Operation Shenandoah II

US Military Operation in Vietnam.

27 September - 19 November 1967

1st Infantry Division operation in Binh Long and Binh Duong Province. The operation was extended to include the Loc Ninh area of Binh Long Province after enemy attacks on the district town 29 October 1967. The operation claimed 956 known enemy casualties plus capturing food, weapons, ammo, and supplies.

VC/NVA KIA's: 956
US KIA's: 5


Primary Sources:
www.3rdmarines.net

http://www.flyarmy.org/panel/battle/67092700.HTM



Good Hunting

MR

Hill 86
by Douglas N. Field



On September 17, 1966 Company B, 2nd Battalion 327 Infantry's command post, located on Hill 86 near the village of Tuy An in Phu Yen Province, was attacked and overrun by an overwhelming superior enemy force employing numerous grenades, satchel charges, and automatic weapons, supported by mortars and machine guns.


The attack, which took place in a driving rain storm, was launched at 0030 hours and with such force, the command post defenses quickly collapsed. The enemy force was estimated at over 100 men consisting of NVA regulars, supported by local main force VC. Bravo company's commanding officer, executive officer, an artillery officer and seven other troops were killed. An additional 15 officers and men were wounded, including the company First Sergeant and the First Platoon Leader, who were both seriously wounded. Every member of the command post element was either killed or wounded in the devastating attack.


During September 1966 Bravo company, along with Alpha and Charlie companies, were participating in Operation Seward in Phu Yen Province. The mission was to protect the rice harvest in the Tuy Hoa and Tuy An areas, and conduct search and destroy operations to locate NVA and VC forces. A number of NVA units, including the 18B and 95th regiments, as well as main force VC battalions, were known to be in the area. The NVA's 5th division headquarters, which had operational control over the 18B and 95th regiments, was also thought to be in the province.


The 2nd Battalion 327th had engaged the same NVA regiments three months earlier during operation Nathan Hale in Trung Luong valley, about 10 kilometers from Hill 86. The NVA lost 437 KIAs in this engagement and the 2nd Battalion 327th earned a Presidential Unit Citation for their efforts. Many members of Bravo company killed or wounded on Hill 86 fought at the battle of Trung Luong and were wounded in action there also.


Bravo company's commanding officer, Captain Joseph B. Mack, thirty-one years old from Marietta, GA, had commanded Company B since May and was known to be an aggressive leader. He was in command of Bravo Company when it was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for the battle of Trung Luong in June, and also earlier in the same month at Dak To in operation Hawthorne, which earned Company B another Presidential Unit Citation, making the company one of the most decorated units in Vietnam.


Since finding and fixing enemy targets was one of the most challenging and frustrating elements of combat U.S. troops encountered in Vietnam, Captain Mack had maintained his command post on Hill 86 for almost two weeks in an effort to draw out the NVA/VC forces. To locate the enemy, Bravo company's platoons, broken down in small units, conducted search and destroy patrols and night ambushes over a wide area. Unfortunately on September 17th his plan back fired and the enemy took advantage of the limited security at the CP to inflict a devastating blow to the very heart of the company leadership. Captain Mack died courageously in defense of his country on Hill 86. He was promoted to the rank of Major posthumously.


|On the evening of September 16th the activities at the CP were much like the previous night's. In what had become a routine, hot chow was brought in by helicopter, a squad from one of the platoons was relieved from normal night ambush duty to provide security and preparations were made for another night on Hill 86. Intelligence sources had not indicated any unusual enemy activity in the vicinity and the officers and men of Bravo company settled in for what had become a fairly uneventful and monotonous routine for them.


There were, however, some ominous signs that Bravo company was not in for an ordinary night. Two Vietnamese interpreters, who had been with the company for some time providing translation for the Americans in their dealings with the local populace and enemy prisoners, disappeared without warning just before sunset. The interpreters had been considered loyal to the American soldiers, but as the events of that night unfolded it was obvious they had been providing valuable intelligence to the enemy.


The other indication this would not be a typical night at the Bravo company CP was the lack of peasants in the village at the base of Hill 86. Normally the village was bustling with people as many of the rice harvesters, who farmed the fields surrounding Hill 86, lived in the village. When a small detail of men went to the village in the late afternoon to fill canteens for the CP element they noticed there were very few people around. A number of these villagers had been allowed to go to the CP on Hill 86 during the proceeding two weeks, providing them the ability to gather intelligence for the enemy.


As sunset approached the command element and the men securing the CP began their preparations for the night. The top of the hill, which was triangular in shape, had two sides with fairly steep access and a gently slopping side that provided easy access from below. The gentle sloped side faced south and led to the village below. The side on the top of the triangle faced north, and the other two sides faced east and west. Since the most vulnerable access to the CP was the finger on the south side, the M60 machine gun crew was positioned there. The west side of the hill top presented another way up from the base as the slope was steep, but could be climbed. Two defensive positions were set up on this side. The east and north sides of the hill had very steep slopes and therefore were not considered to be vulnerable from attack from below.


The hill top was mostly rock and hard packed soil. Even though the CP had been on the hill for two weeks the defensive positions were not improved much due to the difficulty in digging in the soil. Inside the perimeter the situation was the same and holes were barely a few feet deep, hardly providing any protection from the intense mortar barrage, grenade and satchel charge attack that would rain down upon the CP later that night.


As the sun set and the day turned to night it began to rain. Not just a normal rain, but a torrential down pour. The guard rotation was established at the three defensive positions and the command group settled it for what they thought would be a routine, although very wet night.


At 0030 hours, in the driving rain, the first mortar rounds began to land on the CP. Two 50 caliber machine guns also trained on the hill top began firing from enemy positions to the north and east of Hill 86. The mortar rounds landed right on target as the enemy had their weapons zeroed in with deadly accuracy. As many of the defensive positions provided little or no cover the mortar rounds took their immediate toll, killing and wounding many of the defenders. The 50's also found their marks.


The first wave of the enemy's ground assault began while the mortar rounds were still landing. Enemy sappers throwing satchel charges and grenades attacked and overran the M60 position and sprinted inside the perimeter to the heart of the CP. The explosive devices achieved their deadly objective and many casualties resulted. Many of the Bravo company command group and defenders were hit multiple times by mortar rounds, grenades and satchel charges.


A second assault was then launched by the enemy. In this assault approximately 100 enemy soldiers led by a NVA officer, blowing a bugle, charged up the hill. With the M60 machine and its crew having been wiped out, the enemy soldiers met no resistance and ran directly into the center of the perimeter.


The remaining men in the two positions on the west side of the hill, not killed in the initial mortar and grenade attack, attempted to provide fire support. With the visibility close to zero due to the driving rain and the confusion created by the attacking force now inside the perimeter, the few men in the defensive positions were not able to mount any type of counter attack.


PFC Douglas Field, twenty years old now living in Peachtree City, GA, wounded in the initial mortar attack and later by grenade fragments, recalls he stood up and began firing his weapon at shadowy figures in khaki uniforms and black pajamas inside the perimeter, killing or wounding several. He also recalls seeing his squad leader, Staff Sergeant James McGill, stand up and attempt to fire a LAW (Light Anti-Tank Weapon) at a group of enemy soldiers. PFC Field remembers thinking the LAW is a tricky weapon to set up and fire under normal circumstances and how difficult the task would be in these conditions. Sergeant McGill seemed to be suspended in time as he prepared to fire the LAW. Just as he fired it, Sergeant McGill was hit and crumbled to the ground. PFC Field recovered from his wounds and returned to B Co, volunteered for a second tour in 1967 and completed his service in 1968.


There were individual battles and acts of courage going on all over the hill top. First Sergeant Thomas Pulliam, forty one years old now living in Sanford, North Carolina, and a World War II and Korean War veteran was grievously wounded in the battle, losing an eye and suffering a serious leg wound. Despite his injuries Sergeant Pulliam became engaged in hand to hand combat with one of the enemy soldiers. In the fight he lost his jungle fatigue jacket, in the pocket of which was his gold Gruen watch. The watch was found after daybreak by a member of Bravo company's third platoon, Sp4 Four Anthony Burgee. Sergeant Pulliam was medivacted for his injuries and assumed he would never see it again. Thirty-three years later Sergeant Pulliam and Sp4 Burgee were reunited at an awards ceremony at Ft Campbell, KY to honor the men of the 2nd 327 with the Presidential Unit Citation for the Battle of Trung Luong. At that time Sp4 Burgee gladly returned the watch to its rightful owner. First Sergeant Pulliam retired after a long distinguished career in the Army as a Command Sergeant Major.


1Lt. Louis McDonald, Platoon Leader of Bravo company's first platoon now living in California, also displayed great personal courage during the assault. He was wounded several times including being hit by an explosion from a satchel charge, which he was able to turn away from at the last possible second before it would have exploded directly in front of him. He still sustained serious injury from the blast, but he would have been killed if he had not taken the evasive action. Despite being seriously wounded, Lt. McDonald was able to kill or wound several of the enemy soldiers. After the attack was over he rallied the few remaining Bravo Company soldiers that were able to stand and fight and formed a tight perimeter, consisting of himself, PFC Field and PFC Donald Lombardi, the company commander's RTO. He also cared for the many wounded men. 1Lt. McDonald retired as a Lt. Colonel after a distinguished career in the army.


During the time the enemy soldiers were on the hill they took many of Bravo company's weapons and the men's personal effects, some of which were found the next day in the village at the base of the hill. As the VC were searching for Bravo company defenders still alive, they kicked and prodded several men who lay on the ground wounded. PFC Field and PFC Lombardi, both wounded, were able to remain still and were not shot. Lt. O'Brien, who had just joined the company as the new forward observer was not so lucky. He was shot and killed when he called out after being kicked by an enemy soldier.


1Lt. George Pearson, the company's executive officer, was due to rotate to a staff position and 1Lt. McDonald was to become the new XO. Lt. Pearson was killed in the attack and Lt. McDonald severely wounded.


While the battle on top of Hill 86 raged on, the 2/327th battalion command post, located near the village of Tuy An, was monitoring the situation. Concern had already developed as the RTO in the battalion CP was unable to raise Bravo company at 0030 hours for the normal situation report. Alpha and Charlie companies had reported a negative situation report, but there was no response from Bravo. At 0125 hours the battalion CP monitored a transmission from Bravo's CP that clearly indicated a serious situation was unfolding. Loud explosions, machine gun fire and screaming Vietnamese voices were all that could be heard, apparently from an open keyed handset from one of Bravo's radios.


Unable to raise anyone on the radio on Hill 86 the battalion executive officer, Major John Gilboux, considered his options. Major Gilboux was acting on behalf of 2/327 battalion commander Lt Col Joseph Wasco, who was on R & R. One option was to call an air strike on the hill as it was becoming apparent the Bravo CP had been overrun and, unable to contact any one on the hill, from all appearances there were no Bravo company personnel still alive. Due to the weather, an air strike or gun ships were not feasible. Finally Major Gilboux contacted Bravo's third platoon leader and ordered him to advance to the hill ASAP. All of Bravo company's platoons were spread out over a 2500 meter area in night ambush positions, but third platoon was closest at 800 meters.


Lt. Robert Meager, 3rd Platoon Leader and his men advanced to the hill as quickly as possible. As his men approached the hill they observed a large enemy force in the village at the base of the hill. In the ensuing fire fight Lt. Meager's men killed 15 enemy soldiers. At 0245 Lt. Meager arrived on the hill. He made contact with Lt. McDonald to assess the situation and set up security around the perimeter. He also requested a flareship and artillery around the village where the VC were seen fleeing.


Lt. McDonald, despite being severely wounded, and Lt. Meager organized the efforts to care for the WIAs. There were 15 men wounded in the attack, some like 1st Sergeant Pulliam, suffering grievous injuries.


Due to the continuing heavy rain the medevac choppers were not able to reach the hill until 0615. The first chopper, with the most severely wounded men, lifted off the hill at 0630, drawing fire as it took off. There were VC soldiers spotted in a number of locations near Hill 86 by the 327 recon platoon, indicating the enemy was still in the area in significant numbers.


As day break arrived, the reality of the carnage that occurred during the night became readily apparent. While the enemy had inflicted severe casualties on Bravo company's CP, they did not escape without losing many of their own men. Blood trails leading off the hill were everywhere, indicating the VC had dragged off their killed and wounded. There was so much blood it appeared as if 55 gallon drums of the red liquid had been strewn all over the hill top. Many of the bodies of the dead Americans were missing arms and legs. One corpse in the machine gun position was missing both arms and legs, and was headless. The mortar rounds, grenades and satchel charges that rained down upon the defenders of Hill 86 were so numerous there were at least 50 unexploded devices covering the hill top. White paper plates, left over from the previous night's hot chow, were used to mark their locations.


By 0900 all of the KIAs and WIAs were off the hill. Small groups of enemy soldiers were spotted by the 2/327 recon platoon though out the day, indicating the large enemy force that had overrun the hill were moving out of the area to prevent retaliation by the 2/327. The 2/327 would gain revenge for the events of September 17 in future battles, but for the time being the VC had scored a major victory.


One of the lessons learned from the Hill 86 incident was no company CPs were ever allowed to remain in one fixed location for more than 48 hours. While ten men lost their lives and 15 others were wounded on Hill 86, many future lives were saved as a result of the changes in operating procedures made as a result of this event.


The following 101st Airborne soldiers killed in action on Hill 86, September 17, 1966:


Major Joseph B. Mack, 31, Marietta, GA (promoted posthumously) B Co Commanding Officer
1Lt George Pearson, 25, Towanda, PA B Co Executive Officer
1Lt Alan J. O'Brien, 24, Revere, MA 2/320 Artillery Forward Observer Team
SSgt Leonard Burrow, 33, Ferguson, MO 326th Engineers
Sgt Michael C. Nations, 20, Dalton, GA Squad Leader, 1st Platoon, B Co
Sp4 William F. Siegert, 19, Duncanville, TX Machine Gun Crew, B Co
Sp4 James A. Lockwood, 20, Sandpoint, ID 2/320 Artillery Forward Observer Team
PFC Dennis Bunting, 19, Neptune Beach, FL Machine Gun Crew, B Co
PFC Atlas J. Smay, 19, Baltimore, MD 1st Platoon, B Co
PFC Frank F. Douglas, 19, Columbia, PA 1st Platoon, B Co


The following 101st Airborne soldiers were wounded in action:


1Lt Louis M. McDonald, 1st Platoon Leader, B Co
1Lt Acevedo, 2/320 Artillery Forward Observer
MSgt. Thomas W. Pulliam, 1st First Sergeant, B Co
SFC James M. Hargrove, 1st Platoon Sergeant, B Co (Died of wounds September 29, 1966)
Sgt. James McGill, Squad Leader, 1st Platoon Squad leader, B Co
PFC Douglas N. Field, 1st Platoon, B Co
PFC Donald Lombardi, CO's RTO
PFC John D Cudmore, 1st Platoon Leader's RTO
Seven unidentified men were also wounded in the attack.



