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 1 
 on: 29 February 2024, 09:18:46 
Started by Rattler - Last post by Rattler
Huh?Huh?Huh??A little info on Russian Fab-500 ordnance power:

In total, bombs of about 500KG carry about 200KG of explosive, type Huh??-5?.
The efficiency of this type of explosive is 1.3 compared to TNT, so the equivalent is about 300kg.

Air shock wave impact zones in a ground explosion:
- radius of 100% lethal impact zone: 10.8 m (hereinafter - from the epicentre of the explosion).
- radius of the threshold kill zone: 38.2 m (slight contusion).
- Radius of the zone of minimal human exposure: 152.1 m (tinnitus).
- radius of the zone of total destruction: 21.9 m (collapse of all elements of buildings and structures, including basements).
- radius of severe destruction zone: 30.3 m (destruction of 50% of walls, floors, formation of cracks).
- radius of medium destruction zone: 43.6 m (damage to roofs, partitions and infills).
- radius of the weak damage zone: 68.6 m (weakening of load-bearing structures).
- Radius of 100% glazing damage zone: 115.4 m.
- radius of the glazing damage zone: 342,5 ?.

Characteristics of the fragmentation field:
- maximum number of hazardous fragments: 81750 pieces (with ideal hull crushing).
- average mass of a fragment dangerous for a person: 2 grammes.
- initial velocity of fragments: 1127.3 m/s.
- max. relative killing effect of a fragment (mass 2 g): 0.9 (killing effect of a 9x18 mm PM bullet = 1).
- max. relative stopping power of a fragment (2 g mass): 2.8 (9x18 mm PM = 1).
- max. fragmentation range: 1470 metres.
- radius of continuous fragmentation zone (70% probability*): 100,2 ?.
- radius of effective fragmentation zone (50% probability*): 118,5 ?.
- radius of the zone of possible fragmentation damage (20% probability*): 187,4 ?.
- radius of unlikely fragmentation damage zone (probability of 1%*): 838,2 ?.
* - minimum percentage of people who will be hit by at least one fragment at the boundary of this impact zone.

In practice, when a bomb is detonated in an open area, the kill characteristics will be lower than calculated. In a confined space, the explosion is about 1.5 times more destructive, due to ricochets of fragments and overlapping of air shock waves reflected from the walls.

 2 
 on: 18 February 2024, 06:45:06 
Started by Rattler - Last post by Rattler
RUS-UKR war SITREP FEB 17 2024 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, Februar 17, 2024

Cutoff: 171940Zfeb24

Key Takeaways:

    - Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that Russian forces have established “full control” over Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast as Russian forces continued to advance in the settlement on February 17, and Ukrainian forces have likely withdrawn from Avdiivka.
    - Russian sources largely characterized the Ukrainian withdrawal as disorganized and costly and claimed that Russian forces managed to encircle large Ukrainian groups in Avdiivka, but ISW has observed no evidence supporting these Russian claims.
    - Russian forces appear to have temporarily established limited and localized air superiority and were able to provide ground troops with close air support during the final days of their offensive operation to capture Avdiivka, likely the first time that Russian forces have done so in Ukraine.
    - Delays in Western security assistance may lead to further significant constraints on Ukrainian air defenses that could allow Russian forces to replicate the close air support that facilitated Russian advances in Avdiivka at scale in Ukraine.
    - Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down three Russian fighter aircraft—two Su-34s and one Su-35—over Donetsk Oblast on February 17, likely having committed scarce air defense assets to help cover the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Avdiivka.
    - Russian authorities arrested several hundred demonstrators on February 17 amid slightly larger demonstrations responding to imprisoned opposition politician Alexei Navalny’s death.
    - The US Department of Justice (DoJ) announced on February 17 that the US sent $500,000 of forfeited Russian funds to Estonia to repair Ukraine’s energy infrastructure
    - Russian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Avdiivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast
    - Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to propagandize and militarize Ukrainian youth in occupied areas.


Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2024

 3 
 on: 1 February 2024, 15:42:09 
Started by FACman - Last post by S-1
Evrin, new album, In the late inning.

My sister has terminal cancer.
She was helped by no guts no glory foundation to record a new LP.
If you like it please share and get her on the radio worldwide!

https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=OLAK5uy_nsI6_VU9_BZW7F9h4s0fY9bwqfK-3oCWs

 4 
 on: 30 October 2023, 08:55:52 
Started by Rattler - Last post by Rattler
RUS-UKR war SITREP OCT 12 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 12, 2023

Cutoff: 121830Zoct23

NOTE: ISW has added a new section on Russian information operations and narratives to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, found at the end of the update.

