Capturing or killing Osama bin Laden is key to defeating al-Qaida.

Bin Laden capture or death is key to defeating al-Qaida, US general says

Stanley McChrystal, US army commander in Afghanistan, tells Congress terror group's leader is 'iconic figure'

Capturing or killing Osama bin Laden is key to defeating al-Qaida, the US army commander in Afghanistan said yesterday.

Testifying before the US Congress, General Stanley McChrystal said Bin Laden was an "iconic figure" whose survival emboldened al-Qaida as a franchising organisation across the world.

"It would not defeat al-Qaida to have him captured or killed, but I don't think that we can finally defeat al-Qaida until he is captured or killed," he said.

However, the military commander warned that he could not promise his new military strategy would lead to Bin Laden's capture because, when the al-Qaida leader moved out of Afghanistan, trying to track him down was "outside my mandate".

McChrystal and his diplomatic counterpart, the US ambassador Karl Eikenberry, presented a united front to Congress after a highly publicised rift over the value of sending 30,000 extra troops to Afghanistan to combat the Taliban.

The two sat uneasily side by side to give hours of testimony to the armed services committee, providing more detail about how the US planned to stabilise Afghanistan and begin to bring the first troops home in July 2011.

McChrystal acknowledged that the mission would to be difficult, saying: "Results may come more quickly, but the sober fact is that there are no silver bullets.

"Ultimate success will be the cumulative effect of sustained pressure."

The Taliban would avoid mass attacks, knowing their vulnerability to US firepower, he said.

Instead, he predicted insurgents would use suicide attacks, hidden roadside bombs, and coercion of the local population where there were no security forces at night.

Eikenberry expressed full support for McChrystal and the extra troops, saying: "I am unequivocally in support of this mission ... I am exactly aligned with Gen McChrystal in moving forward now to vigorously implement the assigned mission."

His statement appeared to be a reversal of scepticism expressed when McChrystal – appointed by Barack Obama to command all US and allied forces in Afghanistan – asked for extra troops in September.

Eikenberry, a retired general appointed as ambassador by Obama, opposed the deployment as worthless unless the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, first tackled corruption, according to two leaked memos.

The divide had underlined the dilemma facing Obama as he struggled to come up with a strategy for Afghanistan: whether it was worth sending more US troops to prop up a corrupt government.

At the start of his evidence, Eikenberry sought to stress that previous disagreements with McChrystal were behind him.

"I am honoured to testify alongside Gen Stan McChrystal, my professional colleague and friend of many years," he said.

Questioned by members of Congress about their earlier differences, he denied he had been opposed to reinforcements.

"It was a question of the number of troops ... the timelines ... the context that those troops would operate in," he explained.

The White House debate over the future of Afghanistan was prompted by McChrystal's September assessment of the situation. The general revealed he was set to provide a further assessment this month.

He described the next 18 months as the most critical in the conflict, and said the mission was "achievable".

Admitting that history was full of failed counter-insurgency strategies, he said what made Afghanistan different was that the Taliban had been in power, was not seen as credible then and was not viewed now as a national liberation movement.

Another plus, he said, was that the US was not viewed by the population in the way the Soviets had been.

"Afghans do not regard us as occupiers," he told Congress, but listed serious problems including the Afghan government's corruption, its "credibility deficit" and the need for Pakistan to tackle extremists operating from its side of the border.

McChrystal revealed that the July 2011 date to start withdrawal had not come from him. He said he was concerned the Taliban would seize on the date "inappropriately" to suggest the US was preparing to desert the Afghans, but said he could deal with that.

....I'm confused!