NOTICE:
This article is brought to our site with no modification by me. This is written about a battle in Operation Seward and I brought it to our site to support the information base about the operation; in no way to enhance or detract, either from the original article, or the actions of those involved.

Primary Sources:
http://www.327infantry.org/second/hill86

Good Hunting.

MR

Operation Seward

US Military Operation in Vietnam.

4 September - 25 October 1966

101st Airborne Division operation in Phu Yen Province.

Operation Seward was characterized by counter-guerrilla tactics, primarily encompassing small unit actions and frequent contact with small enemy forces. The search and destroy tactics utilized consisted of saturation patrolling, night movement, night ambushes, raids and the use of small unit stay behind forces and small unit immediate action forces. The terrain over which operations were conducted included mountainous jungles, rolling hills, dry and inundated rice paddies, sand dunes and beaches.

VC/NVA KIA's: 347
US KIA's: 435 KIA, 2,396 WIA



Primary Sources:
www.3rdmarines.net


http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=AD0386128


Good Hunting

MR

Operation Scotland II

US Military Operation in Vietnam.

15 April 1968 - 28 February 1969

1st Marine Division operation centered on the Khe Sanh area of Quang Tri Province.

On April 15, Operation Pegasus ended and Operation Scotland II began. The Marines at Khe Sanh Combat Base broke out of their perimeter and began attacking the North Vietnamese in the surrounding area. The Army 1st Air Cavalry Division, with over 400 helicopters under its control, conducted airmobile operations deeper into enemy controlled areas. The fighting was heavy. An additional 413 Marines were killed during Scotland II through the end of June 1968. Operation Scotland II lasted until the end of the year, resulting in the deaths of 72 additional Marines. None of the deaths associated with Scotland II are included in the official body count

VC/NVA KIA's: 3,304 KIAs, 64 POWs
US KIA's: 435 KIA, 2,396 WIA



Primary Sources:
www.3rdmarines.net

http://www.library.vanderbilt.edu/central/Brush/KheSanhCasualtyCount.htm

http://www.flyarmy.org/panel/battle/68041500.HTM


Good Hunting

MR

Operation Scotland

US Military Operation in Vietnam.

1 November 67- 31 March 68

3rd Marine Division operation in westernmost area of Quang Tri Province, centered in the Khe Sanh combat base area. 

The operation terminates with commencement of PEGASUS.

The Marine Corps casualty reporting system was based on named operations and not geographic location. Consequently, and unknown at the time, Operation Scotland became the starting point of the Battle of Khe Sanh in terms of Marine casualty reporting.

By the middle of January 1968, some 6,000 Marines and Army troops occupied the Khe Sanh Combat Base; and its surrounding positions. Khe Sanh was situated on Route 9, the major east-west highway in the northern most province of South Vietnam. Because of washed-out bridges and heavy enemy activity, however, the only way for Americans to get to Khe Sanh was by helicopter or airplane.

During the darkness of January 20-21, the NVA launched a series of coordinated attacks against American positions. At 0330 hours, soldiers of the  6th Battalion, 2nd Regiment, 325C NVA Division, attacked the Marines on Hill 861. About two hours later, an NVA artillery barrage scored a hit on the main ammunition dump at the Khe Sanh Combat Base. At about 0640 hours the 7th Battalion, 66th Regiment, 304th NVA Division, attacked the Huong Hoa District headquarters in Khe Sanh village. This fighting was heavy, involving South Vietnamese militia as well as U.S. Army MACV advisers and Marines attached to a Combined Action Company platoon. That afternoon, as a rescue force was dispatched to the village.
 
The Marine defense of Khe Sanh, Operation Scotland, officially ended on March 31.

VC/NVA KIA's: 1,561
US KIA's: ??


Primary Sources:
www.3rdmarines.net

http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties.htm



Good Hunting

MR

Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS J3-J2)

 

 

Commanding General

25th Infantry Division

ATTN:  AVDCOP

APO US Forces 96225

 

 

 

1.                  Operation SARATOGA

2.                  21 January – 10 March 1968

3.                  Trang Bang (XT4919) to Tan Son Nhut (XS8169)

4.                  Control Headquarters:

a.         3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 25th Infantry Division
b.         2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division
c.         2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
d.         3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

5.                  Reporting Officer:  LTC Glenn K. Otis

6.                  Task Organization:

Troop A, 3-4 Cav
Troop B, 3-4 Cav
Troop C, 3-4 Cav
Troop D, 3-4 Cav
HHT, 3-4 Cav
Company A, 1st Bn, 27th Inf.
Company B, 2d Bn, 12th Inf.
Company D, 2d Bn, 12th Inf.
Troop L, 3d Sqdn, 11th ACR

7.                  Supporting Forces:

a.         Air Support: Tactical air was provided when required.  Troop D (Air) provided light fire teams for close-in support; while UH-1D’s and OH-23’s provided command and control, resupply, and lift helicopters as required.

b.         Artillery Support:

            (1)        Battery B, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery
            (2)        Battery C, 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery

8.                  Intelligence:

9.                  Mission:  3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry performed reconnaissance in force vic Trung Lap (XT5820).  Reacted to attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base vic (XS8196), conducted search and destroy, reconnaissance in force missions vic Tan Son Nhut and Hoc Mon (XT7403).

10.              Concept of Operation:  The Squadron moved vic Trung Lap to conduct reconnaissance in force to locate, destroy, and prevent VC/NVA infiltration in/through that area subsequently terminating this operation 29 January.  The Squadron secured major areas along MSR, characterized by ambush patrols, listening posts, and radar.  31 January the Squadron (-) reacted to Tan Son Nhut Air Base initially with one ground troop (-), which was ambushed.  Subsequently reinforcing with one air troop and one ground troop (+).  The Squadron (-) became OPCON to the 2d Bde, 1st Infantry Division to conduct search and destroy missions vic Tan Son Nhut to locate and destroy all VC/NVA forces in area, Operations terminated 7 February.  The Squadron (-) became OPCON 3d Bde, 25th Infantry Division to conduct reconnaissance in force to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces rocket sites, and VC/NVA Base Camps.

11.              Execution:

                                                 21-29 January

The Squadron conducted road march to vic Trung Lap.  CP was maintained near same area.  The Squadron conducted reconnaissance in force utilizing three ground troops with the air troop screening to their flanks.  On 24 January Troop A tripped a booby trap 105mm round resulting in 3 US WHA and one VC PW with web gear.  On 25 January a tank from Troop C hit a mine resulting in 2 US WHA.  The Troop later was ambushed receiving 3 RPG-2, 300 small arms rounds.  Return fire with organic weapons resulting in 2 US WHA.  On 26 January Troop C picked up 1 VC PW and 1 detainee with carbine, 1 RPG-2 round, notebook and paper, 1 M60 machinegun and 1 aircraft radio.  Troop A engaged 1 VC, XT572284, with three hand grenades and 5-10 rounds small arms, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and capturing 1 AK47 with magazine, 2 batteries and 1 reel of wire, 6ea 2 ½ Lb bags of rice, 4 can of condensed milk, 2 pair brown and 1 pair of black trousers.  On 28 January 3 VC jumped out of spider holes XT567262 and threw grenades at C Troop.  The Troop took under fire resulting in 4 US WHA, 7 VC KIA (BC), 5 VC PW, and 3 detainees.  On 29 January Troop D received fire from 4 VC, XT595304, returned fire resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC), then inserted Aerorifles, which made heavy contact with unknown number VC.  The 2d Bn, 27th Inf. reacted to them.  Results of action 5 US KHA, 6 WHA, 46 VC KIA (BC), 4 VC KIA (POSS), 8 VC PW and 6 detainees.  There was 15 pounds of food, condensed milk, numerous documents and clothing captured.

                                                                         
                                       30 January – 10 March

The Squadron secured major areas along MSR.  On 31 January Troop C (-) reacted to Tan Son Nhut Air Base.  The Troop was ambushed outside gate 051.  The Squadron reacted with Troop D and Troop B (+).  The results of action was 3 APC completely lost, 1 Tank completely lost, 7 APC damaged, 14 US KHA, 64 US WHA, 309 VC KIA (BC), 24 VC PW, 1 Chicom radio, numerous weapons and equipment.  On 1 February Troop B and C began search and destroy mission vic Tan Son Nhut to destroy the remainder of VC/NVA forces in area.  The Squadron was OPCON 2d Bde 1st Infantry Division until the termination of operations 7 February which results were 3 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (POSS).  The Squadron (-) then went OPCON to the 3d Bde 25th Infantry Division.  The Squadron (-) and Co A, 1/27 Inf began search and destroy operations vic Hoc Mon (XT7604).  Troop B and Co A 1/27 Inf, were on line moving through area with Troop C as reaction force when Co A 1/27 Inf made heavy contact.  Troop C moved up to support Co A 1/27 Inf.  The contact continued until 10 February with no night contact except aerial reconnaissance and ambush patrols in the area.  Results of the action was 1 tank destroyed, 2 tanks damaged, 3 APC damaged, 10 US KHA, 53 US WHA, 102 VC KIA (BC).  On 12 February Troop A went OPCON to the 2d Bde 25th Infantry Division.  They were on search and destroy mission vic Ap Cho (XT7008) making contact with unknown size VC force.  They were in contact for 4 days resulting in A Troop being credited with 57 VC KIA (BC) and 6 US KHA, 28 US WHA.  On 14 February Troop C and HHT returned to Cu Chi leaving Troop B OPCON 3d Bde.  On 16 February Troop A and B closed Cu Chi. The next day Squadron went OPCON 3d Bde 25th Infantry Division.  The Squadron moved to vic XS7295.  On 19 February Troop C while returning to CP location was ambushed (XS758979), returned fire resulting in 1 Damaged tank, 2 US KHA, 2 US WHA, and VC loses were unknown.  On 20 February Troop D went OPCON 3/17 Cav.  On 21 February Troop B destroyed 18 bunkers, 4 foxholes, and captured 134 rounds of RPG-7, 1 RPG-2 round, 10 electric blasting caps, 4 22Lb shape charges at XS702982.  Troop C made contact with unknown number VC/NVA XS719922.  Troop D and A reacted to the contact resulting in 3 US KHA, 20 US WHA, 1 UH-1C destroyed, 1 APC destroyed, 1 APC damaged, 135 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC KIA (POSS).  That evening the Squadron CP was mortared resulting in 12 US WHA and light damage to equipment, 2 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC PW.  On 22 February Troop C picked up 1 VC PW WIA with AK47 while sweeping threw the area XS719922.  They also located 1 ea. 7.62 type machinegun on wheels and 2 ea. 9mm pistols vic same area.  Troop C observed one platoon size element moving east to west.  Engaged with artillery and spooky with unknown results.  On 22 February Troop B detonated a dud round resulting in 1 US WHA.  While on search and destroy Troop A and Troop L 3/11th ACR located 2 VC KIA (BC), 1 RPG-2 and 7 rounds, 4 AK47’s, misc. web gear, and 1 PRC-25.  The Squadron received heavy volume small arms sniper, automatic wpns and RPG fire, returned fire resulting in 1 US KHA, 3 US WHA, 1 VC KIA (BC).  Troop C observed 15-20 VC moving behind berm, engaged with organic weapons resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC KIA (POSS), captured 1 AK47.  On 23 February Troop A located and destroyed 50 bunkers XS711931, 2 damaged RPG-7 rounds and one box of 7.62 ammo.  Troop A later located a bunker which contained 1 AK47, 1 M-16, 2 ea. 9mm pistols with magazines, 2 Chicom grenades, 2 Lb of documents, 1 medical kit, 1 NVA gas mask, and one field pack.  On 24 February Troop C on search and destroy, vic XS742997 captured numerous medical supplies, documents, 1 NVA gas mask, 1 AK47 and destroyed one tunnel, one 500Lb bomb, one 105mm round, 2 bunker complexes, 2 round 82mm mortar.  Troop B received unknown number small arms, automatic weapons and RPG rounds from three sides, followed by ground attack, returned fire with organic weapons, air and artillery resulting in 1 US KHA, 4 US WHA, and 2 VC KIA (BC).  On 27 February Troop A and B on search and destroy captured one detainee, and ½ Lbs of documents, while destroying 30 bunkers.  On 28 February Troop A and C received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire XT742015, returning fire with organic weapons, artillery, LFT and Tactical air, resulting in 1 US KHA, 13 US WHA, 1 APC damaged, 1 tank heavy damaged, 7 VC KIA (BC).  On 4 March Troop C and Co D 2/12 Inf on search and destroy vic XT760052 captured one AK47, one set machinegun tools, 3 Lbs of documents, one RPG-7 sight, destroying 18 Chicom grenades, 138 bunkers, 9 rounds of RPG-2 and 7, 6 RPG boosters, 600 meters commo wire, 1 M-17 protective mask, 300 Lbs Chicom C-4, 200 rounds of AK47.  On 6 March, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry received SA, AW, and RPG fire from unknown size VC force, returned fire with all organic weapons, LFT, arty and Tactical Air, resulting in 1 US KHA, 19 US WHA, 1 APC combat loss, 1 APC damaged, 2 tanks damaged, 2 VC KIA (BC), and 15 bunkers destroyed.  3d Squadron 4th Cavalry and D 2-12 Inf while on search and destroy mission vic XT7500 located 2 VC KIA (BC) in graves also destroying 215 bunkers, 4 anti-aircraft positions, 1 Chicom grenade, 1 carbine stock and 5 helmets.  On 8 March Troop B and B Co 2-12 Inf captured 8 detainees and destroyed 12 bunkers and 12 spider holes while on search and destroy vic XT7302.  CP located at XT712030 received 5 rounds 60mm mortar, returned fire with AW and arty, resulting in 3 US WHA.  On 9 March Troop A and D-2-12 Inf captured 1 AK47, documents and a motor bike, they also destroyed 12 rocket positions vic XS736989.  On 10 March Troop A and B on search and destroy vic XS7099 captured 4 detainees and destroyed 8 individual firing positions, also destroyed were 3 bunkers and 20 sleeping positions.  Operations SARATOGA terminated on 10 March 1969.  The Squadron remained in area OPCON to the 3d Bde 25th Infantry Division.



Primary Sources:
http://www.ctrp-3d-4thcav.com/AAR-saratoga.htm

Good Hunting.

MR

Operation Saratoga

US Military Operation in Vietnam.

8 December 1967 - 11 March 1968

25th Infantry Division operation in area west of Saigon and along the Cambodian border

VC/NVA KIA's: 3,862
US KIA's: 215



Primary Sources:
www.3rdmarines.net



Good Hunting

MR

Operation Sam Houston

US Military Operation in Vietnam.