Key Takeaways:

    - Russian forces likely launched a significant and ongoing offensive effort around Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast on October 10, and ISW is revising its initial assessment these attacks are a limited effort to fix Ukrainian forces.
    - Russian forces have not secured any major breakthroughs near Avdiivka as of October 12 and are unlikely to immediately cut off Ukrainian forces in the city.
    - Geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have likely lost at least a battalion tactical group’s (BTG’s) worth of armored vehicles in offensive operations around Avdiivka.
    - The Russian information space is likely exaggerating the degree of Russian successes on the Avdiivka front and will continue to do so despite military failures or a slow pace of advance.
    - Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in both sectors of the front on October 12.
    - Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky advocated for Russian forces to freeze the frontlines in Ukraine in order to replace exhausted mobilized personnel with fresh contract servicemen and launch a renewed offensive effort.
    - Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes across Ukraine, targeting port infrastructure in southern Ukraine and critical infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast on the night of October 11 to 12.
    - Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, around Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizha Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
    - Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on October 12 that the Russian military has recruited more than 357,000 contract, volunteer, and conscripted military personnel since January 1, 2023.
    - Russian authorities continue to persecute religious communities in occupied Ukraine as part of ongoing Russian efforts to destroy the Ukrainian identity.

Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2023

 5 
 on: 30 October 2023, 08:52:44 
Started by Rattler - Last post by Rattler
RUS-UKR war SITREP OCT 11 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 11, 2023

Cutoff: 111730Zoct23

NOTE: ISW has added a new section on Russian information operations and narratives to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, found at the end of the update.

Key Takeaways:

    - Ongoing localized Russian offensive operations near Avdiivka likely demonstrate the ability of Russian forces ability to learn and apply tactical battlefield lessons in Ukraine. These tactical-level adaptations and successes, however, are unlikely to necessarily translate into wider operational and strategic gains for Russian forces.
    - Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in both sectors of the front on October 11.
    - A large number of NATO member states recently announced aid packages to Ukraine against the backdrop of the 16th Ukraine Defense Group Contact Group meeting in Brussels, Belgium on October 11.
    - Russia’s Federation Council Defense and Security Committee voted to replace Senator Viktor Bondarev with Senator Vladimir Bulavin as Federation Council Defense and Security Committee Head on October 10.
    - Russian military command continues to celebrate the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) for its service in Ukraine, despite claims that the brigade was defeated and reportedly transferred to the Kherson direction.
    - Armenia continues to ostensibly distance itself from Russia after a decades-long security relationship.
    - Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on October 11.
    - Russian opposition outlet Sever Realii reported on October 11 that Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) representatives may have recruited over 1,000 convicts to serve in the Russian MoD-affiliated Redut private military company (PMC).
    - Russian occupation authorities are suffering staff shortages at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).

Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2023

 6 
 on: 30 October 2023, 08:48:36 
Started by Rattler - Last post by Rattler
RUS-UKR war SITREP OCT 10 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 10, 2023

Cutoff: 101700Zoct23

Key Takeaways:

    - Russian forces launched localized offensive operations in the Avdiivka area of Donetsk Oblast and southwest of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 9, which are likely intended to fix Ukrainian forces away from the Robotyne area.
    - The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed up to three Russian battalions conducted an attack in the Avdiivka direction, and ISW has observed footage of fighting in the area, but ISW has not observed any confirmation of these claimed Russian advances as of this writing.
    - Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made confirmed advances in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
    - Russian military leadership may have once again replaced the commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA), suggesting ongoing pervasive Russian command and control issues in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
    - Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced plans to open a new corridor through Moldova and Romania for the export of Ukrainian grain.
    - Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on October 10.
    - The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Luhansk Oblast occupation authorities are cracking down against Ukrainian underground communication networks.

Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2023

 7 
 on: 9 October 2023, 04:45:37 
Started by Rattler - Last post by Rattler
RUS-UKR war SITREP OCT 8 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 8, 2023

Cutoff: 081630Zoct23

Key Takeaways:

    - Russia advanced legal mechanisms to form the Leningrad Military District as part of ongoing large-scale military reforms.

