was deployed between Isigny and Bayeux. The latter regiment had recently been redeployed to that area.
The corps (minus Flak Sturm Regiment 1) received orders on afternoon D-Day to move to Normandy as rapidly as possible. During the night between 6 and 7 June the korps had reached Paris. Most of the korps had reached positions south west of Caen on the evening 8 June.
During the march to Normandy the korps suffered greater casualties than most German units marching to Normandy.
The march to Normandy did not only result in losses for the korps. It also shot down about 35 aircraft during the movement to Normandy.
Ammunition supply was a problem for most German units in Normandy and the III. Flakkorps was no exception. Since no ammunition had been stored in advance in Normandy, the distances to haul the ammunition to the korps were long. Despite these difficulties the Flakkorps was probably better off than the army.
The korps received the following number of new guns during its actions in Normandy:
53 88 mm guns
36 37 mm guns
72 20 mm guns
12 20 mm guns (4-barreled)
As has been emphasized above, the korps was mainly employed in the air defence role, not in the anti-tank role. This is also reflected in the claims by the korps during the Normandy battle:
Aircraft shot down: 462
Tanks Destroyed: 92
Armored Cars Destroyed: 14
Of the tanks destroyed about twelve fell victims to the man-held Panzerfaust close range antitank weapon.
The number of tanks claimed is quite small. Given the fact that Army and Waffen SS units claimed to have destroyed 3,663 enemy tanks from 6 June to 21 August, the III. Flakkorps can not be regarded as a very important part of German anti-tank defences.
According to Pickert the casualties were mainly caused by artillery. Air attacks on AA units in firing positions had relatively little effect.
Mainly the corps was employed on the eastern half of the German front in Normandy, against the British units. In particular its participation in halting the British Goodwood operation warrants certain comments. In several publications it is stated that this korps employed "144 AT/AA guns". Probably this refers to 88 mm guns, but the number 144 seem to have been derived by assuming that the korps had four regiments with three battalions each and that each battalion had twelve 88 mm guns. However, each battalion did not have twelve 88 mm guns. As shown above the korps had fewer than 144 88 mm guns. Also the guns were not "AT/AA guns" but AA guns.
The Flak Sturm Regiments were employed so far to the rear that the British armour units did not encounter them during the operation. The three Flakkampfgruppen were however deployed further forward and they did become involved in combat. Since they only had a T/O&E; strength of eight 88 mm Flak guns each these units were hardly significant.
The Flak Sturm Regiments were employed so far to the rear that the British armour units did not encounter them during the operation. The three Flakkampfgruppen were however deployed further forward and they did become involved in combat. Since they only had a T/O&E; strength of eight 88 mm Flak guns each these units were hardly significant.
Finally, it is worth discussing why the 88 mm Flak gun has received such a repution, in the history of operation Overlord. In 1940 and 1941, when the German antitank defences mainly consisted of the 37 mm AT gun, the 88 mm Flak 36 was significantly superior in terms of armour pentration and range. With the introduction of the 75 mm Pak 40, the superiority of the 88 mm Flak 36 was relatively marginal. However, it seems that the image of the all-pervasive 88 mm Flak guns was created in the early years of the war, largely in North Africa. During much of the fighting in North Africa British tank units were equipped with tanks armed with guns that had no HE ammunition. Also the cooperation between British tanks and artillery was often abysmal. In Normandy the behaviour of British forces was quite different however. Hence, the drawbacks of the 88 mm Flak gun, described above, were much more pronounced. But still the image of the "88 mm Flak" seem to have been vivid.
PRIMARY SOURCES:Book ReferencesU.S. War Department Handbook on German Military Forces
Verbunde und Truppen der Deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen SS 1939-1945 Units 1-5
Verbunde und Truppen der Deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen SS 1939-1945 Units 6-14
Verbunde und Truppen der Deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen SS 1939-1945 Units 15-30
Websites referencing III Flakkorp Units:III Flakkorps:http://www.ww2.dk/ground/hq/iiiflak.htmhttp://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/gerob/gerob.html2nd Flak Division:http://www.ww2.dk/ground/flak/2fladiv.htm7th Flak Divisionhttp://www.ww2.dk/ground/flak/7fladiv.htm16th Flak Divisionhttp://www.ww2.dk/ground/flak/16fladiv.htm22nd Flak Divisionhttp://www.ww2.dk/ground/flak/22fladiv.htm