1 January - 5 April 1967

4th and 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Divisions involved in border surveillance.This operation took place in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. This was a follow-up operation to Paul Revere IV.

It in turn would be followed by FRANCIS MARION. Initially the 4th had only its 2nd Brigade and 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, but during February the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division joined from Tuy Hoa to add extra support for the operation.

This operation consisted of a series of aggressive search and destroy missions especially in southwestern Kontum Province. In mid-February the 4th Infantry Division had no less than eleven major engagements with the NVA. By March the NVA had had enough and began retreating back into Cambodia.

VC/NVA KIA's: 733
US KIA's: 169



Primary Sources:
www.3rdmarines.net

http://www.flyarmy.org/panel/battle/67010100.HTM



Good Hunting

MR

Operation Bribie

Australian Military Operation in Vietnam.

17–18 February 1967


Lieutenant Colonel Colin Townsend, the commanding officer of 6 RAR, was called to the task force command post for a briefing at 10:20. Townsend subsequently issued verbal orders to deploy the battalion at 11:30, and 6 RAR subsequently launched a quick reaction force code named Operation Bribie. The plan envisioned C Company, under the command of Major Brian McFarlane, being inserted by M113 APCs from A Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment to secure a helicopter landing zone—known as LZ Amber—3 kilometers (1.9 mi) east of Hoi My, just north of the hamlet of Ap My An. A, B and D Companies would then be flown into LZ Amber by American UH-1 Iroquois helicopters. The battalion would then link up and establish a blocking position to prevent the Viet Cong withdrawing east, before patrolling westward to contact. In direct support were 105 mm M2A2 howitzers from 101 Field Battery at the airstrip at Dat Do, which would subsequently be secured by A Company 5 RAR, while also supporting the operation were Bell H-13 Sioux light observation helicopters from 161 Reconnaissance Flight and elements of the 1st Battalion, US 83rd Artillery Regiment. A New Zealand forward observation party was attached to the battery and would accompany B Company, 6 RAR. Due to the need to secure the task force base, 6 RAR would be required to return to Nui Dat before dark and this restriction would later impact heavily on the operation.

Over seven hours after Gilham's original request, at 12:35 the Australian APCs had finally departed Nui Dat under Murphy's command with C Company and the Mortar Platoon. Suspecting a Viet Cong ambush, Murphy had prudently avoided following the obvious route to Lang Phuoc Hai, traveling cross-country instead, moving through Long Dien and into the paddy fields parallel to Route 326. Yet the initial lack of artillery cover had slowed the movement of the 35-vehicle column, while the continual need to reduce speed while traversing the numerous paddy bunds en route was not appreciated beforehand and further hampered their progress. Indeed, while Murphy had correctly calculated that the rice fields would be dry and hard at that time of year, he found that the main obstacle to rapid movement was a 1-metre (3.3 ft) high paddy-bund every 30 to 100 meters (33 to 110 yd) at the edge of each rice field. Meanwhile, although the lead company in the air assault—A Company commanded by Major Max Carroll—had departed Nui Dat at 13:30 aboard fifteen UH-1 helicopters from a US Army aviation company, C Company had still not arrived in position to secure the landing zone.

Although unknown to the Australians at the time, the earlier attack on Lang Phuoc Hai had been a deliberate attempt by the Viet Cong to provoke a reaction from 1 ATF. As such there would be no withdrawal on this occasion. Anticipating that any relief force would move by road, the Viet Cong had subsequently established an extensive ambush in the buildings alongside Route 44, which led into the village itself. Although the presence of this trap was not detected by the Australians, Murphy's evasion had ensured that his APCs had avoided it, moving the infantry by a cross-country route instead. However, with C Company delayed as a result, A Company made their airmobile assault onto an unsecured landing zone at 13:45, supported only by indirect fire from the artillery at Dat Do in suppression, which was initially limited due to delay in setting up the fire support base. Under the command of Major Owen O'Brien, A Company then began to advance into the fringe of thick rainforest to secure the southern edge of the landing zone for the arrival of B Company and the remainder of the battalion. Finally, over 30 minutes after the lead company had flown in, the APCs began to receive sniper fire as they neared the landing zone.

A Company moved south, shaking out into an open formation across a frontage of 150 metres (160 yd), with 2 Platoon on the right and 3 Platoon on the left, while 1 Platoon was in depth. Already in the dense vegetation, 2 Platoon—under Second Lieutenant Graham Ackland—had only advanced 150 meters when a sniper was spotted in a tree and was subsequently shot by the platoon sergeant. Almost simultaneously, 3 Platoon was engaged with small arms fire, while behind them the company headquarters was engaged by more snipers. 2 Platoon assaulted straight into the main Viet Cong position with grenades and machine-guns. Breaking-in they moved forward, killing a number of Viet Cong in their weapon pits but suffering six casualties in less than a minute, with a third of the lead platoon falling wounded in the initial volleys. Pinned-down and in trouble, Ackland realized that he was facing a sizable and well dug-in force and he attempted to move his sections into an all-round defensive perimeter in order to defend against any counter-attack; the Viet Cong did not attack however and instead remained in their pits. In an attempt to relieve 2 Platoon, O'Brien maneuvered 1 and 3 Platoons, while requesting B Company support his right flank as soon as they arrived at the landing zone.

Arriving shortly after the initial contact, the lead platoon from B Company—5 Platoon under Second Lieutenant John O'Halloran—was forced to jump from their helicopters as they were unable to land after taking fire at the landing zone. The platoon quickly formed up and moved into the vegetation on the western edge of the landing zone, with the remainder of the company following them as they landed. Meanwhile, O'Brien estimated that A Company was facing at least a company dug-in across a 100 to 200 meters (110 to 220 yd) frontage, armed with five or six machine-guns. Unable to use artillery because of the helicopters still flying-in the remainder of the battalion, while the mortars were still with the APCs and had not yet arrived, O'Brien was without support and any further advance would not be possible. Unlike previous encounters during which the Viet Cong had attempted to avoid battle, the force now confronting A Company appeared to have no intention of withdrawing and was instead mounting an unexpectedly determined defense. The Australians suspected that this uncharacteristic willingness to fight during daylight indicated that the Viet Cong force may have been covering the withdrawal of their command elements.[35] Under heavy fire from what appeared to be a Viet Cong base area, O'Brien extricated his platoons with difficulty and subsequently broke contact, withdrawing 250 metres (270 yd) with the wounded to the southern edge of the landing zone.

Only twenty minutes since the first contact, A Company had returned to its original position on the rainforest fringe, having suffered seven men wounded and using most of their ammunition. O'Brien subsequently briefed Townsend by radio, again reporting the Viet Cong position as a 'camp' of at least company-size, and proposing that A Company remain in location while B Company adopted a position on the right flank until the situation could be clarified, to which he agreed. Townsend subsequently arrived by helicopter as A Company's casualties were being evacuated by an Australian UH-1 Iroquois from No. 9 Squadron RAAF. Meanwhile, the APCs carrying C Company and the Mortar Platoon began to arrive, while D Company was inserted by helicopter a few minutes later and took up blocking positions in the tree-line north-east of the landing zone. Just after 14:30, B Company—under Major Ian Mackay—began receiving sniper fire in their position just south-west of A Company, and in response Mackay moved the company back before calling-in artillery fire onto the Viet Cong positions. Initially believing that he only faced a company-sized Viet Cong force, with his rifle companies now finally assembled, at 15:15 Townsend issued orders for a quick attack by two companies.

Townsend's plan envisioned A Company advancing south approximately 200 metres (220 yd) and engaging the Viet Cong in an attempt to split their fire and provide fire support, while B Company would move around from the right flank to launch the assault. Meanwhile, C Company would occupy a blocking position to the west, while D Company would be kept in reserve. B Company would then assault in a south-east direction on an axis that would take them across the front of A Company, which would require their fire to cut-out as they did so. The scheme of maneuver was based on the assumption that the Viet Cong position was a camp as previously reported, and not a defensive position, yet with visibility in the thick vegetation limited to between 10 to 30 meters (11 to 33 yd), few of the men from A Company had actually seen much of the position during the earlier fighting.[36] Yet the Viet Cong had likely now been reinforced by North Vietnamese regulars from 275th Regiment and unknown to the Australians they now faced a battalion-sized force in well prepared positions.

The assault began at 15:35, with A Company beginning their advance into the rainforest with two platoons forward and one back. Meanwhile, B Company began forming up in single file on the right flank, also with two platoons forward in assault formation, while one remained in reserve at the rear. Each of the forward platoons covered a frontage of 100 meters (110 yd), with 4 Platoon—under the command of Second Lieutenant John Sullivan—on the left, and O'Halloran's 5 Platoon on the right. Company headquarters was located centrally, while 6 Platoon—commanded by Sergeant Butch Brady—was to the rear. Each platoon adopted a similar formation, with two sections forward and one back. From the outset the lead elements of B Company came under constant sniper fire from the trees, and from Viet Cong machine-guns that had not previously been detected by the Australians. Even as the company was shaking out they were engaged sporadically by a group of Viet Cong just 50 meters (55 yd) to their front, with one Australian soldier being hit before the attack began and later dying at the landing zone before he could be evacuated. B Company subsequently crossed the line of departure at 15:55, and two minutes later A Company began engaging the Viet Cong positions with small arms from their 7.62 mm M60 machine-guns and L1A1 Self Loading Rifles, and 5.56 mm M16 assault rifles in support.

As B Company moved forward, their left flank was engaged by a machine-gun from a small party of Viet Cong to their front, while sniper fire intensified. The Australians continued to advance with coordinated fire and movement, but were now receiving fire from three directions. Ten minutes after stepping off, B Company crossed the front of A Company, forcing them to cease their covering fire. Without support, the Australians were now assaulting a well dug-in and largely unseen Viet Cong force that was disposed in a wide arc. Penetrating the position, the Australian flanks were increasingly exposed to fire, while the dense undergrowth obscured the Viet Cong pits and reduced visibility to just a few meters. Both the lead Australian platoons were soon enveloped, as fire swept across the front of B Company from the Viet Cong engaging them with heavy machine-guns, claymore mines and light mortars. Meanwhile, Viet Cong snipers continued to engage the Australians from the rear, who unsuccessfully attempted to regain the initiative with small arms fire and grenades. The assault soon faltered with steadily increasing casualties.

The two forward Australian platoons subsequently lost contact with each other, while the left section of 4 Platoon was engaged by a 12.7 mm heavy machine-gun, and began to fall behind. The section on the right was also engaged by a machine-gun, and the frontage of the platoon subsequently broke. The section commander assaulted the Viet Cong position with an M79 grenade launcher, however he was unable to dislodge them. Meanwhile on the right, 5 Platoon pressed their advance, and they subsequently pulled further ahead of the rest of B Company. At 16:25, with 5 Platoon now 40 meters (44 yd) in front and also receiving machine-gun fire from its front and right flank, Mackay finally ordered the platoon to halt as he attempted to maneuver the company to regain control of the situation. 6 Platoon was ordered to advance through 4 Platoon to assault the machine-gun on the left flank, before linking up with 5 Platoon and continuing the assault. Brady subsequently directed his men to fix bayonets and charge the Viet Cong positions, yet the attack was soon cut to pieces by machine-guns which engaged them from the center and left and it was subsequently halted behind O'Halloran's rear section. Brady then requested mortar fire in support; however, the need to request air clearance only resulted in further delay. By 16:45 B Company's assault had bogged down due to the strong Viet Cong resistance. All of its platoons were in contact and unable to move, while company headquarters had advanced behind the lead platoons and was also pinned down.

As the fighting continued, D Company remained in a blocking position to the north-east of the landing zone. Meanwhile, after inserting C Company into its blocking position to the west, the APCs from A Squadron had moved into a harbour around the tree line, from where they covered the flanks of the rifle companies in the rainforest. Not included in the assault due to the belief that the terrain was unsuitable for armor, in their location the APCs were occasionally hit by overshooting rounds, but otherwise remained out of the battle. This assumption was later found to be incorrect though, and the APCs would likely have been able to move through the dense undergrowth, while the firepower provided by their .50 calibre machine-guns would have been able to assist B Company, which was pinned-down. Regardless, the armament of the M113s would have likely proven inadequate for attacking strong defenses and bunkers, and their light aluminum armor was known to be vulnerable to heavy machine-guns and RPGs. With both A and B Company now heavily engaged, Townsend subsequently asked Murphy whether his APCs could move around to the right in another attempt to outflank the Viet Cong; however, a creek made the ground in that area too boggy for the vehicles and this proved impractical. A close quarters battle then ensued, continuing until night fell with the Australians assaulting the Viet Cong positions using frontal tactics which resulted in heavy casualties on both sides.

Under orders from Townsend to press on with the assault as fast as possible, Mackay decided to switch the B Company assault to the right flank, ordering O'Halloran by radio to advance a further 30 metres (33 yd) in order to outflank the Viet Cong machine-gun and allow 6 Platoon to resume its advance on the left flank. However, the machine-gun was soon found to be located a further 30 meters forward than expected, and 5 Platoon would need to assault 60 meters (66 yd) across open scrub under heavy fire in order to silence it. As O'Halloran relayed orders for the assault, machine-guns and snipers continued to engage them intermittently, and the Australians continued to return fire with small arms and grenades. Again fixing bayonets, on order the Australians rose as one and were almost immediately hit with heavy fire, with the forward line disintegrating as a result. The left forward section under Lance Corporal Kerry Rooney then advanced directly at the machine-gun located to their front, firing as they moved. Rooney then charged the position throwing grenades but was shot and killed within meters of the Viet Cong position. Suffering several more men wounded, the Australian left flank again became pinned down.

Meanwhile, the right forward section under Corporal Robin Jones attacked the Viet Cong at close range, inflicting heavy casualties on the defenders with grenades and small arms fire. However, three previously undetected Viet Cong machine-guns subsequently engaged 5 Platoon, which succeeded in breaking up the Australian attack on the right flank with intense enfilade fire which killed three men and wounded five more. Of his section only Jones was left unwounded. For his leadership he was later awarded the Military Medal. The Australian assault stalled having covered just 25 meters (27 yd). Nearly half of the men in the forward sections had become casualties and the platoon stretcher bearer, Private Richard Odendahl repeatedly risked his life dragging men to safety, providing first aid, recovering weapons from the dead, and providing O'Halloran with information on the disposition of his platoon. For his actions Odendahl was also later awarded the Military Medal. Attempting to reinforce his threatened right flank, O'Halloran ordered the M60 machine-gun from his reserve section forward to support Jones while the wounded were recovered, however both the machine-gunner and his offsider were killed attempting to move forward. Surrounded by Viet Cong machine-guns and receiving fire from all sides, the lead Australian elements from B Company could advance no further against a determined and well dug-in force, and all attempts to regain momentum were unable to dislodge the defenders.