Russian state media noted that the proposal indicates that the Northern Fleet (NF) will no longer be a separate military-administrative unit equal to a military district, suggesting that the NF and its four constituent regions (The Komi Republic, Arkhangelsk, and Murmansk oblasts, and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug) will be transferred to the reformed Leningrad Military District.[2] Russian military analyst Yuri Fedorov noted that the recreation of the Leningrad Military District suggests that Russia is preparing for possible conflicts with Baltic states and NATO.[3] The Russian military merged the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts into the Western Military District in 2010.[4] The MoD created the Northern Fleet in 2014 out of territory covered by the Western Military District, and Russian President Vladimir Putin made the NF a military-administrative unit equal to a military district starting January 1, 2021.[5] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu proposed the recreation of the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts on the basis of the Western Military District (reversing the 2010 and 2014 changes) in December of 2022, and confirmed that these military districts were under active formation as of August 2023.[6] The MoD’s decision to re-divide the WMD indicates Russia sees the need to restructure its forces facing NATO and likely posture on the Finnish border, although it remains unclear how Russia will be able to mobilize, train, and organize these forces into new military district-level formations.

    - Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and marginally advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 8.
    - Russian forces are intensifying mining efforts in the Robotyne-Verbove area and seek to fix Ukrainian forces on areas of the front away from western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have begun remining previously cleared areas on the Robotyne-Verbove line (10km south to 18km southeast of Orikhiv) to achieve tactical surprise.[12] The milbloggers claimed that heavy Russian mining and remining efforts have disrupted the movement of heavy Ukrainian cargo and equipment in these areas in recent days. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces intensified tactical offensive operations in several areas of the front beyond Zaporizhia Oblast in order to stretch Ukrainian defenses and divide Ukrainian attention.[13] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces are trying to fix Ukrainian forces in the Avdiivka and Marinka directions and prevent them from deploying reserves to the Zaporizhia direction.[14]

    - Russian sources are highlighting apparent fault lines between regular Russian forces and irregular formations of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR).
    - Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat expressed concern over an anticipated Russian Shahed 131/136 drone strike campaign against Ukraine this winter.
    - The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) observed satellite imagery showing that rail traffic between North Korea and Russia “dramatically” increased since Russian President Vladimir Putin met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un on September 12-17

CSIS’ Beyond Parallel project found that satellite imagery captured on October 5 showed an “unprecedented” 73 freight railcars at the North Korea’s Tumangang Rail Facility. Beyond Parallel noted that previous satellite images showed a maximum of approximately 20 railcars at the Tumangang facility at once over the past five years. Beyond Parallel also observed shipping crates/containers and equipment laid out in the open at the main warehouse area at the Tumangang facility, although the contents of the transported goods remain unclear. Beyond Parallel remarked that the external characteristics of the containers and equipment are different from those observed during the past five years at the facility and assessed that it is “probable that these shipments are, or include, munitions and artillery.” Russian milbloggers and sources amplified Beyond Parallel findings in the Russian information space without confirming or denying the possibility of North Korean arms supplies to Russia.[22] ISW previously assessed that Putin may be open to some forms of technological and defensive cooperation with North Korea in return for North Korean artillery ammunition as long as such cooperation does not trigger secondary sanctions against Russia.[23]

    - The Russian federal government continues to disenfranchise certain ethnic minority federal subjects (regions) while selectively empowering others.
    - Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, western Donetsk Oblast, and on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border on October 8 and reportedly advanced in some areas.
    - Prague-based Russian-language outlet Current Time reported on October 8 that the number of desertion cases within the Russian military has increased.

Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2023

 8 
 on: 9 October 2023, 04:31:41 
Started by Rattler - Last post by Rattler
RUS-UKR war SITREP OCT 7 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 7, 2023

Cutoff: 071800Zoct23

Key Takeaways:

    - The Kremlin is already and will likely continue to exploit the Hamas attacks in Israel to advance several information operations intended to reduce US and Western support and attention to Ukraine.

The Kremlin amplified several information operations following Hamas attacks in Israel on October 7, primarily blaming the West for neglecting conflicts in the Middle East in favor of supporting Ukraine and claiming the international community will cease to pay attention to Ukraine by portraying attention to the Middle East or alternatively Ukraine as a zero-sum comparison. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev claimed the United States and its allies should have been “busy with” working on “Palestinian-Israeli settlement” rather than “interfering” with Russia and providing Ukraine with military aid.[1] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) accused the West of blocking efforts by a necessary “quartet” of Russia, the US, the European Union, and the United Nations, leading to an escalation in violence, implicitly blaming the West for the current fighting.[2] Prominent Russian propagandist Sergei Mardan directly stated that Russia will benefit from the escalation as the world “will take its mind off Ukraine for a while and get busy once again putting out the eternal fire in the Middle East.