With the Australian and Viet Cong positions now too close to each other, O'Halloran could neither move forward nor withdraw. Artillery began to fire in support of the Australians, however it initially fell too far to the rear to be effective, and it had to be adjusted by the B Company forward observer, Captain Jim Ryan, himself under heavy fire. 5 Platoon was still in danger of becoming isolated and O'Brien now suggested he move A Company forward to assist B Company, however this was rejected by Mackay who feared the two companies clashing in the confusion. Meanwhile, O'Halloran called for the APCs to come forward to provide assistance, while the platoon sergeant—Sergeant Mervyn McCullough—guided a section from 6 Platoon forward to reinforce 5 Platoon, and begin evacuating the casualties. Bolstered by reinforcements and with accurate artillery covering fire O'Halloran now felt that he was in a position to extract his platoon. Yet at that moment two rounds from one of the howitzers fell short, and while one of the shells harmlessly exploded against a tree, the other landed just to the right of the 5 Platoon headquarters, killing two men and wounding eight others, including six of the seven reinforcements from 6 Platoon. Following an urgent radio call from O'Halloran, the artillery ceased fire. Shortly afterwards an RPG round hit the same area, wounding McCullough.

Townsend subsequently then reported that he was facing a force of at least battalion-strength with support weapons—likely D445 Battalion—while the level of proficiency indicated that it might also include North Vietnamese Army (NVA) elements.[50] However, due to earlier warnings that the Viet Cong were preparing to attack Nui Dat that evening, prior to the start of the operation Graham had ordered Townsend to return to base that afternoon, and this restriction remained extant. Likewise, with Operation Renmark scheduled to start the following morning, A Company 5 RAR—then at Dat Do protecting the artillery—would also need to be released before nightfall, adding to the requirement to conclude the operation that afternoon. Regardless, this restriction had only served to make B Company's task all the more difficult, with Mackay facing demands to complete the action while at the same time not become decisively engaged and unable to withdraw his company. At 16:17 Townsend was ordered to prepare his battalion for a helicopter extraction which was due to begin an hour later, while at 17:15 he was ordered to break contact immediately, however this proved impossible as 5 Platoon remained in heavy contact. Mackay now estimated that he would be unable to get forward to support the beleaguered platoon for a further 30 minutes; however, by 17:50 he realised that the Viet Cong had moved between them and A Company. Yet even while the Viet Cong continued to heavily engage both A and B Companies, the remainder of the Australian battalion and the APCs were beginning to line up on the landing zone in preparation for returning to Nui Dat. The order was finally rescinded when it became clear that both companies were unable to break-off the engagement. Meanwhile, a number of bush fires were now burning through the area, detonating discarded ammunition and adding to the noise of the battle.

Initially the Australians had used their APCs to secure the landing zone at the jungle's edge, however with the infantry in trouble they were subsequently dispatched as a relief force. Three M113s from 2 Troop under Sergeant Frank Graham entered the rainforest shortly after 17:15; however, lacking clear directions to B Company's position 300 metres (330 yd) away, they fumbled around in the dense vegetation before locating A Company instead. Instructed by Mackay to head for the white smoke of the bush fire, in error the APCs then set out towards the most obvious smoke further to the south-east of B Company. A Viet Cong 75 mm recoilless rifle subsequently engaged the lead vehicle twice at close range, though both rounds missed, exploding in the trees nearby. Still unsure of B Company's location, Graham was unwilling to engage the Viet Cong position with heavy machine-guns for fear of hitting his own men, and the cavalry subsequently withdrew. Later it was discovered that the cavalry had likely been engaged by elements defending the Viet Cong headquarters. Meanwhile, due to the threat posed by the Viet Cong anti-tank weapons the remainder of 2 Troop then arrived under the command Second Lieutenant David Watts to provide added protection; in total 12 vehicles. A further attempt to reach B Company by the cavalry also failed however, after the A Company guide became disorientated in the thick vegetation. Mackay then threw colored smoke, while Sioux helicopters arrived overhead to guide the vehicles to their position. B Company's casualties now amounted to seven men killed and 19 wounded.

Fighting their way forward, the M113s finally arrived by 18:15 and began loading the most badly wounded as darkness approached. The Viet Cong subsequently launched two successive counter-attacks, assaulting B Company from the east and south-east; however, both attacks were repulsed by the Australians, as they responded with small arms fire while Mackay called-in an airstrike. During the fighting one of the APCs was subsequently disabled by a recoilless rifle at close range, killing the driver and wounding the crew commander. A second round then struck the open cargo hatch, wounding several more men and re-wounding a number of the Australian casualties. A third round then landed nearby, as the M113s returned fire with their .30 and .50 calibre machine-guns. Under covering fire the Australians attempted to recover the damaged vehicle, yet it became stuck hard against a tree. With the Viet Cong threatening a further attack from the north-east, the Australian cavalry swept the area with a heavy volume of fire and were met by equally heavy return fire. By 18:50 the light was fading rapidly, while the bulk of 5 Platoon's more serious casualties had been evacuated by APC. However, with many of the Australian dead lying in close proximity to the Viet Cong positions, no attempt was made to recover them due to the likelihood of further casualties. Meanwhile, the damaged APC was subsequently destroyed with white phosphorus grenades to prevent its weapons and equipment from being captured.

Finally, by 19:00 B Company was able break contact and withdrew after a five-hour battle. Both sides then fell back as the Viet Cong also dispersed, evacuating most of their dead and wounded. Meanwhile, under covering fire from the APCs of 2 Troop, B Company boarded the remaining carriers, moving into a night harbour near the landing zone with the remainder of the battalion at 19:25, as the last of their casualties were extracted by helicopter. Mortars, artillery fire and airstrikes covered the Australian withdrawal, and then proceeded to pound the abandoned battlefield into the evening. That night the body of the dead APC driver was evacuated by helicopter, as American AC-47 Spooky gunships circled overhead, dropping flares to illuminate the battlefield and strafing likely Viet Cong positions, while F-4 Phantoms dropped napalm. The airstrikes then continued in preparation for a further assault by the Australians planned for the following day. Otherwise there was no further fighting that night, and both sides remained unmolested. Ultimately no attack was made against the Australian base at Nui Dat that night either, while no unusual activity was reported in the area.

After a tense night the Australians returned to the battlefield the following morning. At 09:30 on 18 February 6 RAR assaulted into the area on a broad front, with C and D Companies forward and A Company in reserve, while B Company and the APCs from A Squadron occupied a blocking position to the south. Anxious not to repeat the failure to follow up the retreating Viet Cong after Long Tan, from Saigon Vincent urged Graham to pursue D445 Battalion. Meanwhile, a large American force of over 100 armored vehicles from the 2nd Battalion, US 47th Mechanized Infantry Regiment, supported by a battery of self-propelled guns and helicopters from the US 9th Division, attempted to cut-off likely Viet Cong escape routes. Having deployed in support of 1 ATF earlier that morning from Bearcat, 42 kilometers (26 mi) north-west of Nui Dat, the Americans subsequently cleared an area along the line of Route 23, 5 kilometers (3.1 mi) north-east of the battle-zone. Although constituting an impressive display of combat power, the Americans had arrived too late to affect the outcome of the battle, and no contacts occurred before they were withdrawn the following day. Meanwhile, the Australians conducted a sweep of the battlefield only to find that the Viet Cong had left the area during the night, successfully avoiding the large blocking force while dragging most of their dead and wounded with them.

During the sweep one of the missing Australians—Lance Corporal Vic Otway—was unexpectedly found alive, having spent the night in close proximity to the Viet Cong after being wounded in both legs and falling just meters from the machine-gun he had been assaulting. Unable to answer calls from other members of his platoon for fear of being discovered, he was presumed to have been killed. Lying still for four hours, Otway had managed to crawl 70 meters (77 yd) to the rear after dark, before artillery fire and airstrikes began to fall on the area. Digging a shell scrape for protection from the American napalm strikes, he was subsequently wounded again by shrapnel. After first light he had continued to crawl back towards the Australian lines, but was confronted by a group of Viet Cong soldiers just 6 meters (6.6 yd) away. Otway attempted to fire on them, however his weapon jammed, and the Viet Cong had walked past him unaware of his presence. Continuing their search, the Australians then located and recovered the bodies of the six dead from 5 Platoon. Most had been burnt beyond recognition by napalm, while at least one had been stripped of his webbing and equipment. The burnt out APC was also recovered. On the side the Viet Cong had written "DU ME UC DAI LOI" in blood; loosely translated into English as "Get fucked Australians". Its destruction was subsequently completed by the cavalry and the burnt out hull was recovered aboard a flatbed trailer. At 10:35 A Squadron then undertook a thorough search of the area.

The bodies of six Viet Cong soldiers were also found by the Australians. Among the dead was the commander of C3 Company, D445 Battalion and his second-in-command, while others were identified as personnel from the command elements of the battalion and the heavy weapons company. Three of the dead were NVA soldiers, possibly from 275th Regiment, although this was not able to be confirmed. Many more bodies were thought to have been carried away, while one AK-47 assault rifle and a small quantity of ammunition and equipment was also located. The Viet Cong position was found to have been hastily prepared overnight, and consisted of well-sited, but shallow weapon pits rather than bunkers, approximately half of which had overhead protection. Assessed as a good night defensive position rather than a position designed for a deliberate defensive battle, it had been laid out in the shape of a half-moon; by the fortunes of war B Company had directly assaulted into the center of the position. Yet the flat terrain had offered good fields of fire, while the dense vegetation provided excellent concealment. The Australians believed that the Viet Cong had withdrawn to the east, and B Company subsequently patrolled through the "Light Green" up to the small village of Ap Gia Thanh, 2 kilometers (1.2 mi) east, supported by the APCs, hooking south along the jungle tracks towards the swamps along the Song Rai river. Although signs of heavy foot traffic were obvious the Viet Cong had long since left the area, while no evidence of blood trails or discarded equipment were found, indicating an orderly retirement from the battlefield. B Company returned to Nui Dat by 17:30, while the remainder of 6 RAR was extracted by helicopter. The last APCs from A Squadron finally returned by 20:10 that evening as Operation Bribie concluded.


Casualties

In the aftermath of the operation Hanoi declared that the Viet Cong had won a decisive victory, claiming to have inflicted heavy losses on the Australians. The Australian higher command also claimed a major triumph, a view later reflected by Graham who believed that the Viet Cong had "got a thrashing". While in total just eight Viet Cong bodies had been recovered from the battlefield, many more had obviously been removed and later Australian intelligence reports assessed Viet Cong losses as between 50 and 70 killed, with many fresh graves later found on the withdrawal route. Indeed as a result of the fighting D445 Battalion was unable to mount a full battalion operation for the remainder of 1967, while their losses were increasingly filled by North Vietnamese. Yet the Australians had also suffered heavy casualties, and both sides had matched each other in bravery and determination. The fighting had cost 6 RAR seven killed and 27 wounded, while the cavalry also lost one killed and one wounded, and an APC destroyed. The Viet Cong had proven themselves able to withstand multiple Australian assaults, as well as heavy mortar, artillery, and aerial bombardment, before both sides fell back with their casualties. Although 6 RAR had ultimately prevailed, if only by default, the vicious fighting at Ap My An was probably the closest that the Australian Army came to defeat in a major battle during the war.

Assessment

By staying and fighting the Viet Cong had surprised the Australians, who expected them to withdraw rapidly to their jungle bases following their attack on Lang Phuoc Hai as they had on previous occasions. This assumption had led the Australians to commit forces in a piecemeal fashion when the situation required a deliberate battalion attack supported by blocking forces, a co-ordinated indirect fire plan, and APCs. Yet such an operation would have required considerable time to plan and execute, and Townsend had been ordered not to become too heavily engaged. Ad hoc and planned in haste, Operation Bribie went badly for the Australians from the start with delays in deploying the reaction force. Expecting only minor contact, Graham had finally sent the battalion out after midday and ordered it to return before nightfall. Yet this restriction had a significant impact on the operation, and limited the time available to commanders at all levels for planning and reconnaissance, thereby preventing a more deliberate approach. Once committed, the Australians realized that they had struck at least a company from D445 Battalion with elements of a heavy weapons company, possibly supported by North Vietnamese reinforcements and at least five machine-guns, one heavy machine-gun and two recoilless rifles. Graham had intended to land 6 RAR behind the Viet Cong in order to cut-off their withdrawal, yet instead they had almost landed directly on top of them. Further misjudgement and circumstance affected the Australian response once the battle began, with the initial reports that the Viet Cong position was a 'camp' proving incorrect, as had the belief that the dense scrub made the area unsuitable for cavalry. Meanwhile, A Company's initial assault had lacked adequate artillery support, while B Company's final assault had been hampered by the requirement for A Company's supporting fire to cut-off early. The resulting friction had then culminated in A Squadron's difficulty linking-up with B Company in the dense vegetation, further delaying their relief.

The experience held a number of lessons for the Australians, not least of all was the need for tanks. Although the APCs had been used to support the infantry during the operation, they lacked the firepower and armor to be an effective substitute for tanks which would likely have found the terrain and vegetation no obstacle and may have proven decisive. Meanwhile, the futility and waste of frontal tactics and massed bayonet charges against automatic weapons had once again been demonstrated. Yet such lessons still had not been fully grasped by Australian Army training doctrine, and under pressure from Townsend to press on with the attack Mackay had given the order to fix bayonets and charge due to the proximity of his forward platoons to the Viet Cong. Despite having long since ceased to be a decisive weapon of warfare, when ordered the Australians had unhesitatingly charged towards the Viet Cong machine-guns in the certainty of suffering casualties. As a result of their bravery 5 Platoon became one of the most highly decorated Australian platoons of the war. Yet aggression alone could not overcome concentrated firepower, and many survivors were later bitter about the order and losses suffered in these attempts. Another lesson identified included the need to thoroughly prepare an unsecured landing zone by fire prior to insertion. Likewise during the initial contact A Company had been unable to call in artillery, and the need for a dedicated command and control helicopter to co-ordinate indirect fire during an airmobile assault was also evident.

In attacking Lang Phuoc Hai the Viet Cong had likely intended to draw out and ambush any relief force as it approached the village; a standard tactic they had employed on previous occasions. Indeed, early on 17 February two companies of Viet Cong had established an ambush between Dat Do and Lang Phuoc Hai. That morning the South Vietnamese had subsequently dispatched 189 RF Company from Hoi My, yet the ambush subsequently failed when the RF company commander elected to move by an indirect route to the east of the road, striking the Viet Cong flank just after first light. Although outnumbered, the South Vietnamese had caught the Viet Cong by surprise and were able to fight their way clear, forcing the communists to withdraw to the north-east. Later that day Murphy had taken a similar precaution, moving A Squadron cross-country over the paddy fields to the LZ Amber. Several days after the battle uncorroborated information was received which suggested that in so doing, the Australians may have also avoided a large area ambush on Route 44 between Hoi My and Lang Phuoc Hai by up to two main force battalions, with the convoy perhaps passing within 200 meters (220 yd) of the Viet Cong command group without realizing it. Murphy subsequently deduced that the two-company Viet Cong force that had earlier contacted 189 RF Company may have been flank protection or a blocking force for the larger ambush. By inserting into LZ Amber it was probable that 6 RAR had unknowingly also avoided this ambush, yet had subsequently clashed with a large group of Viet Cong resting in the dense jungle adjacent to the landing zone. This force was likely either a reserve or flank security element, and was not a part of the main force that had attacked Lang Phuoc Hai.