    - Several key sources within the Russian information space shifted the focus of their daily coverage to the situation in Israel on October 7, which may impact the information environment around the war in Ukraine in the coming days or weeks.

Many Russian milbloggers focused largely on the Hamas attacks in Israel on October 7, and some promoted Kremlin information operations by claiming that the West’s attention has shifted away from Ukraine and towards Israel.[4] This focus on Israel even prompted one Russian milblogger to urge others to not “forget” about the war in Ukraine.[5]  ISW cannot forecast at this time how the source environment will change as the Hamas attacks in Israel unfold but will provide clear updates on any impact on ISW’s ability to collect from Russian milbloggers and geolocation sources, and subsequent effects on the detail available ISW can provide in these daily assessments.

    - Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 7 and reportedly advanced in both directions.
    - Russian forces conducted a series of missile strikes targeting Ukrainian rear areas and port infrastructure on the night of October 6-7.
    - The Russian government approved legislation temporarily restricting the border checkpoints that Ukrainian citizens can use to enter Russia from third countries, likely focused on Belarus and the Baltic States, likely in response to continued concern over the security of Russian border regions and possible Ukrainian infiltration efforts.
    - Belarusian officials are leveraging international partnerships in an attempt to legitimize Belarus’ role in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children.
    - Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky stated that Russian “patriotic” communities remain vulnerable to division due to Russian officials’ failure to consolidate society, particularly after Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s June 24 rebellion.
    - The Russian MoD highlighted the production of the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on October 7, supporting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statements about successful tests of the missile on October 5 as part of a continued nuclear brinkmanship information operation.
    - Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in some areas on October 7.
    - Ukrainian partisan activity reportedly killed a United Russia official in occupied Kherson Oblast.

Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2023

 9 
 on: 9 October 2023, 04:24:11 
Started by Rattler - Last post by Rattler
RUS-UKR war SITREP OCT 6 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 6, 2023

Cutoff: 061800Zoct23

Key Takeaways:

    - Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 6.
    - Russian forces appear to have recently conducted a regimental rotation in the Orikhiv area, demonstrating an ability to sustain their defenses in this critical sector of the frontline.
    - ISW previously assessed that Russian forces were likely struggling to conduct tactical to operational level rotations along the entire frontline, but is revising this assessment considering the apparent rotation of substantial elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division and two VDV divisions to and from the frontline south of Orikhiv.
    - Russian forces reportedly resumed an offensive effort near Kupyansk on October 6, but the majority of the Russian forces reportedly deployed to this sector of the front likely remain combat ineffective.
    - Russian forces may be expanding military training infrastructure in occupied eastern Ukraine as part of ongoing efforts to increase the training and mobilization capacity of the Russian military.
    - The Kremlin’s continued attempts to deflect blame for the crash of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s plane and disgrace Prigozhin are generating continued praise for Prigozhin and efforts to defend his legacy among select information space communities.
    - Former Russian military commanders who participated in the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reportedly remain in peripheral positions of some influence within the Russian military or defense-industrial base.
    - Russian forces conducted a Shahed-131/136 drone strike targeting port, grain, and border infrastructure in southern Ukraine on the night of October 5-6.
    - Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Lyman line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
    - Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut and advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
    - Russia has reportedly recruited up to several hundred Serbian nationals to fight in Ukraine.

Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2023

 10 
 on: 1 October 2023, 05:39:09 
Started by Rattler - Last post by Rattler
RUS-UKR war SITREP SEP 30 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 30, 2023

Cutoff: 301700Zsep23

Key Takeaways:

    - Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Bakhmut on September 30.
    - The Kremlin has seemingly not yet clarified what Ukrainian territories it claims that Russia has annexed, leading to continued confusion among Russian government and occupation officials a year after the illegal annexation of occupied territories.
    - Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes primarily targeting Vinnytsia Oblast on the night of September 29 to 30.
    - Russian milbloggers claimed on September 30 that the Russian military command removed the commander of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade following recent outrage from milbloggers about the brigade’s command.
    - An organization with alleged ties to Russian First Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko is reportedly categorizing Russian internet user data in an effort to disseminate tailored information to specific domestic populations as part of a wider attempt to control the Russian information space.
    - Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, Kreminna, Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and marginally advanced along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
    - Russian authorities have started to conscript citizens in occupied Ukraine who have Russian passports.
    - Russian authorities continue to forcibly deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia in order to assimilate Ukrainian children into Russian culture.

Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2023

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