During the subsequent fighting at Ap My An the Viet Cong had elected to fight from a hasty but well-prepared position and had displayed good battle discipline, command and control and effective camouflage and concealment. The Australians were later generous in their praise for their performance. In particular their use of snipers had been particularly effective, although overall their individual shooting was of a poor standard and had often been too high. Townsend concluded that the Viet Cong force had most likely been ordered to fight a rearguard action until dark in order to cover the withdrawal a larger force and their command elements. Regardless, despite their strong performance, the battle also held lessons for the Viet Cong themselves. In particular their failure to deploy their machine-guns in the tree line on the edge of the landing zone had allowed the Australians to establish a foothold, despite A Company being forced to assault into an unsecured landing zone with only minimal suppression from a single artillery battery. Later during the war the Viet Cong developed the effective tactic of targeting troop helicopters as they arrived at landing zones when they were most vulnerable.

The most intense fighting involving 1 ATF since Long Tan, during Operation Bribie the Australians had suffered their highest casualties since August 1966. In terms of the number of Viet Cong bodies recovered compared to their own losses it was the worst result they had experienced in Vietnam to that point, while the task force had also been unable to destroy D445 Battalion. The results of the fighting continued to be debated long after its conclusion, and while Graham felt that 6 RAR had inflicted severe casualties on the Viet Cong and that the battle later had far reaching effects on the insurgency in Phuoc Tuy province, Vincent believed that any success had only been marginal at best. Certainly to many of the Australian soldiers that fought it, the battle had been no victory. Private Robin Harris of 5 Platoon later wrote: "I think that on this occasion Charlie's losses were overstated. It was us who had copped a hiding." This view was shared by APC commander David Clifton when he recalled: "We had been soundly thrashed on Operation Bribie." Perhaps though, as Mackay later wrote, the "truth of Operation Bribie" was that the Australians and Viet Cong had "thoroughly belted each other". Overall, the Australians had lost the operational strength of a platoon, while the Viet Cong had effectively lost a company; arguably though it was questionable if such attrition would achieve any long-term gains in Phuoc Tuy for the Australians. The battle had a lasting effect on 1 ATF, and ultimately resulted in a number of measures to overcome a perceived weakness in firepower, while also confirming the need to limit the Viet Cong's freedom of movement.


For further details on this operation see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bribie



Primary Sources:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bribie



Good Hunting

MR

Operation Woolgoogla

Australian Military Operation in Vietnam.

28-29 March 1968

The 7th Battalion, of the Royal Australian Regiment conduct it's final operation as a company in a detailed search of an area of jungle measuring 2km by 1 km, known by the Viet Cong as the Cay Den Jungle. 1 km southeast of  Hoa Long, Phuoc Tuy province,1 km south-east of the center of Hoa Long.  

Viet Cong Casualties: 6 KIA, 2 WIA, 2 POW.
Australian Casualties:1 WIA .


Primary Sources:
http://www.facebook.com/notes/vipers-vietnam-veterans-pages/news-on-this-date-during-the-vietnam-war-march-28/272326049517069

Good Hunting.

MR

Operation Rich

US Military Operation in Vietnam.

23 - 27 October 1968

5th Infantry Division (Mech) operation in Quang Tri Province

VC/NVA KIA's: 308
US KIA's: 212


Primary Sources:
www.3rdmarines.net



Good Hunting

MR

19 May 1966, 0800 hrs: B1/8 CAV under command of Capt. Roy Martin moves out to the “Green Trace” perimeter defense line of
the 1st CAV DIV (AMBL) at it’s Base Camp, AN KHE, VN replacing B2/8 CAV under command of Capt. John Coleman, who’d recently
assumed command after a staff assignment at Division. B 2/8 was going out “on a training mission” N.E. of AN KHE some 25
minutes via UH-1D helicopters. C 1/8 was soon to return from their latest combat operation.

20 May, 0900 hrs: C 1/8 CAV under command of Capt. Bill Mozey returns to AN KHE Base Camp after combat operations, enjoys a
hot meat, cleans it’s weapons and replenishes it’s ammunition and grenade supplies.

1000 hrs: SP/4 Michael Vinassa, an expert with his M79 Grenade Launcher, previously named “C” Company’s finest solder and
recently been assigned to help the Division Chaplain build a copy of the 1/8 CAV chapel, asks to speak to Capt. Mozey. SP/4
Vinassa explains that he greatly misses being with the company and asks to be returned to combat duty with his 3rd Platoon. Capt.
Mozey is aware that he’s the last surviving male in his family, which consists only of his mother, has fought well in every battle the
past nine months and has been selected to be the first member of our company to depart Vietnam within the next 3 or 4 weeks.
He told SP/4 Vinassa he’d already done more than his duty and he should continue helping the Division Chaplain. He started to cry
and said “C” Company was the only real home he’d ever had and begged to go out on “just one more operation and then he’d
gladly help build the Division Chapel. Capt. Mozey should have said no but finally agreed to Vinassa’s plea. He’s never been able
to forget that decision nor the battle spirit which truly made them “A Band of Brothers”.

1100 hrs: C 1/8 is ordered to make an air assault to assist B 2/8 which had made heavy contact with a large NVA force. There’s no
time to replenish “C” rations but they’ll get more in the field. 1200 hrs: C 1/8 lifts off enroute to assist B 2/8. B 1/8 is ordered off the
“Green Trace” to join C 1/8 in the same operation N.E. of AN KHE. B 1/8 will lift off at 1500 hrs.

1220 hrs: C 1/8 lands in a broad valley against ineffective 12.7 mm (.51 cal) HMG fire from surrounding hilltops. Quickly forming a
combat formation, the company moves toward B 2/8 location. A 1/8 soon lands to establish a defensive perimeter for the 1/8 CAV
Forward Base and C 1/8 81 mm Mortar Platoon ably commanded by 2LT Gerald Houchens.

1420 hrs: C 1/8 locates B 2/8 which is pinned down halfway up a steep ridge by heavy NVA fire emulating from bunkers atop a
ridge. Using our organic weapons’ fire against the NVA, Capt. Mozey ordered both companies to pull back approximately 100
meters.

1500 hrs: B 1/8 lifts off from AN KHE to join C 1/8. B 2/8 moves to 1/8 CAV Forward Base and is airlifted back to AN KHE.

1515 hrs: Capt. Mozey orders his Artillery Forward Observer, (F.O.) 2Lt. Ron Emry, 2/19th Arty. BN (ABN), to “lower the NVA
ridgeline” using heavy artillery. LT. Emry, a brave, experienced and expert artillery F.O. puts it exactly on target, pulverizing the
NVA positions and all enemy bodies.

1630 hrs: C 1/8 seizes the ridge without further opposition. NVA positions are thoroughly destroyed. They were well-built log
bunkers with commo wire connecting other positions on the axis of the ridgeline. Commo wire is cut and the situation is reported
to 1/8 CAV HQ. B 1/8 lands and Capt. Martin establishes radio communications with Capt. Mozey.

1650 hrs: C 1/8 advances in column of platoons on top of ridgeline following it to the N.E. Immediately South of this ridgeline, 100
meters down a 45-degree steep slope, was a small creek coming from the N.E. heading S.W. towards a river.

1800 hrs: C 1/8 halts and forms a defensive night perimeter on the ridge. There hasn’t been any enemy contact since we seized
the ridgeline nor would there be any during the entire night. This will become a critical factor in the coming battle.

21 May, 0500 hrs: C 1/8 eats breakfast before dawn. Capt. Mozey orders the platoon leaders to continue the advance to the N.E.
atop the ridgeline which generally runs S.W. to the N.E. 2LT Jon Williams leads with the 2nd Platoon, 2LT Patrick Greiner follows
with the 1st Platoon and 2LT Frank Vavrek remains in reserve with the 3rd Plat. The Company HQ element remains to the rear of
the lead 1st Platoon. By coincidence, the point man, who’d recently returned from the hospital at Camp Zama, Japan where he’d
recovered after being gut-shot a few months prior. Upon reporting back to the company, he said he was “so damn happy to be
back with “C” 1/8 and wanted to be point man forever so he could shoot some NVA in the stomach and then they’d know how
painful it was”. Capt. Mozey explained it was best that everyone rotated through the point man position but this just happened to
be his turn as point this morning.

0630 hrs: The point man, a seasoned combat infantryman, silently snuck up on a NVA Outpost and kills all five NVA who’d unwisely
stacked their AK-47’s and were eating breakfast.

0700 hrs: Capt. Mozey radios situation report to Bn Forward HQ, fully explaining that it’s obviously a large enemy force is in the
area, including that LT. Vavrek (following last on the ridgeline as the reserve platoon) has heard NVA to his rear. Capt. Mozey
radios SITREP to his friend Capt. Martin who is also heading N.E., nearby on the South side of the creek below which Capt. Mozey
can sometimes observe from the very few places that the triple canopy jungle permits. Both experienced commanders concur
that they’ve never seen such extensive evidence of NVA forces nearby and they agree they’ll coordinate their companies attack
when the NVA are encountered.

0930 hrs: B 1/8 trooper is wounded by a NVA sniper firing from a position in a tree. A rifle squad carries him back for medical
treatment to the 1/8 BN HQ approximately 2 km away. B 1/8 observes other NVA nearby. Considering the increased signs of the
NVA, Capt. Martin orders this squad to remain and assist the 1/8 BN HQ at its Forward Base.

AFTERTHOUGHT #1: Both commanders agree that the triple canopy jungle was so heavy that the commander of nearby NVA forces
may not have heard his Outpost being wiped-out. Furthermore, if the NVA commander did hear the Outpost being wiped-out, B 1/8
was thought to be the U.S. Unit which wiped-out this outpost. Thus, Captains Martin and Mozey are thoroughly convinced that the
NVA were totally ignorant of the presence of C 1/8 advancing in control of the high ground of the ridgeline which C 1/8 had never
relinquished control of since the previous day and didn’t until after the battle had been won.

0930-1200 hrs: B 1/8 and C 1/8 continue their advances paralleling each other respectively on the South of the creek and on the
ridgeline North of this creek, both heading N.E. B 1/8 personnel periodically detect NVA on their Southern flank and to their rear.
C 1/8 encounters no NVA but find numerous log bunkers and sniper positions in the trees. Commo wire connecting these
positions along the ridge is habitually cut. These are overwhelming signs that a large NVA force is nearby! Both company
commanders report these developments to BN HQ, making all concerned aware that heavy combat is imminent!

1205 hrs: BN HQ orders C 1/8 to depart their ridgeline position and link-up with B 1/8 at the creek below. Knowing that battle is
eminent and that the high ground must be held, Capt. Mozey elected only to meet with Capt. Martin at the creek immediately
below and South of his concealed position atop the ridge. Capt. Mozey informs Capt. Martin of his decision and both companies
halt in place for lunch while the company commanders meet to discuss the situation.

1210hrs: Capt. Mozey halts C 1/8 and brief’s his platoon leaders. Lieutenants Grenier and Vavrek are ordered to secure the
ridgeline while 2 LT Williams is ordered to spread his platoon across the approximately 80-100 meters down the steep 45-50
degree slope. Capt. Mozey, his RTOs and HQ element accompany him down to the creek where Capt. Martin and B 1/8 await their
arrival.

1225-1300 hrs: Captains Martin and Mozey share one tin of jam for lunch and make plans for the battle they both expect at any
moment. The small creek coming from the N.E. and flowing S.W. will be the dividing line and appropriate platoons will maintain
visual contact at the creek line. They use their binoculars and note that the NVA had numerous bunkers and foxholes on a
fortified finger coming down from the ridge controlled by C 1/8. This finger of land was some 100 meters East of us. Capt. Mozey
ordered his F.O., 2LT Emry to call in 105 mm artillery on the finger. The fire was right on target but no enemy movement or reaction
was observed. The captains correctly surmised that the enemy had no troops in these positions. However, after six months of
fighting the NVA, they knew they were close by and that battle was eminent! Later they learned that NVA formerly in these
positions had been ordered to temporarily leave, conceal themselves East of this fortified finger and reoccupy these same
positions when ordered to bring deadly crossfires on B 1/8 which would then make it impossible for anyone to escape this NVA
ambush. Would the 7th Cavalry defeat at The Battle of the Little Big Horn repeat it’s self?

1300 hrs: The NVA battalion (reinforced) suddenly starts the battle with overwhelming light and heavy machinegun and automatic
AK47 rifle fire. At this same moment C 1/8 occupies the finger of land full of NVA bunkers and foxholes. Commo wires linking these
well-prepared positions are promptly cut. At least two cooking fires are still smoking and there’s a slit trench latrine. All fires are
being directed at 2/LT Crum’s, 1st Plat, B 1/8. Not one single NVA bullet is directed at C 1/8 which now not only holds the high
ground on the ridgeline but the entire NVA fortified finger of land. C 1/8 quickly establishes a perimeter around the upper 70% of
this finger, which includes all the NVA positions.

Capt. Martin was soon on the radio explaining the B 1/8 situation to Capt. Mozey: B 1/8 was pinned-down by heavy fire, a platoon
nearest C 1/8 was badly shot-up and needed rescue. He needed “to borrow” a platoon and most of all, needed massed
machinegun and rifle fire commencing at the yellow smoke extending 50 meters East to a tall teak tree. Capt. Mozey assembled
50% of his M60 LMGs and immediately delivers the requested massed MG fire at the designated area. In addition, virtually all C 1/8
M16 rifles and M79 grenade launchers joined-in, saturating NVA positions with many thousands of rounds. Capt. Martin radios that
NVA snipers are shot out of trees, bunkers are being heavily hit and NVA not killed or wounded by C 1/8 fires are forced to get
down in their positions. C 1/8 carried at least double the amount of ammo carried by most infantry companies, but Capt. Mozey
knew both companies would need more ammunition and blood plasma. Unexpectedly, all NVA fire instantly ceased for some ten
minutes after being hit by the heavy C 1/8 fires. This enabled B 1/8 to safely approach and grenade the NVA bunkers and foxholes.
Throughout the battlefield, B 1/8 started killing the surprised NVA who seemed stunned by this immediate, unexpected and deadly
fire. Capt. Martin directed the massed machinegun and rifle fire via radio to Capt. Mozey throughout the entire battle. Despite
numerous changes of targets, Capt. Martin’s skill in directing these fires resulted in not even one friendly casualty! His skill was
the result of his experience as an enlisted man ranging from being a machinegunner to being the MG Platoon Sergeant in an
Airborne Heavy Weapons Company which recorded the highest ATT score ever achieved in 7th Army on duty in Germany. Very
soon after C 1/8 commenced firing at the NVA positions, numbers of NVA approached C 1/8 from the East side of this fortified
finger. They weren’t carrying their weapons in a manner ready to fire and obviously didn’t expect to meet American troops. They
were promptly killed and/or retreated. LT. Vavrek’s platoon ran into more NVA down by the creek who similarly weren’t ready to
fight, seemed confused and were easily killed.

AFTERTHOUGHT #2: Both commanders agree that the reason C 1/8 wasn’t fired upon even when the NVA saw them taking up
positions prepared by the NVA, was probably due to THEIR troops to reoccupy these positions after NVA troops South of the creek
had ambushed and pinned-down what they still thought was the only U.S. Company present! Distance from the creek up steep 45-
degree slopes was approximately 80-100 m to the top of each opposite ridge. The bunkers on each were merely 100 meters apart
on a straight line opposite each other. Captains Martin and Mozey believe NVA leaders were stunned when troops they thought
were their own and part of their ambush plan “fired on their own comrades”. They were so stunned that they halted their fires for
10 minutes while attempting to learn the identity of troops firing at their positions instead of at B 1/8 caught in the ambush.

1305 hrs: LT. Williams’ 2nd Platoon, nearest to the creek, is ordered by Capt. Mozey to rescue LT. Crum’s platoon. LT. Williams
moves his platoon under the intense massed fires of C 1/8 and very quickly survivors of LT. Crum’s platoon, including the
wounded, are brought into our perimeter. While this rescue is in progress, LT. Vavrek is ordered to move his 3rd Platoon down
form the ridge, report to Capt. Mozey and be prepared to assist B 1/8. LT. Grenier’s 1st Platoon is ordered to hold the upper
portion of our perimeter, including the ridgeline we’ve held since commencing this operation the previous day. Capt. Mozey
radios BN HQ for resupply of ammo, blood plasma and C-rations.

1315 hrs: As survivors of LT. Crum’s platoon are being brought into our perimeter, Capt. Mozey greets them and asks SP/4 David
Dolby, carrying his machinegun, where the NVA machineguns are. He replied that he wasn’t sure but had returned fire against
them and encouraged those around him to stay low. SP/4 Dolby said one man stood up and was instantly killed by the heavy NVA
fire. He also said that all but five of his platoon had been rescued and were now safely in our perimeter. SP/4 Dolby thought that
the missing five men were dead. Capt. Mozey ordered him to assemble all members of his platoon still able to fight and report to
LT. Grenier to help defend the upper side of our perimeter. The wounded were put into protected NVA bunkers and treated
immediately. LT. Williams was ordered to occupy NVA positions and defend the lower half of the perimeter.

1300-1315 hrs: Amidst all that was happening, Captains Martin and Mozey quickly discussed their battle plan via radio and agreed
their close proximity to the NVA and the triple jungle canopy over and surrounding them prevented use of air, artillery and ARA
supporting fires. However, Capt. Martin said the massed machinegun fire was having a devastating effect on the NVA and he
continued his personal direction of C 1/8 supporting fires throughout the entire battle. During this same “busy time” LT. Vavrek, C
1/8’s most experienced LT, reported to Capt. Mozey and was ordered to switch his PRC-25 radio to B 1/8 frequency and report to
Capt. Martin for further orders.

Lt. Vavrek was called “The Lead Magnet” as he was always at the point of heaviest enemy fire. Standing nearby him was a very
brave trooper, SP/4 Michael Vinassa, who could “tread a needle” with his M79, 40 mm grenade launcher. Capt. Mozey put his hand
on his shoulder and said, “Frank, don’t let Vinassa do any John Wayne heroics.” LT. Vavrek and his 3rd Plat immediately crossed
over the creek to fight under Capt. Martin’s orders.

1315 hrs: About this time the stunned NVA leader recovered his senses with a vengeance! After not firing a single round for
approximately 10 minutes while trying to determine if it was his own troops mistakenly firing at them from NVA positions opposite
them as planned to finish-off B 1/8 with deadly crossfire after the ambush commenced, the NVA leader directed heavy fires
against C 1/8. Numerous .51 caliber HMGs raked our perimeter but did little damage. However, fire was so heavy that trees were
being cut-down and Capt. Mozey told his RTOs, “God Damn, these woods are rotten.” Soon after the HMG fire commenced, the
NVA launched a counter attack against the West side of the perimeter. As heavy fire was now coming from two directions, one of
Capt. Mozey’s RTOs licked his finger, held it up and said, “I think it’s now heaviest from the West and we should change
positions.” LT. Williams’ 2nd Platoon halted this determined attack with instant heavy fire. The NVA continued their determined but
disorganized counter attacks by small isolated groups for the next hour. Capt. Mozey walked the perimeter, encouraging his
troops, visited the wounded and repeatedly talked with Capt. Martin as he ordered a shift in the massed MG fire of C 1/8.

Afterthought #3: Not only was the NVA leader confused and his troops not given orders for a least 10 minutes but numerous
commo wires had been cut and subordinate leaders killed or wounded. NVA troops attempting to carry out existing orders to re-
occupy their previously occupied positions on the “fortified finger” now occupied by C 1/8 were separated and confused to the
extent that several didn’t realize these were Americans. As they approached they were easily killed. The NVA leader was under
the added pressure of being observed by at least three VIPs who were invited to witness “the planned, easy annihilation of an
American airborne company”. On top the NVA ridge the next morning C 1/8 discovered “an elaborate veranda” with three graves
under it. Several shot-up, folding chairs were nearby. This was unusual. Why would the NVA take the time to give anyone “an
honorable burial” when over 50 dead NVA were left where they fell on the battlefield? Capt. Mozey ordered these three graves
dug-up. Two of average Asian height were dressed in safari suits as opposed to the dead NVA troops’ uniforms. The third dead
man was 6’2” tall and wore a Chinese, dark blue, wool turtleneck sweater that we’d heard Chinese advisor’s wear. Capt. Mozey
laid beside him for measurement and noted there wasn’t any blood on his sweater as a single bullet had hit him in the forehead
and his head must have been in a downhill position when he fell. Beneath him was a knapsack unlike what the NVA used. It was
full of documents, many in Chinese, which Capt. Mozey was able to identify as he’d collected Chinese and Japanese weapons and
militaria for over 20 years. Even more interesting was an 8” x 12” photograph of him in the dress uniform of a high-ranking officer
in the Chinese People’s Army. He’d signed the photo which was in a glass and wood frame and obviously intended for
presentation to some dignitary. It gave Capt. Mozey a wonderful, warm feeling while smiling and taking off the Chinese’s sweater
for his use during the cold nights. He also took the Chinese pistol, holster and belt as souvenirs, later giving them to one of his
sons. What irony! These VIPs had been invited by the over-confident NVA officers to sit and enjoy watching Americans die! THEY
PROBABLY LIKED THE INITIAL PERFORMANCE BUT WEREN’T AWAKE FOR THE DRAMATIC FINAL ACT. After their opening fire and
being quickly hit by the massed return fire, the NVA leader had to be extra nervous and dismayed as he watched his well planned
ambush crumble into a disaster in front of these VIPs he was so confidently going to impress. The NVA leader was certainly aware
of the 1/8 CAV Forward Base a few miles away and the Air Cavalry’s instant response capabilities. All of these factors combined to
destroy the methodical thinking mind of the NVA leaders. Unlike trained American combat leaders, they couldn’t “think on their
feet” and quickly adjust to an unexpected and rapidly changing situation.

1420 hrs: It was raining fairly heavily by now but as the rains increased, the NVA attacks and gun fire against C 1/8 perimeter
decreased. This was due primarily to the determined and highly effective attacks by B 1/8 lead by Capt. Martin and ably assisted by
Lt. Vavrek’s 3rd Platoon from C 1/8. Capt. Martin and his men slowly destroyed bunker after bunker of NVA troops. Before long, the
increasing rains brought fog and it got darker much faster than normal. This, added to the fact they were fighting in triple canopy
jungle, increased the difficulty of Capt. Martin’s command and control.

Despite all problems, he and his troops continued the slow process of locating and destroying each and every NVA position as
they moved up the slope, continually adjusting the massed LMG fire by radioing Capt. Mozey.

1430 hrs: Capt. Mozey received a radio message that needed resupply would soon be enroute despite the lack of adequate
visibility for safe flying. Two or three “Huey Slick” helicopters, and accompanying gunships, approach. They’re flown by very
brave pilots who’ve eagerly volunteered to fly in this dangerous weather. There’s no LZ within several miles as a large enemy
force surrounds us and it’s such bad weather that neither the helicopters nor “B” and “C” 1/8 can see each other. Illumination
flares and strobe lights are totally ineffective. Considering the large number of NVA light and heavy MGs, Capt. Mozey warns the
pilots to make a fast fly-over and throw the supplies out at his command when engine noise is the loudest. He didn’t want to lose
a helicopter and crew and didn’t want a burning helicopter to crash into his defensive position. This is done on the second pass.
Most supplies land within C 1/8 perimeter but some luckily land nearby B 1/8 troops who welcome the needed resupply of ammo.
However, the day has gotten so dark that falling supplies weren’t visible until they’re only 5-6 feet above one’s head. Falling
supplies strike at least two troops but they’re not seriously hurt. The gunship pilots offer use of their deadly machinegun and
rocket fire, but Capt. Mozey declines these fires due to the inclement weather, triple canopy jungle trees and close proximity to
the enemy. The entire battlefield is almost exactly the size of a football field.

1500-1600 hrs: C 1/8 perimeter was receiving only periodic and ineffective gun fire from various small groups or individual NVA
who remained alive. They continued their massed machinegun fire in support of B 1/8 until about 1530 or 1600 hrs when Capt.
Martin observed it striking the very top of the ridge (where we discovered the veranda and three dead VIPs the next morning).
Wounded from both companies were receiving appropriate medical treatment in the safety of protected, formerly NVA positions
seized from the NVA by C 1/8. Meanwhile, an inspired Capt. Martin continues leading B 1/8 efforts to destroy the NVA “down to the
very last SOB”, as he radios Capt. Mozey periodically with quick progress reports. Throughout all this heavy fighting Capt. Martin
has remained his usual “cool, calm and collected self”. His low, steady voice never gets excited and greatly inspires his troops as
he shouts commands while personally destroying bunker after bunker with hand grenades supplied by his RTO who is a C.O.
(conscientious objector) and doesn’t want to personally kill. B 1/8 and LT. Vavrek’s 3rd Platoon continue this close combat until
approximately 1700 hrs when Capt. Martin, his RTO and one other trooper shoot the guard outside the door into the NVA
Command Bunker, jump in and shoot all eight NVA officers dead.

1700 hrs: A heavy fog descends close to the ground amidst the steady, heavy rain. Movement is difficult on the now slippery,
steep 45-degree slope. Disregarding these problems, Capt. Martin, who had fought his way up to the ridge, now moves down
towards the creek throwing grenades in through the back doors of all bunkers he encounters. His men and LT. Vavrek’s platoon
are killing every NVA in virtually all their bunkers and foxholes. In such close combat with very little visibility.

1800 hrs: Capt. Martin radios Capt. Mozey requesting illumination be fired by the 105-mm howitzer battery supporting C 1/8.
Illumination comes quickly and is critical in order to locate our wounded and KIA, including the five men missing from the initial
ambush of LT. Crum’s platoon. It also enables B 1/8 and Lt. Vavrek’s platoon to locate and kill any NVA they may have overlooked
in the darkness, fog and increasingly heavy rain. This continues for some two hours. All firing at C 1/8 has stopped and B 1/8 has
run out of NVA to kill.

2000 hrs: There hasn’t been a single enemy shot fired for over two hours even though the illumination makes B 1/8 and C 1/8
“easy targets”. The task of carrying the dead and wounded up the dark, slippery and steep slope commences. In the daylight
when it was dry, it was very difficult for anyone to climb these slopes. Now, the fog and rain has made these slopes nearly
impassable. The added weight of the dead, wounded, their equipment and captured enemy weapons, etc., greatly increased the
difficulty. Parachute suspension lines, strong shrubs, vines and trees plus human chains were used in the slow process of
bringing all into the C 1/8 perimeter. All were aware that while NVA in the immediate area were dead, badly wounded, or had “run
for their lives”, a large enemy force was probably nearby and could attack at any moment. “B” and “C” 1/8 had to get everyone
into that well prepared perimeter ASAP in case of an NVA counter attack.

The triple canopy jungle, bad weather and distance from any friendly force left B 1/8 and C 1/8 totally isolated in an area “infested”
with vastly superior enemy forces which certainly wanted revenge!

2130 hrs: Capt. Martin and LT. Vavrek radio Capt. Mozey that all their personnel have reached the creek just below the C 1/8
perimeter. Capt. Mozey then requested that his 105 mm arty battery use one tube to continue firing illumination rounds and use
the remaining five tubes to fire high explosive (HE) at the top and behind the NVA ridgeline in order to kill surviving and
retreating NVA. Cdr 1/8 BN personally radioed and told Capt. Mozey he could have 6 tubes firing illumination or firing HE at the
NVA ridge. THAT WAS THE ONLY OPTION: NO MIX OF ILLUMINATION AND HE! Illumination was absolutely critical and Capt. Mozey
chose it. Without illumination, it would be nearly impossible to save our wounded as well as bring everyone into the relative
safety of the C 1/8 perimeter from which we could easily defend against possible NVA counter-attack. Capt. Mozey had never had
anyone interfere with his supporting fires before.
22 May, 0130 hrs: It took 5 to 6 hours of maximum effort to bring all into the perimeter of C 1/8. Without illumination you couldn’t
see beyond 10-12 feet through the heavy fog and driving rain. Captains Martin and Mozey quickly planned and placed B 1/8 and
LT. Vavrek’s 3rd Platoon in positions to strengthen perimeter defense. Resupply of ammo, grenades and “C” rations was
distributed. Wounded were being cared for in NVA positions which were protected from the rain. Officers and NCOs visited their
wounded, praising their brave actions, which led to this great victory, and assuring them they’d recover after being medivaced at
first light. They had been awake for nearly twenty tension filled hours, which had steadily increased in intensity to today’s violent
life and death conclusion. There hadn’t been time to eat and smoking in the open wasn’t allowed as enemy snipers may have
been waiting to shoot at lighted cigarettes. Troops were soaking wet, splattered with mud: happy to finally enjoy a peaceful
moment despite sitting or laying in cold, wet mud being chilled by the heavy rain which was driven by strong, chilly winds. Blood
from minor wounds and cuts inflicted by rocks and the thick jungle vegetation ran down their smiling faces and torn uniforms. A
bit of American blood fertilized these slopes today but these brave troopers made certain the NVA were “the greatest
contributors”! YET, THERE WAS A WARM GLOW EMULATING THROUGHOUT THIS COLD, DARK AND LONELY PERIMETER: THE
PROUD, CAN-DO SPIRIT OF WELL-TRAINED, WELL-LEAD, SEASONED PARATROOPERS WHO’D REPEATEDLY PROVEN THEY WEREN’T
AFRAID OF THE BEST NVA UNITS WHOM THEY’D SAVAGELY BEATEN WHENEVER THEY WERE ENCOUNTERED!

0100-0600 hrs: Medics continued working on the wounded under shelter, “Cs” were being eaten, a few smoked cigarettes in their
holes and the few who carried ponchos sought shelter from the cold rain and wind. (Most carried a piece of 6’ x 6’ vinyl to wrap
around their bodies and weapons to conserve body heat.) Orders were given allowing 50% to get a couple hours sleep while the
remainder stayed on alert against a possible NVA counterattack. It had been over three hours since Capt. Mozey had been denied
HE artillery fire on the NVA ridge, so he didn’t request it again thinking the NVA had ample time to retreat from the area. He
revisited his wounded and his Chief Medic SP/5 McDonald called him aside, out of earshot of other troops. One of C 1/8’s most
popular and finest machinegunners, SP/4 David Jolley, was bleeding to death internally and desperately needed surgery or he’d
die. Capt. Mozey asked why SP/5 McDonald couldn’t do the necessary surgery and this outstanding Chief Medic, who’d already
won two Silver Stars for bravery, explained that only a medical doctor and aid station had the skill, personnel and equipment to
successfully accomplish the major surgery required. Capt. Mozey summed-up the situation and said aloud to SP/5 McDonald, “We’
re in an isolated position with reduced strength, over two miles from 1/8 CAV BN Forward Base through heavy, rugged terrain,
under triple canopy jungle being hit with cold, bitter fog, rain and wind in near total darkness and probably surrounded by
superior NVA forces seeking revenge.” SP/5 McDonald replied, “You’re the commander and paid to make decisions. What are
your orders?” Capt. Mozey made his decision: “There’s no reasonable chance of a successful medivac and I can’t waste men’s
lives. Tell Jolley he’s going to be O.K. and will be the first on the morning’s medivac. Make sure he doesn’t feel any pain.” Capt.
Mozey walked back to SP/4 Jolley and talked encouragingly but was trying hard not to let Jolley see his tears of farewell to a good
man who’d fought beside him through so many battles. SP/4 Jolley would receive a Silver Star Medal for his bravery. Capt. Martin
had similar thoughts about getting the wounded to safety but arrived at the same decision: There wasn’t anyway to remove our
wounded until morning’s first light! Shortly after 0100 hrs on 22 May 1966, Capt. Martin radioed for help from an aerial gunship and
soon an AC-130 was flying overhead.  

However, it was so dark and raining so heavily that it’s illumination flares were hardly noticeable. Its massive fire support wasn’t
needed, but its presence was reassuring. Capt. Mozey sat down and fell asleep for a short time but was awaken by artillery or ARA
fire impacting behind the NVA fortified ridge opposite our defense perimeter. Either Capt. Martin had ordered this appropriate
supportive fire or perhaps the Bn Comdr had finally ordered the fires which had earlier been denied. Capt. Mozey then had time
to visit SP/4 Michael Vanessa’ body. He was C 1/8’s most effective and popular M79 man who would receive the DSC for his
bravery. Vinassa lay wrapped in a poncho. The captain lifted it away from Vinassa’s face and whispered his goodbye. His decision
to allow SP/4 Vinassa to go on “just one more operation” had the inescapable impact on Capt. Mozey. This emotional moment
would return when he visited SP/4 Vinassa’s mother after returning to America. After six months of front line combat together,
Capt. Mozey and C 1/8 CAV had become “closer than brothers” and every loss pained the heart.

Throughout this dark, rainy morning Captains Martin and Mozey reflected on the battle, walked the perimeter, visited the
wounded, radioed SITREPs to BN HQ and made plans to defend their perimeter should the NVA launch counterattacks. After brief
naps for short periods if any, “B” and “C” 1/8 CAV stirred with activity. Exhausted troops, chilled to the bone by 10 hours of heavy
rain, strong winds, and dropping temperature, shake off fatigue with hot coffee, “C” rations, cigarettes and the knowledge they’d
just won one hell of a fine battle and would be alive to see the coming day. Before dawn, preparations were being made to
medivac the wounded and tree’s had to be removed in order for litter baskets to be lowered through the triple canopy jungle
surrounding us. Captains Martin and Mozey plan for the coming day and they agree that B 1/8, which had suffered the most
casualties, will remain on this fortified finger of land and be responsible for evacuation of all casualties. They will be protected by
LT. Vavrek’s 3rd Platoon, C 1/8. The remainder of C 1/8 will advance up the opposing NVA ridge, kill any NVA who remain, police the
battle field for weapons and documents and then pursue any NVA who managed to escape. The Bn Comdr approves the plan and
shortly after dawn this plan is executed.

0600-0700 hrs: Dawn arrived bright and clear. “Huey” helicopters hovered above and using ropes, lowered chainsaws, axe’s and
extra gasoline in order to cut a large enough opening for the medivac litter baskets. More enemy action was expected and troops
remained on alert around the perimeter, but not one single round was fired at “B” and “C” 1/8 CAV on this day! SP/4 David Dolby
had the most knowledge where the five KIA missing from his platoon might lay and was ordered to accompany C 1/8 into what had
been the NVA positions of the battlefield. The bodies were located and all five were tenderly carried up the steep slope to be
medivaced to the Graves Registration Point. 1/8 CAV never abandoned any of their wounded or dead and that fact reassured
every trooper!

0700-0800 hrs: C 1/8, minus 3rd Platoon, cautiously advanced up the through the NVA positions. Enemy weapons and anything of
value were brought to a single location for evacuation to AN KHE Base Camp. Anxious to pursue any NVA survivors and now
without his 3rd Platoon, Capt. Mozey ordered his troops not to follow blood trails away from the battlefield. Most likely, wounded
NVA were or would soon be dead where they lay. Like the Americans, the NVA couldn’t possible locate all their wounded and dead
during that dark, rainy night. C 1/8 counted some 50 NVA bodies laying where they’d fallen in and outside of their fortified
positions including the graves of the three VIPs under a well made veranda atop the ridge surrounded by several shot-up folding
chairs. Capt. Mozey knew it was highly unusual to bury three men in such a prominent location, while some 50 others lay where
they fell in battle. The NVA always carried away their dead and they had 13 hours to do this while both sides “licked their wounds”.
Captains Martin and Mozey believe that the actual numbers of NVA dead and wounded were so enormous that NVA simply lacked
enough survivors and probably no leaders to order the recovery of all dead before the Americans would find them. The NVA
habitually did this so their battle losses wouldn’t be known.

0800-0900 hrs: Capt. Mozey radioed a SITREP to BN HQ and commenced pursuit of surviving NVA along a heavily traveled trail atop
the ridge heading in a East-South East direction. Troops had “a blood lust” and some shouted out loud their intentions to
annihilate any and all NVA. The number of blood trails, bloody bandages and discarded equipment increased as C 1/8 proceeded
after the enemy that was obviously badly hurt. About 0900 hrs Capt. Mozey received orders from the Bn Comdr to halt and return
back to the defensive position they’d established the previous day. Capt. Mozey protested and explained it would waste a great
opportunity to annihilate weakened NVA survivors of the battle. No reason was given but the Bn Comdr repeated his order and C
1/8 turned around and returned as ordered.

1000-1130 hrs: Shortly after arriving at its former defensive perimeter, C 1/8 was ordered to make an overland march to 1/8 CAV
Forward Base. Moving in combat formation, ready for enemy action, we encountered no enemy except one VC courier riding a
bike along a well-used trail. He was instantly killed and C 1/8 arrived at our battalion’s forward base without further incident.

CONCLUSION: Thirty four years after fighting this great battle and following four long days of “re-fighting it again” as the only two
commanders on that battlefield and the only ones aware of their joint plans and actions, both Captains Martin and Mozey, after
reading all statements, reports and maps of other participants, as will as, telephone discussions with others who were there, are
totally convinced that the unexpected arrival and seizure of the NVA fortified finger of land immediately North of the creek by C
1/8 was and is the key factor enabling these two well trained and highly experienced airborne rifle companies (ably lead by two
very aggressive “battle-smart” captains who were and remain best of friends) to fight wisely and win a great victory against a
vastly superior NVA force which was very nearly destroyed in a battle the NVA had thoroughly planned for some 24 hours and
initiated at a fortified ambush site of their choice. It is the hopes of both Captains Martin and Mozey, that the U.S. Army will award
the Valorous Unit Citation so clearly deserved by Companies “B” and “C”, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 8th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry
Division (Airmobile).

Primary Sources:
http://www.jumpingmustangs.com/charlie6571/charliecrazyhorse.html

Note: There are maps included in the main article as well as some additional information you might find interesting.


Good Hunting.

MR

 

This information was extracted from U.S. Army Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division, Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS:MACV J3-32) 28 January 1967.

Operation Paul Revere IV was a search and destroy operation that took place from 18 October 1966 to 31 December 1966, in the western II Corps area.

 

Taking part in the operation:

2d Brigade Task Force, 4th Infantry Division, consisting of:
2/8 Infantry
1/12 Infantry
1/22 Infantry
4/42 Field Artillery


3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division, consisting of:
1/14 Infantry
1/35 Infantry
2/35 Infantry

2/9 Field Artillery

 
Numerous supporting and attached units.

 

The following are the incidents involving the 1/22 Infantry Battalion:

On November 5 1966 A Company, 1st Battalion 22d Infantry made contact with an estimated two platoons of NVA at 0935 hours in the vicinity of YA700532. The enemy initiated fire from prepared positions against advancing friendly troops. This was considered to be part of a delaying action. The volume of fire seemed to be five to seven automatic weapons firing initial bursts of 30 to 60 rounds, expending a total of about 900 rounds followed by a 15 to 20 minute lull. Fire was resumed by the enemy at a sustained rate of eight to 10 rounds per minute. When the firing started about 25 percent of the friendly troops were within 25 to 50 meters of the enemy position. Results of this engagement were three US KIA, eight US WIA and six NVA KIA.

On the night of 10 November, A Company, 1st battalion, 22d Infantry recieved 20 mortar rounds and heavy small arms fire from northwest of their position at YA677566. The Battalion remained in contact with an estimated company size force for approximately two hours resulting in three US KIA and 20 US WIA.

A PW captured on 11 November as a result of this action stated that he was a member of the K6 Battalion, 95B Regiment located in the vicinity of YA702549.

12 November A Company and the Recon Platoon, 1st Battalion 22d Infantry located an NVA base area with five NVA bodies at YA678571.

18 November B Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry discovered a fortified base area on the west side of the Nam Sathay at YA650650. An air strike was called on the area. Traces of blood were found after the strike and also 300 pounds of rice and a trail leading southwest.

Another captive taken on 24 November by B Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry in the vicinity of YA669740, claimed to be a member of the H-20 Engineer Company, 32d Regiment, which he located in the vicinity of YA701716. He also said that the 32d Regiment Headquarters had been located in the vicinity of YA669720 since about 3 November.

On 25 November B Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry captured one PW vicinity of YA659737 who stated that he belonged to the H-20 Engineer Company, 32 Regiment, and that five days earlier his company had been located in the vicinity of YA685712. Numerous visual reconnaissance reports and other reports from reliable sources, indicated a possible large unit concentration in the vicinity of YA7071, YA7074, YA7471, and YA7474. The sighting of numerous anti-aircraft positions and other activity indicated that the area bounded by coordinates YA6469, YA6485, YA6885, and YA6879 was being prepared for receipt of a large enemy headquarters. Frequent sightings of rafts, wood and log bridges and trail activity along the Nam Sathay between YA670781 and YA727870 indicated extensive enemy activity in that area.

In an area of dense undergrowth in the vicinity of YA659754, B Company, 1st battalion, 22d Infantry located a large number of enemy troops late on the afternoon of 27 November. One NVA soldier taken prisoner identified his unit as the 2d Battalion, 95B Regiment, but he was unable to provide its location.

On 29 November in the vicinity of YA656755, B Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with three NVA soldiers, taking one captive. The captive identified his unit as the 2d Battalion, 95B Regiment and stated that four days earlier it was located near a stream in the vicinity of YA692723. Its mission was to remain at that location and act as a blocking force.

An NVA Sergeant, who had been separated from his unit, was captured in the same area on 4 December by B Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry. The sergeant identified his unit as the 5th Battalion, 88th Regiment, and stated that the unit in contact on that area on 2 December was an element of the 88th Regiment. He stated that until approximately one month ago, the 88th Regiment had the mission of ambushing US heliborne troops at landing zones, but that heavy casualties had caused a change in mission. According to the captive, the 5th Battalion had been ordered to assume the mission of locating and ambushing Special Forces and CIDG patrols. To the north, on 2 December, A Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, located a 75 bed hospital in the vicinity of YA646746. Several documents found in the hospital area indicated that it had been used by the 32d Regiment. One NVA soldier was killed in that location.

3 December the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located and destroyed two tons of rice in the vicinity of YA654756. The area also contained a 59 bunker complex and one hut, all of which were destroyed. Three tons of rice from the same vicinity were evacuated.

6 December at 2010 hours, C Company, 1st Battlion, 22d Infantry received approximately four mortar rounds outside their perimeter, vicinity YA668827. The Recon Platoon found one 82mm mortar tube and base plate vicinity of YA655741.

In the vicinity of YA635729 on 9 December, B Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, captured one badly wounded NVA soldier who stated that he was a member of the 2d Transportation Battalion, 10th NVA Division, and that he had been separated from his unit 12 days previously after a B-52 strike. On 10 December in the vicinity of YA626719, A Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located a large village, estimated to be regimental size and very recently evacuated. The village included kitchens, latrines, possible classrooms, 50 by 30 foot sleeping quarters, and underground trenches, used as air raid shelters. Diggings estimated to be one day old were also found in the area. On 11 December, A Company made contact with two NVA soldiers in a village located in the vicinity of YA607714. One NVA Lieutenant was captured, who claimed that he was assigned as a platoon leader in the 3d Company, K4 Battalion, 10th Regiment, 320th Division. According to the Lieutenant, the regimental mission was to ambush an American Battalion that had landed in a landing zone in the vicinity of YA638777 on 8 December. The prisoner also said that, as of 10 December, the regimental headquarters was located in the vicinity of YA610770, and that its subordinate elements, the 4th, 5th, and 6th Battalions, were located in the vicinity of YA6074, YA6079, and YA 6082 respectively. Analysis of all available order of battle indicated that the 10th Regiment was probably the 32d NVA Regiment. On 12 December, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located a village of 15 huts capable of housing a battalion in the vicinity of YA606715.

12 December the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry engaged four NVA at YA601712. Results were one NVA KIA, two AK-47 rifles captured, and 800 pounds of rice and two grenades destroyed. A search of the area revealed three NVA soldiers' graves, estimated to be several days old.

In the vicinity of YA635772, on 15 December, C Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located a village of 20 huts, a kitchen, a latrine and a possible 10 to 12 bed hospital. Also found were 10 incomplete huts that appeared to have been built within the last 72 hours. The large amount of military and personal equipment left in the area indicated that it had been hastily evacuated within the previous 24 hours.

There was a mortar attack against the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry Command Post, located at YA656757, on 18 December. Twenty-five to 30 rounds of 82mm mortars were fired from northwest of the command post location, but all rounds fell outside the battalion perimeter.

19 December the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry ( - ) was airlifted from their fire support base to the Division Base Camp at Dragon Mountain.

Operations continued on 20 December with elements of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry completing their airlift to the Division Base Camp at Dragon Mountain.


Primary Sources:
http://1-22infantry.org/history/paulrevereiv.htm


Good Hunting.

MR

Operation MONTANA RAIDER, conducted from 12 April to 14 May 1969 in the area east and north of Tay Ninh City, was aimed at a rear service support and transportation zone for enemy troops and equipment entering South Vietnam from Cambodia. Although the exact location and identity of enemy units in this region were not known, two North Vietnamese divisions were thought to be present. The terrain was not rugged, but dense jungle hampered movement. The MONTANA RAIDER force consisted of one infantry-heavy and two armor-heavy task forces under command of the 11th Armored Cavalry. The regiment's air cavalry troop and the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, the air cavalry squadron of the 1st Cavalry Division, flew in support of the operation. An artillery battalion headquarters under direct control of.the regiment coordinated all artillery fire. A cover and deception plan was devised to persuade the enemy that U.S. forces were moving north and west of Tay Ninh City. Air cavalrymen, flying over enemy base camps, deliberately lost map overlays clearly marking the area northwest of Tay Ninh City as an objective for the operation, and intentional security breaches in radio transmissions were employed to the same end.
 
At 0800 on 12 April operational control of the 11th Armored Cavalry passed from the 1st Infantry Division to the 1st Cavalry Division, marking the beginning Of MONTANA RAIDER. In accordance with the deception plan, the armor-heavy task forces left Bien Hoa and moved past the actual area of operations. As the 11th Armored Cavalry's 2d Squadron task force neared Dau Tieng, it swung northwest to join Company A of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry (Airmobile), while the l1th Cavalry's 1st Squadron task force moved into another base and linked up with Company C of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry. The movement through and beyond the actual area of operations was designed to suggest further to the enemy that the operation would be conducted northwest of Tay Ninh City. By 1700 on 12 April all forces had completed the 98 kilometer move and were ready for action.
 
On 13 April Colonel James H. Leach, commander of the 11th Armored Cavalry took operational control of an airmobile infantry unit, the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, and began reconnaissance in force operations east to Tay Ninh City. The 11th Cavalry's 1st Squadron task force entered the area from the southwest, its 2d Squadron task force from the northwest, and the 8th Cavalry task force from the northeast. In order to give the 8th Cavalry task force additional firepower and some armored protection, Troop G and one platoon of Company H, the tank company of the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, were attached. The first unit to clash with the enemy was the regimental air cavalry troop, which was assessing bomb damage from a B-52 strike. After the aerorifles and infantry reinforcements were sent in, Troop A of the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, arrived, and in an all-day battle in the heavy jungle finally drove the enemy out. The following days saw scattered fighting as the task forces converged. Artillery and air strikes were used liberally to destroy enemy base camps. The longest battle of Phase I occurred on 18 April when Troops A and B of the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, met a large enemy force. Heavy artillery and air strikes were used against the enemy, but the assault was delayed when machine gun tracer ammunition created a fire storm in the bamboo thickets. The enemy lost seventy-six men in this battle.
 
At the end of Phase I, and after two days devoted to maintenance, Phase II opened with a 149-kilometer road march for the entire regiment to Quan Loi in Binh Long Province, 100 kilometers north of Saigon. Phases II and III saw the combined arms task forces of the 11th Armored Cavalry ranging throughout eastern War Zone C, engaging the enemy in short, bitter fights, almost always in heavy jungle. The stress again was on mobility, firepower, and the combined arms team.
 
MONTANA RAIDER demonstrated the versatility of a large, mounted unit, aggressively led and employing conventional armored award doctrine in isolated jungle. All three phases of MONTANA RAIDER again showed the value of combined arms -armored cavalry, infantry, artillery, and air cavalry. Surprising mobility was achieved by tracked vehicles, which covered more than 1,600 kilometers during the operation; of that distance, 1,300 kilometers were in dense jungle. More important was the fact that this operation, REMAGEN in the north, and others throughout Vietnam put free world forces in possession of the enemy base areas during 1969. With nowhere else to go, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese pulled back to their bases in Cambodia and Laos.


Primary Sources:
http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/mounted/chapter6.htm

Good Hunting.

MR

Welcome to the site Spawtan.

These first posts are generally very brief. I wanted to get them listed and will come back as I have time and put more information on each of them.

Sorry to hear you were wounded.

Thanks for your service.

Good Hunting.

MR

The American soldier has always developed his own vocabulary to describe the sights and sounds of war, and the soldiers of today are maintaining that tradition.  The jargon of the Vietnam GI is often humorous, sometimes confusing.

   From the moment a replacement enters Vietnam he is subjected to the lingo of war.  The new man is a "turtle" for the man he replaces because he seems to be so slow in arriving.

   If he did not know before coming across the "big pond" (Pacific Ocean), he soon learns that MACV stands for Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; USARV means United States Army, Vietnam; and "short-timer" is a soldier going home soon.

   A few of the terms for his fighting comrades, "jet jockey" and "Saigon warrior", are self evident. Many are not.

   It is possible to spend an entire tour of duty in Vietnam without learning all the terms for an infantryman.  He is a "grunt" or a "stump jumper".  He is called a "gravel crusher" or, most often, a "leg."

   After a few months in the "boondocks" the GI respects the courage of his tenacious foe and calls him "Mister Charles" or "Sir Charles."
   Enemy infested jungles become the "VC National Forests."

   A wounded soldier is "zapped" by Charlie and enemy soldiers are "greased," "massaged," or "blown away," by "friendlies" (Allied soldiers).
     Abbreviations

   Abbreviations are used extensively in this war and it is possible to carry on a conversation that would leave a linguist dizzy.

   The military units of Vietnam are divided into several categories.  The "good-guys" are:
   ARVN - Army of the Republic of Vietnam. This group is the Vietnamese regular army.
   CIDG - Civilian Irregular Defense Group.  A Vietnamese force that maintains territorial border surveillance.
   PF - Popular Forces.  This force, recruited at local levels and kept in their home villages, is concerned with civil defense.
   RF - Regional Forces.  These troops maintain public order and security in rural areas.
   
The "bad guys" are:
   NVA - North Vietnamese Army.  Trained and well equipped soldiers, the NVA have taken over much of the fighting.
   NLF - The National Liberation Front is the political organization of the Communist forces.
   VC - Viet Cong.  This term, dating back to the French Indochina War, refers to the local guerrillas.
     
Vietnam Slang
   From the Vietnamese language the GI's have adopted "chop-chop" for food, the French word "beaucoup" for many, and "xin loi" for the phrase "sorry 'bout that."
   A snake is called "Mr. No-shoulders" and if a rumor going around Da Nang can be believed the term "Sabre Jet" is fitting for the Vietnam mosquito.
   
Army and Air Force pilots have their own lingo for the various aircraft employed in Vietnam.
   The A-1E Skyraider, a prop driven World War II fighter-bomber, is affectionately labeled "Spad."
   
The briefing room language of attack pilots that fly over the north include:
   SAM - surface to air missile used by North Vietnamese against American aircraft.
   Jinx - means to take evasive zig-zag action to avoid SAM's.
   Junk - what becomes of a million dollar war plane that zagged when it should have zigged.
   
Beginning the day a "turtle" arrives, and until he leaves Vietnam as a "short-timer," the most important term in a GI's vocabulary encompasses everything from his sweetheart to Mom's apple pie and a soft bed: The United States - reverently called "The World."


Primary Sources:
http://www.25thida.org/TLN/tln3-43.htm


Good Hunting.

MR

While there were obviously smaller battles lost by US forces I believe it is entirely accurate to say that the US military did not have an operation that they did not beat the Communist forces against them.

The communist forces never had much of a chance in the major operations that were fielded by US forces. With the tremendous firepower and support to them US forces were going to be able to punish any communist force that tried to stand and fight for any length of time. Every operation that I have read about or had participants recall ended in punishing losses for the communist forces involved.

Some of those defeats are historical in their size. During Tet of 1968 the Viet Cong was effectively destroyed as a fighting force. By the end of 1970 there were virtually no VC units left with any South Vietnamese recruits in them. Those that were in the field were filled with NVA regulars that were used as reinforcements to keep the VC units on the OOB and in the news.

The NVA Campaign to overrun the Khe Sahn base was a resounding victory considering the NVA intended on either overrunning the base or ambushing large forces sent to relieve the siege. Neither of those happened. Even though the CIDG camp at Lang Vei was overrun with the use of light tanks the NVA took a tremendous beating trying to do the same at Khe Sahn and the surrounding terrain.

On June 28, a Communist spokesman claimed the Americans had been forced to retreat and that Khe Sanh was the "gravest tactical and strategic defeat" for the U.S. in the war. It was the only time Americans abandoned a major combat base because of enemy pressure. So, here again, what is victory? The US/Free World countries were fighting a war of attrition. They thought they could break the North Vietnamese will to fight simply by making it too costly in human terms. The North Vietnamese were fighting a war of occupation. They wanted to occupy South Vietnam. Here is an example of how the two were at odds yet gave the same result. The USMC did eventually leave the Khe Sanh base, but did it on their own terms in their own time. They did inflict at least 5 times more casualties on the communists than they themselves suffered. So, no matter whose victory terms you choose to look at Khe Sahn was a victory for US forces.

From the opening of US offensive actions with Operation Starlight where the USMC defeated the Viet Cong's best regiment, to Operation Silver Bayonet where the US 1st Cav took on an NVA Division in the Ia Drang Valley through the way to the last operation for Fire Base Ripcord US forces caused tremendous casualties on communist forces.

Whether the operations were of US or VC/NVA origin US/Free World forces always won the operations. The communists learned the hard way and didn't launch major operations of their own often. And when major US/Free World Forces were involved their main tactic was to ambush the search units in the process of leaving the area. When they were found by the search tactics they were often destroyed as a combat effective unit. Often for months or a year afterwards.


Good Hunting.

MR

Australian Battalion Order of Battle


This is for the 6th Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR)

A Company
   1st Platoon
   2nd Platoon
   3rd Platoon

B Company
   4th Platoon
   5th Platoon
   6th Platoon

C Company
   7th Platoon
   8th Platoon
   9th Platoon

D Company
   10th Platoon
   11th Platoon
   12th Platoon


Primary Sources:
"Unheralded Victory: The Defeat of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army 1961-1973" by Mark W. Woodruff    page 24

Good Hunting.

MR

The definitions of what a battle and operation/campaign is has blurred as time goes on.


In times past a battle was two forces in a relatively small area fighting until one side quit fighting. For the most part by forces that a single commander could 'see'. The size of the forces could be anything from a few men per side to hundreds of thousands of men per side. It could take anywhere from a few minutes to days to fight it out.

For instance:

The Battle of Antietam was a single day fight in the American Civil War that produced the single most American casualties in the history of the United States. There were roughly 38,000 men involved and the battle created 3,654 killed and 17,292 wounded.
 
The Battle of Gettysburg was a three day fight in the American Civil War that had the most soldiers involved. There were 165,620 men engaged with 7,863 being killed and 27,224 wounded.

The Battle of Barbourville, Kentucky had about 1,100 soldiers involved and 20 total casualties.

 
Operations, or campaigns, the term is interchangeable, are different because they are often over a much larger area and take place over an extended period of time that the forces of both sides are not in constant combat with each other.

For instance:

The Maryland Campaign of 1862 was a series of movements by the Confederate forces to invade Union territory starting 3 September 1862 through 20 September 1862. It included three separate battles. The Battle of Harpers Ferry, The Battle of South Mountain and the Battle of Antietam.


The blurring of the two terms of battle and operation/campaign starts to develop around the time of World War I. The main reason for the blurring of the definition is an advance in communication technology. The greater the ability of a single man to control forces outside his own personal range of vision the wider the term battle was used to describe the outcome.

Now we have terms coming into use such as the Battle for Normandy, the Battle for Stalingrad, the Battle of Kursk or the Battle of the Bulge. Combat engagements which were spread over long distances and over long periods of time. By earlier definitions these would have been campaigns or operations.

Some such as the Battle for Moscow or Operation Typhoon are used interchangeably to describe the same event.

Now, the definitions are more goal oriented.

A battle has a short term tactical goal, usually within a few days duration. The destruction of a relatively small enemy force or the seizure of a specific local terrain location, or both being the determining factor.

An operation, or campaign, has a longer term duration. Which has the goal destroying large enemy forces or seizure of a large region of terrain.

A strategic operation, or campaign, takes that one step further with the goal of destroying the enemies ability to wage by destroying it's ability to field, supply or support it's nations armies in the field.

Good Hunting.

MR

Woman to Wed Slain French Soldier Posthumously

PARIS (AP) - The pregnant girlfriend of a French soldier killed in a dramatic gun rampage will wed her partner posthumously, a family lawyer said Saturday.

Paratrooper Abel Chennouf was shot dead earlier this month at a cash machine in southern France, one of a series of killings blamed on 24-year-old Islamist fanatic Mohamed Merah.

Lawyer Gilbert Collard said that Chennouf's pregnant girlfriend, 21-year-old Caroline Monet, is applying for permission to get married to her late partner at an official ceremony in a few weeks' time.

Such ceremonies are unusual but not unheard of in France, where the law allow posthumous marriages in cases where a fiance dies before the wedding. The law states that such weddings can only be approved by the French president "in grave circumstances."

"I've already had it done twice, for policemen's girlfriends," Collard said in a telephone interview. "It's a really moving ceremony, with an empty chair representing the dead spouse."

Collard said the official request was being sent out Saturday, but that he'd already received the nod from the French president's office.

"There won't be any problems," Collard said, adding that he hopes the ceremony will "let the child have a father."



Primary Sources:
http://m.apnews.com/ap/db_268743/contentdetail.htm?contentguid=dGwyXcmw

Good Hunting.

MR